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PURPOSE OF THE REVIEW

Fifteen years after the introduction of the universal basic education (UBE) reforms, access to, and the quality of, basic education remain significant concerns in Nigeria. Despite this concern, there has been no systematic review of the UBE reforms, which set out to provide nine years of free and compulsory education to all Nigerian children.

This review seeks to lay the groundwork for a detailed, systematic review of Nigeria's UBE reforms by taking stock of what we know about the implementation and outcome of these reforms, and looking at them from a comparative international perspective. We identify a set of useful ideas that could feed into the preparation of advice for the Nigerian government in the wake of the 2015 elections, as well as for the UK’s Department for International Development in Nigeria (DFID Nigeria) as it enters a new programming cycle. Within this framework, the review has two broad goals:

1. To take stock of the evidence base on education reforms in Nigeria, focusing on the UBE reforms; and

2. To compare Nigeria's experience with basic education reforms to the experience of four other countries that are similar to Nigeria in several important ways – being large, low to middle-income countries in which sub-national levels of government have substantial responsibility for education policy and delivery – in order to identify useful ideas and lessons for the Nigerian government.

METHODOLOGY: Comparator Countries

In order to draw lessons for Nigeria we analyse recent experiences of reform in South Africa, Brazil, India and Indonesia. All four are large, low/middle-income countries in which sub-national governments play a major role in the education sector. Like Nigeria, all four are major emerging markets that face the challenge of ensuring that their education systems are able to generate the skills required to sustain growth.

For each of the comparator countries, the review looks at reform episodes that, like the UBE reforms, have occurred over the last 25 years, have been undertaken at the federal level, and have
encompassed changes to multiple aspects of education policy and delivery. Within the context of these reform episodes, the case studies focus on those elements of the reforms that were considered to be most relevant to Nigeria.

To analyse each reform episode, we apply an adaptation of the World Development Report 2004 (WDR04) accountability framework that has been tailored to the education sector. The WDR04 accountability framework is built around three sets of actors within the service delivery chain (for our purposes, the provision of education) and is presented as a three-cornered relationship that includes citizens, politicians, and service providers. The adapted version focuses in more detail on the ministry of education in each country, sub-national bodies, and the specific content of accountability relationships. We answer two questions for each country:

1. How have education reforms been conceived, introduced and implemented? What has worked well and what has not?
2. What implications does this experience have for basic education reforms in Nigeria?

SIX KEY LESSONS FOR EDUCATION REFORMERS IN NIGERIA

Since 1999 Nigeria has made some progress in improving basic education outcomes. However, large numbers of children remain out of school, particularly in the north, and the quality of student learning and teaching is a major concern everywhere.

Nigeria's education system suffers from weak monitoring systems, fiscal stress, basic governance challenges, overlapping responsibilities across government departments, and flaws in teacher management. Information and data are strikingly poor. Improvements are hampered by rapid turnover of senior staff and the absence of strategies for system-wide improvement, despite strong programme goals.
Continuity of leadership and the empowerment of reform champions were keys to successful reforms in Brazil and Indonesia. Once this stability is established, education reformers should choose carefully between legislative solutions and decrees.

These are essential for system improvement and accountability. Brazil's experience illustrates how data systems can be used to improve the management of an education system. Well communicated, citizen-led learning assessments are worth exploring for their role in boosting accountability and voice, as has taken place in India. School report cards must put student results in a context that parents can comprehend and that helps them differentiate between the likely effects of student background and those that are attributable to the school.

A stable overall policy-making environment is crucial.

We have identified six key lessons for Nigerian reformers from Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa:

1. Make sure you have quality educational data, assessment systems, and school report cards
   
   These are essential for system improvement and accountability. Brazil's experience illustrates how data systems can be used to improve the management of an education system. Well communicated, citizen-led learning assessments are worth exploring for their role in boosting accountability and voice, as has taken place in India. School report cards must put student results in a context that parents can comprehend and that helps them differentiate between the likely effects of student background and those that are attributable to the school.

2. Take on the difficult and controversial issues of teacher accountability.
   
   This is possible, for instance, by linking pay to performance or qualifications, or hiring contract teachers. However, it tends to run into resistance at both the design and implementation phases (as in Indonesia and India). Education reformers in Nigeria should remain vigilant regarding the substance of such reforms until enabling legislation is passed, and at least until the initial implementation phases are complete. The legislation relating to both a national education law and to the teaching profession should be closely tied together.

3. Teachers need to be on board with critical re-training processes.
   
   When advocating new pedagogies, a basic prerequisite is to ensure that teacher trainers themselves are practising these approaches. Teacher training needs to be based on the recognition that imparting new pedagogies is not a purely technical process. Trainers need to look out for resistance amongst teachers or a merely superficial adoption of new approaches, and find ways to address this. The content of in-service training should be based on needs assessment and mechanisms should be put in place to check whether teachers are actually benefiting from training (see the case of India).
This may involve giving citizens some control over renewing teachers’ contracts, or letting parents choose which school they send their child to.

*School-based management (SBM) and site-based decision-making can improve accountability,* but they are unlikely to do so if school councils and other local decision-making units do not also include real participation by a wide range of stakeholders. In turn, such participation often hinges on stakeholders feeling that they have meaningful input into key decisions about some portion of the school budget (e.g. through school grants) or oversight of teachers. School report cards dovetail with SBM efforts because they provide stakeholders with the information they need to make sound decisions.

*Giving service users control over teachers’ contracts can lead to improved learning outcomes.* Contracts for teachers tend to have a greater impact on performance when contracts are reviewed every year, rather than less frequently. However, without a well-functioning school supervision system, decisions on contract renewal are likely to be based on fairly superficial information, which restricts the impact of such decisions.

*Increased client power can improve learning outcomes.*

*Real decentralisation is powerful but requires strong financial and outcome monitoring systems.* This is important to track fund usage and educational achievement and learning. Lessons on this emerge from all four comparator case studies. Decentralisation reforms should not be driven by a search for cost savings. Some staff turnover at sub-national levels of government may well be necessary to bring in staff who are able to make informed decisions about funding and teacher management. Systems need to be devised to hold each tier of government to account for its decisions. The structuring of inter-governmental fiscal transfers has clear implications for how incentives inherent in the transfers can foster accountability, but such transfers are only as good as the data used to operationalise them – quality data and information is key.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASER</td>
<td>Annual Status of Education (ASER) (India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOS</td>
<td>Indonesian School Operational Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCT</td>
<td>Conditional cash transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIFD</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISE</td>
<td>District Information System for Education (India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPEP</td>
<td>District Primary Education Programme (India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDOREN</td>
<td>Education Data, Operational Research and Evaluation in Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMIS</td>
<td>Education management information system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETF</td>
<td>Education Trust Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHC</td>
<td>Fernando Henrique Cardoso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNDEF</td>
<td>Fund for Maintenance and Development of Primary Education and the Valuing of Teaching (Brazil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNDEB</td>
<td>Fund for Maintenance and Development of Basic Education and Valorisation of Education Professionals (Brazil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEB</td>
<td>Index of the Development of Basic Education (Brazil)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local government area</td>
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<tr>
<td>NALABE</td>
<td>National Learning Achievement in Basic Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAS</td>
<td>National Achievement Survey (India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCERT</td>
<td><em>National Council of Educational Research and Training</em> (India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD-INES</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development–Indicators of Education Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDE</td>
<td>Education Development Plan (Brazil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Parent–teacher association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QMT</td>
<td>Quality monitoring tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SABER</td>
<td>Systems Approach for Better Education Results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBM</td>
<td>School-based management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBMC</td>
<td>School-based Management Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGB</td>
<td>School Governing Boards (SGBs) (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td><em>Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan</em> (‘Education for All’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBE</td>
<td>Universal basic education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBEC</td>
<td>Universal Basic Education Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPE</td>
<td>Universal primary education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEC</td>
<td>Village Education Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>WDR04</td>
<td>World Development Report 2004 (WDR04)</td>
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</table>
In 1999 the Nigerian government embarked on a process of education reforms that centred on a commitment to provide nine years of free and compulsory education to all Nigerian children. Fifteen years on, a systematic review of the UBE reforms has yet to be carried out. Against this backdrop, this report presents the findings of a comparative review of basic education reforms in Nigeria and four other countries, carried out by Education Data, Operational Research and Evaluation in Nigeria (EDOREN), in partnership with the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC). The review seeks to lay the groundwork for a detailed, systematic review of Nigeria's UBE reforms by taking stock of what we know about the implementation and outcome of these reforms, and looking at them from a comparative international perspective.

In line with this, the review serves two broad objectives. First it takes stock of the evidence base on education reforms in Nigeria, focusing on the UBE reforms. The Nigeria case study (see Part 2 of this report, in a separate document) briefly charts the history of basic education reforms in the country, reviewing past reform efforts and their outcomes. It then analyses Nigeria's experience with the UBE reforms, assessing available evidence on the parameters of the reforms, their content, the quality of implementation, and their impact on educational outcomes. The analysis presented here is far from complete, largely owing to gaps in the evidence base on UBE. A key contribution of the Nigeria case is, therefore, to highlight what we do and do not know about the UBE reforms, and the reasons why the main evidence gaps are worth filling. This will inform EDOREN's research programme on UBE in 2015.

The second, and the central, objective of the review is to compare Nigeria's experience with basic education reforms to that of four other countries that are similar to Nigeria in several important ways – being large, low to middle-income countries in which sub-national levels of government have substantial responsibility for education policy and delivery – in order to identify useful ideas and lessons for the Nigerian government. The case studies, which are presented in the second part of this report, provide an analysis of recent reform experiences in South Africa, Brazil, India and Indonesia: they review how these countries have sought to pursue their education goals, the challenges
that they have faced, the impact of their reform efforts, and some implications for Nigeria. The analysis in the case studies was informed by an accountability framework that is tailored to the education sector, which is outlined in Section 2. The synthesis of findings presented in Section 3 brings these cases studies together to systematically discuss the key lessons that they point to for education policy and delivery in Nigeria.

The overarching objective of the review is to identify a set of useful ideas that can feed into the preparation of advice for the Nigerian government in the wake of the 2015 elections, as well as for DFID Nigeria as it enters a new programming cycle. One element of the review is to identify further steps that need to be taken to fully understand the implementation and impact of the UBE reforms (an important prerequisite for designing the next generation of reforms). More generally, the review seeks to contribute to one of EDOREN’s primary objectives, which is to generate new evidence regarding, and understanding of, how best to support equitable access and improved learning outcomes for all Nigerian children through innovation and sustainable education systems development.

Given the review’s focus on reforms at the federal level, the primary audience for these findings consists of UBEC and the Federal Ministry of Education. However, a number of the findings are also expected to be of interest to the State Universal Basic Education Boards and state ministries of education, given their substantial role in the design and delivery of basic education, and DFID and other development partners’ programmes. Finally, the review is likely to have broader relevance for those interested in the design and implementation of education reforms in large, developing, federal economies, the key measures that have proved to be effective in these contexts, and the typical impediments to meaningful reform.

1.2 SCOPE OF THE REVIEW

1.2.1 The Comparator Countries

Based on the criteria mentioned above, the Terms of Reference for the review identified South Africa, Brazil, India and Indonesia as potential comparator countries. All four are large, low/middle-income countries in which sub-national tiers of government play a major role in the
education sector. All four are also similar to Nigeria in that they are major emerging markets that are facing the challenge of ensuring that their education systems are able to generate the skills required to sustain growth. The choice of comparators was reviewed and finalised by EDOREN and UBEC during the review’s inception phase. Some key aspects of these countries' education systems and reform experiences that make them interesting subjects for the review are outlined in Table 1.

### Table 1: Selected Reasons Why the Comparator Countries Offer Interesting Case Studies for Review

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Reason</th>
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| South Africa | - The South African government has introduced far-reaching reforms in the post-apartheid era that have fundamentally reshaped the education system.  
               - Under these reforms, schools have been given a relatively high degree of autonomy.  
               - South Africa's formula-based system for funding schools, which seeks to address inequalities within and between provinces, offers an interesting model for education financing. |
| Brazil    | - State and municipal governments in Brazil have a high degree of control over education policy. At the same time, the federal government plays an important role in proposing different types of policies and programmes to guide the states and municipalities in their decisions and allocation of resources.  
               - Brazil has experimented with various changes to education financing, marked by the creation of FUNDEF (Fund for Maintenance and Development of Primary Education and the Valuing of Teaching) in 1998. Key features of FUNDEF include the requirement that resources be allocated to states and municipalities in direct proportion to the number of students enrolled in their school systems; the requirement that 60% of resources received through the fund be spent on teachers’ wages; and the stipulation of a minimum amount be spent per pupil. In 2007 the fund was modified and expanded to cover other types of schools.  
               - Over the last two decades, Brazil has reorganised its education statistics and has started implementing a large-scale system of education assessment. The creation of the Index of the Development of Basic Education (IDEB), an indicator of the quality of education that combines information from national assessments, with repetition rates, has allowed schools to monitor their performance and has boosted accountability in Brazil’s school system. |
### TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>REASON</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| **India** | • India has tried to decentralise aspects of education delivery, right down to the village level, and to boost accountability through community mobilisation. These measures have not worked entirely as intended, and could offer a window through which to explore some of the typical stumbling blocks of such reforms.  
• The use of contract teachers (a key theme in the literature on accountability in education) has grown sharply following its endorsement by the central government, offering some insights into the pros and cons of this approach, and the supportive measures required to boost its efficacy.  
• Various changes have been introduced to the teacher training system, in an attempt to support a shift from rote-based learning to child-centred interactive learning – a challenge that Nigeria also faces. India has made considerable progress in setting up a nationwide education management information system (EMIS), with data published at the national, state, district and school levels. |
| **Indonesia** | • Indonesia is home to a large education system serving a young population, with regional governments increasingly given control over its management.  
• The country's recent decentralisation of education delivery, including the introduction of school grants and establishment of school committees, appears to have been well received and to have improved access to education, particularly in rural areas, though there are ongoing implementation challenges that could be used to draw lessons.  
• Large-scale reforms have been introduced to target the unequal distribution of teachers, a challenge that Nigeria also faces. Efforts have been made to improve teacher accountability and link salary increases to qualifications, but with mixed results. |

### 1.2.2 CHOICE OF REFORM EPISODES

For each of the comparator countries the review looks at reform episodes that, like Nigeria's UBE reforms, have occurred over the last 25 years, have been undertaken at the federal level, and that have encompassed changes to multiple aspects of education policy and delivery. Within the context of these reform episodes, the case studies focus on particular elements of the reform episodes that were considered to be most relevant to Nigeria. For example, the India case (among other items) looks at efforts to involve local communities in the management of schools, which bear some resemblance to the creation of School-Based Management Committees (SBMCs) in Nigeria. The South Africa and Brazil cases provide assessments of approaches to education financing, looking at different funding
formulae and the division of responsibilities across different tiers of government. These offer useful comparisons to Nigeria’s model of disbursing funds to the states through UBEC, based on a system of matching grants. The Indonesia case looks at the efficacy of different approaches to redressing the unequal distribution of teachers (marked specifically by shortages in rural areas), a challenge that Nigeria also faces. Table 2 outlines the reform episodes and key reform components that were focused on for each of the comparators.¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Reform episodes</th>
<th>Elements of reform that have been focused on</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Post-apartheid education reforms</td>
<td>• Various aspects of education financing, including the equitable share formula and fee exemptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The role of school governing bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1. District Primary Education Programme (DPEP)</td>
<td>• Community involvement in school management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA: ‘Education for All’)</td>
<td>• District-level planning</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• In-service teacher training</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The use of contract teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The EMIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Post-Suharto reformasi (reformation)</td>
<td>• School-based management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Teacher allowances, teacher certification and teacher distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Islamic schooling system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1. Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s (FHC’s) reforms</td>
<td>• School financing: FUNDEF and FUNDEB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva’s reforms</td>
<td>• Division of responsibilities across different tiers of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Student assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The curriculum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ The Nigeria case is not included in the table as it provides a comprehensive review of the UBE reforms.
1.2.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The review seeks to answer two broad research questions:

1. In each of the five focus countries, how have education reforms been conceived, introduced and implemented? What has worked well and what has not?

2. What implications does this comparative experience have for basic education reforms in Nigeria?

The first question is broken down further into five sets of questions related to the parameters of the reforms in each country, their main elements, their results, the extent to which they were adapted in response to evidence, and their implications for Nigeria. With regard to the results of the reforms, the case studies document the findings of any rigorous evaluations and changes in educational outcomes over the course of the reform. However, more importantly, the case studies pay considerable attention to the manner in which the reforms worked their way through the education systems in these countries. This involved looking at the quality of implementation, political economy factors, and the reforms' impact on key accountability relationships. The conceptual framework described in Section 2 below (while not extensively referred to in the case studies) played a key role in helping to structure the study team’s thinking around these issues.

The second research question is addressed briefly by each of the case studies, but is covered most extensively and systematically by the synthesis of findings (Section 3). This draws on the case studies' findings to identify the main factors that appear to have influenced the degree of success of attempts to implement education reforms in the comparator countries; the manner in which improvements in particular areas (like teacher accountability or pedagogy) were achieved and consolidated; and the implications that these experiences have for Nigeria as it reviews its approach to delivering UBE. The full set of research questions is outlined in the Terms of Reference in Annex A.
2. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This section describes the conceptual framework that informed the analysis of the reforms in the country case studies, and which underpins the synthesis of findings presented in Section 3. Holding service providers accountable for delivering expected results is key to successful education outcomes, and is most effective when providers simultaneously face pressure to provide high quality services, and receive the support they need to deliver this. The WDR04 accountability framework is built around three sets of actors within the service delivery chain (for our purposes, the provision of education) and is presented as a three-cornered relationship that includes citizens, politicians, and service providers (see Figure 1). The traditional framework of service provision is referred to as the 'long route of accountability': citizens elect their political representatives, who appoint or influence policy-makers, who in turn form policies that take into account the needs and preferences of citizens.

We have tailored the WDR04 framework to the education sector in order to explore how reforms in each country have affected key accountability relationships. Figure 2 presents a version of the WDR04 accountability framework that is tailored to both the complexities of the education sector and the most common reform contexts and priorities in a range of countries (Gershberg et al., 2012).
Figure 2 expands the WDR04 accountability framework in three key ways:

1. It separates out the education ministry in order to capture its relationship with the central government;

2. It highlights the important roles of either sub-national governments or other sub-national management entities (or both); and

3. It specifies the potential content and components upon which the accountability relationships are built, represented by the 14 arrows.

The 14 arrows represent potential flows of information, power and decision-making. The plain text next to an arrow indicates items that many governments manage to collect or show or monitor successfully, while the text in bold indicates items that are much harder and less often achieved. For example, arrow 1 indicates that central governments are usually good at setting mandates and goals for the ministry, but less effective at clarifying performance expectations; arrows 8 and 3 indicate that basic school data generally flow up from the schools to the ministry, but information about school performance against set goals is more elusive.

This conceptualisation allows a policy analyst to develop a detailed snapshot that focuses on a few key aspects of an education reform, both in design and as it is implemented; and then to work towards understanding the primary challenges and accomplishments, in order to improve accountability without losing the focus on the institutional and political detail required for policy analysis.

It is worth noting that this framework is based on a very broad notion of accountability that allows for a mapping of a diverse set of reforms. In particular, it recognises that accountability is a two-way process: service providers are accountable to politicians to deliver certain learning outcomes, but equally politicians and policymakers need to ensure that service providers receive the inputs needed to deliver these outcomes.
For the case studies, the research team's primary focus was to answer the questions in the Terms of Reference, rather than to directly provide a detailed assessment of accountability dynamics. However, the framework played a vital role in structuring the team's approach to analysing each country's reform experiences, and in helping the team differentiate between superficial 'reforms' and those that actually changed the way each country's education system works. With respect to the latter, each case contains an appendix that summarises the reforms' impact on the 14 accountability relationships in the framework (even if, as is often the case, there are in fact no developments to report). This has supported the synthesis of findings by helping to build a comparative picture of the reforms across the different countries.
This section summarises the most relevant components of education reform in the country case studies. It synthesises the most salient issues – accomplishments and pitfalls – of the reforms and suggests guideposts for the Nigerian educational reform agenda. We also use the Nigerian case study to establish the reform context. The Nigeria case study focuses on two main education reforms: Universal primary education (UPE), and the ongoing UBE programme. In addition to verifying the key challenges identified in the inception report, the case study is useful in providing depth and focus in regard to these challenges, particularly as they relate to accountability and governance. For instance, one of the main legacies of the UPE scheme was the increased centralisation of educational administration – the Federal Government took on the bulk of the responsibility for establishing policy and standards, as well as education financing. The government also took over the administration of schools previously run by voluntary agencies (particularly churches).

The historical perspective reveals that there has been a lack of grassroots mobilisation, weak monitoring systems and significant corruption. It shows, too, that during previous decentralisation efforts, state and local governments were unable to fulfil their fiscal responsibilities, and immediately introduced fees and levies at all levels of education. Teacher strikes were also common in many states, due to lack of payment of salaries, suggesting both fiscal stress and basic governance challenges. These challenges are endemic in Nigeria’s education management framework, which imposes responsibilities on various tiers of government in a manner that does not reflect their financial and human resources capability. The state and local governments ‘routinely refuse to implement national policies until they receive money from the federal government, either from grants-in-aid or through the revenue allocation system’ (LeVan, 2008: 6).

Another striking feature of the Nigerian educational system is how poor the available information and data are, and how difficult it has been to improve them over the past several decades. This is true regarding all aspects of data and information, from EMIS-type school census data and basic administrative data, to assessments of learning and student outcomes. In many ways, governments at all levels in Nigeria are ‘flying blind’. We thus pay attention to how other countries...
have improved in this area during periods of significant educational reform and how, in some cases, the reforms have even driven the improvement of data, information, and assessment systems.

Regarding SBMCs, Nigeria has established these officially but they have little real power and in some cases are non-functional. The World Bank’s Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) project³ has identified five core policy goals that are important in assessing school-based management policies¹ and it is clear they are all lacking in the Nigerian case:

1. School autonomy in the planning and management of the school budget
2. School autonomy in personnel management
3. The role of the school council in school governance
4. School and student assessments
5. Accountability to stakeholders

We thus examine the successes and failures of similar SBM efforts across our case studies.

One crippling tendency that is apparent in reform efforts in Nigeria is the nearly constant turnover of key government staff—for instance, 19 ministers of education in one 23-year period. As we shall see in looking at the case of Brazil and Indonesia, continuity is a key component to successful reform efforts, especially regarding accountability, decentralisation, and governance—for instance, Fernando Henrique Cardoso had only one minister of education from 1995 to 2003. Another minister remained in post from 2005 to 2011.⁴ The lack of continuity of key government staff in Nigeria is particularly problematic given delays in introducing key enabling legislation. While there are countries that have successfully put the reform cart before the legislative/legal horse, so to speak (e.g. Nicaragua), this required savvy use of ministerial decrees and stability among reform champions that has not been possible in the Nigerian context. And our Indonesia case study provides another example of the riskiness of over-reliance on ministerial decrees.

In fact, our Nigerian case study reveals that the government’s plans and programmes have clear goals, but do not contain clear strategies for system-wide improvement. Thus, it is not surprising that in the

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⁴ While such continuity should not come at the expense of underperforming ministers being retained in their posts, this can be avoided through the careful selection of ministers who have the capability and commitment to champion reform. Furthermore, while underperformance might lead to some turnover, underperformance alone fails to explain the extremely high degree of turnover seen in Nigeria, which does not seem to have been related to a quest for greater efficiency.
application of the accountability framework more than half of the fourteen key relationships experienced no change or very little change over the entire reform period studied; and the remaining key relationships experienced only weak changes. In particular, while there has been some effort to improve the EMIS system, this effort has clearly been insufficient to promote accountability. Some similar issues are identified in India, where lofty goals were stated but strategic thinking was less prominent. Even when potentially strategic goals, such as increasing community participation were articulated, the form of the intended participation seemed vague and the theory of change obtuse.

3.1 GUIDEPOSTS FROM CASE STUDIES

Against this backdrop, we can glean insights from our four country case studies for near- and medium-term reform efforts in Nigeria. Indonesia, in particular, offers the case of a large country with many isolated sub-national jurisdictions, and many similar challenges, that underwent a significant reform effort with considerable accomplishments and instructive pitfalls. Brazil, too, offers significant insights, and while it is a country at a more 'advanced' stage of economic development than Nigeria, 40 years ago it was very poor, with dismal educational outcomes; thus, the Brazilian case may provide some long-term goals, and strategies for reaching them. India’s experience has proven to be quite problematic, although it does offer lessons about EMIS and community-based learning assessments, as well as insights about what not to do. Finally, South Africa turns out to have underlying conditions (in terms of specific demographics and power dynamics) that make us more hesitant as regards drawing direct lessons for Nigeria; however, even there we can see helpful lessons, especially regarding the goal of equity, funding formulae, and the use of intergovernmental fiscal relations.

3.1.1 EDUCATIONAL REFORM PROCESSES AND FOSTERING ACCOUNTABILITY

Reform Processes And Sequencing
Indonesia’s decentralisation reforms have often been dubbed ‘big bang’ reforms, owing to their scale and speed. They began with a strong legal foundation, via a national education law (2003). Even though Indonesia’s reforms were ‘big bang’, changes were

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5 The application of the accountability framework is discussed in the Nigeria case study, and is also referred to in more detail in the final sub-section of this synthesis of findings.
introduced in stages. The list of the components of the reforms, while by no means offering a road map, includes many of the key areas for strategic reform:

- Minimum service standards in education;
- The provision of direct school grants;
- Substantial teacher allowances;
- The distribution of electronic textbooks to schools;
- The introduction and dismantling of ‘international-standard’ public schools with English as the language of instruction; and
- Three curricular reforms in a ten-year period.

On the other hand, as is often the case, Indonesia enacted a separate law in order to govern changes to the teaching profession (2005). While the intent to improve accountability was present, in the end politics led to teachers getting what amounted to a near doubling of their salaries with few improvements in their credentials, qualifications or performance. Our case studies, along with other previous country experiences, suggest that reforms that are otherwise significant, but which do not improve accountability in the teaching profession, tend not to improve accountability overall. Chile is among the most well-known and oft-studied examples of this kind. We see similar outcomes in our Indonesia and India case studies. In addition, the case of Indonesia shows us that even if such improvements in teacher accountability are prominent in the plans and rhetoric of the reform, there is a strong tendency for them to fall by the wayside deep in the legislative and negotiation processes, as teachers’ unions and related interest groups gain an upper hand when the central government must garner enough votes for final passage of key legislation. In fact, it is not uncommon to see controversial accountability components of reforms dropped well into project design and negotiation. The lesson for Nigeria is, thus, to take on the difficult and controversial issues of teacher accountability and remain vigilant regarding their overall substance until the enabling legislation is passed and at least until the initial implementation phases are complete. Education reformers in Nigeria should try to ensure that legislation in respect of both a national education law and the teaching profession are closely tied together.

As per its initial design, the Indonesian teacher certification programme was intended to create incentives for teachers to improve
their skills and performance by providing allowances to teachers who met certain related criteria. Competency assessments were initially to take the form of subject knowledge tests and external classroom observation. However, this was scrapped, ostensibly due to the costs and perceived difficulties in implementation, as well as push-back from teachers’ associations (Jalal et al, 2009; Chang et al, 2014). Instead, a system was introduced whereby assessments are made on the basis of portfolios submitted by teachers. These contain certificates of training programs or workshops that teachers have attended, references, model lesson plans and other documents. Portfolios are graded according to a point system, and teachers whose portfolios receive a set minimum grade are certified. Those who do not receive the minimum grade are required to participate in a 90-hour training program and pass a test on its contents. Approximately half of all teachers who submit a portfolio pass the certification process, but almost all who undertake the training program pass the associated test (Chang et al, 2014). This has led to the widespread view amongst teachers that anyone who embarks on the certification process will ultimately become certified (Hastuti et al, 2009). The initial rationale of creating an allowance system that promotes teachers' skills and knowledge appears to have been replaced by a drive to raise teachers' salaries while avoiding pressure to award similar increases to other public sector employees (Chang et al, 2014). It is unsurprising then that impact evaluations suggest that the certification programme has not had a significant impact on pupils' learning outcomes.

3.1.2. DECENTRALIZATION DOES NOT OFTEN SAVE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT MONEY

In part because of the failed negotiations regarding linking salary increases to accreditation and teacher quality and performance, the case of Indonesia shows us that decentralisation and related education reforms can be expensive, on the one hand, and that they may not necessarily decrease the central share of financing, on the other (See Figure 3).⁶

Between 1995 and 2005 overall education spending in Brazil increased by 42% in real terms, equivalent to 3.5% a year, due in large part to minimum expenditure standards for sub-national governments focused on improving equity. These costs were, thus, a direct result of decentralisation efforts.
The content of the constitutional amendment in Brazil that established the Fund for Primary Education Administration and Development and for the Enhancement of Teacher Status (FUNDEF) was very controversial and unpopular. This is because the modified funding formula often resulted in financial losses for some of the richest states and municipalities. The federal government employed a crafty political strategy that took advantage of municipal and state election campaigns during which mayors and governors were loath to publicly denounce the policy. Nevertheless, such cost increases and redistributive funding mechanisms must be carefully considered and implemented. And, clearly, such decentralisation reforms should not be driven by a search for cost savings.

3.1.3. FUNCTIONAL ASSIGNMENTS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND DECENTRALISED PLANNING

The case of Indonesia also shows that so-called decentralisation reforms are very complex processes that involve decentralising some aspects of the educational governance system, while maintaining and in some cases strengthening centralised control over others—and that in the end what one is really interested in are changes in the locus of decision-making that improve performance accountability. For example, while schools have greater autonomy in selecting textbooks and determining teaching methods, course content and instructional times allocated to them are still the purview of the central government. In Indonesia, while staff hiring and career progression have become the responsibility of district governments, salary scales are still determined by the central government. While many resource allocation decisions have been devolved to district governments and schools themselves, funds for teachers' salaries are still determined centrally.
Table 3: Locus and mode of key decisions in lower secondary education, Indonesia 1998 and 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision Area</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instructional matters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruction time</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designing programmes of study</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defining course content</td>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choosing textbooks</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching methods</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode of grouping students</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support activities for students</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation/closure of schools</td>
<td>Province</td>
<td>District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation/abolition of grades</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting qualifying exams</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credentialing</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods for assessing students' regular work</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiring teachers</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiring principals</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixing teacher salaries</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixing principal salaries</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers' careers</td>
<td>School (de facto)⁷</td>
<td>District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals' careers</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation to school for teaching staff</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation to school for non-salary current expenditure</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation to school for capital expenditure</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use in school for capital expenditure</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>School</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (1) Text in italics indicates that decisions by the government unit are made in consultation or within a set framework, otherwise the unit has full autonomy to make decisions; (2) 1998 data are from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development–Indicators of Education Systems (OECD-INES) study while 2003 data are from World Bank survey.

⁷ The category of decisions regarding principals' and teachers' careers includes evaluation methods, supervision and training/professional development. Prior to 2003 there was no policy to govern these, so they were effectively left to schools. In most schools, however, few such activities took place. The 2003 law gave district governments the responsibility for them.
Similarly, the distribution of functional assignments across different levels of government is quite mixed in Brazil; however, it will be instructive for Nigeria to consider how much genuine decision-making and service provision has been devolved:

Table 4: Responsibilities of government levels in some educational dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teacher compensation</td>
<td>National teacher minimum wage negotiated by state and municipal governments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher recruitment</td>
<td>State and municipal governments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal recruitment</td>
<td>State and municipal governments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional school finance</td>
<td>The Constitution establishes that the federal government is required to spend at least 18% of its budget on education. States and municipalities are required to spend 25% of their budgets on education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local school finance</td>
<td>This is regulated by the Constitution and by FUNDEF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation of budget</td>
<td>Schools have limited authority to define the allocation of their budgets. However, there are some programmes (at the federal, state or municipal level) to increase school autonomy in the allocation of resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School construction</td>
<td>State and municipal governments and some federal funding, mainly for poor regions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Indian experience with intergovernmental relations is also relevant to Nigeria. Nigeria's size and diversity, like India's, also makes it a strong candidate for decentralised decision-making. In theory, this has taken place already in Nigeria, with local government authorities (LGAs) holding primary responsibility for the delivery of basic education. However, there are questions about whether this has involved genuine devolution of responsibility or mere deconcentration, as is the case in India. If the latter, there are few grounds for expecting improvements in education outcomes. The Indian experience also points to the need for staffing decisions to be aligned with the new responsibilities that decentralisation confers. Some staff turnover at the sub-national levels may well be necessary to bring in staff who are able to make informed decisions about funding and teacher management. However, this may be tricky if existing staff are on permanent contracts and the required skills are in short supply locally. Finally, decentralisation needs to come with strong financial and outcome monitoring systems to track fund usage and educational achievement and learning, and systems need to be devised to hold local authorities to account for their decisions.
3.1.4 EDUCATIONAL FINANCE, FUNDING FORMULAE, AND FISCAL FEDERALISM

The design of intergovernmental fiscal transfers, funding formulae and the assignment of fiscal responsibility is obviously crucial, and the devil is in the detail. In Nigeria allocations from the Federation Account are distributed equally across states but these are topped up as a result of allowance for factors such as differences in population and land area, and the contribution of the state to oil revenues. It is difficult to draw very specific lessons from the experiences in our case study countries; rather, in this section we provide some descriptive detail regarding the design of such intergovernmental fiscal relations in the case study countries, as a kind of menu of options to consider.

Regarding equity and finance, South Africa's intergovernmental finance formulae provide transparent and relatively objective attempts to target poor populations. The 1996 South African constitution implicitly recognises the existence of a fiscal gap by establishing an intergovernmental system, known as the 'equitable share', which calls for the distribution of a portion of nationally-raised revenues to provinces and local governments. The size of the grant to each province is determined in a two-step process. First, each year parliament enacts a division-of-revenues bill that specifies the vertical split of the equitable share among the three levels of government (national, provincial and local). Available revenue consists of nationally collected revenues minus payments for debt service and contingency reserves. Most of this is divided between the national and provincial governments. In practice, parliament generally accepts the allocations proposed by the national treasury (Reschovsky, 2006). A similar process occurs in Nigeria, where 85%–90% of all state government expenditures and around 90%–95% of all local government expenditures are funded through transfers from the Federation Account (World Bank, 2008).

In the second stage, the pool of funds allocated to each province is calculated on the basis of a weighted average of demographically-driven formulae that apply to each major functional area, where the weights reflect the proportions of spending allocated to each expenditure category. In the case of education, equitable shares are computed on the basis of school enrolments and the number of school-age children. The weighting scheme is equivalent to counting each school-age public school pupil as one pupil; each school-age child not

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⁸ Although the predetermined formula used by the national treasury to determine each province’s annual equitable share allocation has been revised several times, the basic structure of the allocation formula established in fiscal year 1997–1998 has remained unchanged.
enrolled in public schools as one-half of a pupil; and each over-age or under-age public school pupil as a third of a pupil. The formula, therefore, provides a strong incentive for provinces to take steps to reduce the number of over or under-age students, and a somewhat weaker incentive to discourage dropouts. Illustrates that this system led to a marked decline in disparities in per learner budget allocations across the provinces, with the initially low spending provinces (such as the North West, Limpopo and Eastern Cape) recording faster growth in budget allocations than the initially high spending provinces (such as the Western Cape). To ease the transition to the new system, particularly for provinces like Western Cape that would face sizeable reductions in allocations, the formula was phased in over five years.⁹

Similarly in Brazil, FUNDEF established a minimum per pupil expenditure as a way to guarantee a minimum quality standard for all students.¹⁰

Table 5: Per learner budget allocations in South Africa, by province, 1994–95 and 2000–01

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>1994–95</th>
<th>2000–01</th>
<th>Change (percentage points)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>-53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>+26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>+17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All provinces</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GUARANTEED QUALITY EDUCATION

FUNDEF established a minimum per pupil expenditure as a way to guarantee a minimum quality standard for all students.

⁹ The South Africa case study provides a great more detail on the specifics of the funding formulae.

¹⁰ The Brazilian case study provides a great deal of detail on these constitutional shares and the other components of the funding formulae.
nationally (R$ 300), and almost half of those spent less than half of the spending minimum. One potential concern with this type of policy is that it can create an incentive for states and municipalities to reduce their own allocations to education as they know that this will be topped up by the federal government. In Brazil this less of a factor as the Constitution and the National Education Law (as well as FUNDEF and FUNDEB) require that each tier of government spends a certain minimum share of its budget on education. While the federal government is required to spend at least 20% of its budget on education, state and municipal governments are required to spend 25% of their budgets on this. The law also requires states and municipalities to allocate 60% of education funds to teacher expenditures, such as salaries, training, and professional development.

The lessons from Brazil’s funding instruments, aligned with the goals of improving quality and reducing spending inequities, may be valuable for Nigeria, where there are no requirements related to per pupil spending or minimum budgetary allocations for education. Policies of this kind would, however, need to be complemented with measures to improve the effectiveness of education spending, and minimise leakages associated with it.

#### 3.1.5 SBM, SCHOOL AUTONOMY AND PARTICIPATORY ACCOUNTABILITY

The provision of direct school grants and the establishment of school committees in Indonesia is similar to the introduction of SBMCs in Nigeria in 2006. The implementation strategies behind both reforms have been similar, in that they were both centrally managed in the first few years but this management has been increasingly devolved to sub-national governments. In Indonesia, the funds are now transferred to schools through the provincial government. The Indonesian School Operational Assistance (BOS) programme targets all schools within the formal education system – primary and secondary, public and private, general and religious. Schools directly receive quarterly BOS grants for non-personnel operational expenses. The scheme is a key component in the government's education spending, with 8.1% (or approximately $2.5 billion) of the total government education budget spent on the programme in 2012 (World Bank, 2012).
Currently, schools receive approximately US$62 per primary school student and US$76 per secondary school student per year.

A 2006 randomised study found that some components of the SBM interventions increased student achievement: in particular, successful reforms promoted ties between school committees and outside parties through increasing membership quotas for parents, holding elections of committee members, and improving political access by linking school committees with the local village council or Desa, Indonesia’s most local-level form of government.¹¹ (Pradhan et al., 2011). There were some additional examples of transparency measures implemented by local communities – a local radio station holding call-in sessions for complaints on fund mishandling in one district and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) receiving complaints to submit to politicians in two districts.¹²

By 2010 almost all public primary school principals in Indonesia reported that a school committee existed. Although the extent to which they are universally operational is uncertain, the requirement that school committees be involved in the management of BOS funding seems to have increased the importance of their role. One lesson that rings out from the Indonesia case is that real decisions over meaningful budgetary allocations improve SBM committee engagement and performance. The BOS reform is likely to foster greater accountability in the system. It directly strengthens client power (or the short route of accountability, as per WDR04), by codifying the role of parents and local communities in participating in and monitoring the management of education service providers.

Brazil, too, has increased school autonomy in the allocation of resources for school management activities. To achieve this goal, the federal government created a programme called the Direct Resources to the School Programme (Programa Dinheiro Direto para a Escola). The objective of the programme is to foster decentralisation in the management of resources by allocating the resources directly to the public schools. The resources can be spent on school facility improvements and on the development and implementation of pedagogical projects and educational activities.

Likewise, the Indian experience suggests that school-based and community planning can be effective tools for making funding

¹¹ To provide a sense of scale, there are over 75,000 Desa in Indonesia and another 6,500 other forms of local village council.

¹² The same study did identify high incidence of leakage during transfer, spending and monitoring phases, including to bank employees involved in transferring funds and officials conducting or monitoring spending (ibid). In a move to strengthen its monitoring and evaluation of the BOS programme, the central government introduced an online system for schools to report when they received BOS funds and the amount they received. This was implemented in 2013. With this system, the central government is able to identify the provinces that experience delays and the banks they use. They report this to sub-national officials and the public during BOS evaluation workshops.
decisions and involving the community in monitoring educational outcomes. However, in India the effectiveness of these measures has been largely restricted to the few cases in which NGO workers have acted as facilitators and in which communities have had some control over funding decisions.

More broadly in India, Village Education Committees (VECs) have been the main channel for participatory action under both DPEP and the SSA. At least in some aspects of their design, VECs do have the potential to improve teacher accountability. However, as implemented the incentives have been inconsistent and in many cases inadequate. There have been considerable variations across states as regards the powers vested in VECs. The north-eastern state of Nagaland has made the most far-reaching changes, through its communitisation policy. The key change is that teachers’ salaries are disbursed by the VEC, which has the right to implement a ‘no work, no pay’ principle (Govinda and Bandyopadhyay, 2010). In a number of other states, while VECs have no control over regular teachers, they have some rights related to hiring and firing contract teachers. In India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, VECs can request funds for hiring a contract teacher and recommend eligible people from the community to be appointed to the post. The VEC also decides whether to renew the teachers’ contracts at the end of the year. In most states, however, VECs have little control even over contract teachers, and their role seems to be largely restricted to carrying out community sensitisation activities, and deciding how to spend school grants and locally-mobilised resources. As a result, there is little scope for VECs to hold schools to account.

India’s experience with contract teachers offers a number of pointers for Nigeria. This may involve giving citizens some control over renewing teachers’ contracts (as in India), or letting parents choose which school they send their child to.
contract teachers. One reason may be that the government has not done enough to make VECs aware of their rights and duties on this front. Another reason may be that VECs are dominated by better-off members of the community who send their children to the local private school (an increasingly plausible scenario given the growth of low-cost private schools across India), and therefore they have little incentive to monitor the performance of teachers at government schools. The specific types of implementation failures are likely to vary from one context to the next—the key issue is to identify the risks and find ways to mitigate them.

More broadly, India’s disappointing experiences with VECs—combined with the more positive experiences in Brazil and Indonesia—offer some cautionary lessons for Nigeria, where SBMCs have been set up with similar goals. The key lesson that emerges is that SBMCs are likely to need to have the power to hold service providers to account, if they are to perform an oversight function. This could take the form of the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings against underperforming teachers; the power to make formal complaints to the LGA, which the LGA would then be legally obliged to investigate within a set period of time; or the right to disburse teachers’ salaries, as in Nagaland. In the absence of powers of this kind, community members are less likely to see the SBMC as an effective medium for holding schools to account, and therefore to engage with it. Once such rights are in place, oversight could also be encouraged by spreading awareness about cases where SBMCs have been successful in holding schools to account. A related point is that community members need to have faith in their own ability to be heard on the SBMC, and to shape its activities. If they feel that the SBMC is controlled by the head teacher or by elite groups, then they will have little incentive to participate in its activities. On a more basic note, the Indian experience highlights that considerable effort and innovative approaches may need to be taken to raise awareness about the rights and responsibilities of SBMCs, and their ability to effect change.

South Africa, too, has relatively well developed SBM bodies with some control over school-level resources, called School Governing Boards (SGBs). There have been efforts (perhaps noteworthy for Nigeria) to provide financial management training for SGBs, but the process of procurement, budgeting, monitoring and control of physical assets, managing school funds and financial reporting remains complex and
onerous for many of them. These efforts have had mixed results at best. Like in Nigeria, many SGBs are functioning poorly and in both countries there is a need for school committee members to be trained on financial management so that they have the requisite knowledge and skills to make informed financial decisions for school improvement.¹³

3.1.6 EDUCATIONAL DATA, ASSESSMENT SYSTEMS, AND REPORT CARDS

As mentioned throughout this review, educational data and assessment systems are extremely weak and poorly developed in Nigeria. While always challenging, our case studies show that improvement on this front is both possible and also crucial to system improvement – especially in the case of complex intergovernmental systems with relatively independent sub-national governments but where a central government maintains control over key components.

Brazil has improved both basic educational census data and assessments of learning outcomes via both national and sub-national efforts. The FUNDEF law specified that central resources would be distributed based on the school census, which would be the official school data set. However, for this to occur, the government needed to make structural changes to the education information system, not just in terms of the way the data were collected, but also the institutional arrangements for this.¹⁴

In parallel to these changes, the federal government embarked on the creation of a national system of standardised learning assessments. The introduction of these student assessments, together with the packaging and dissemination of assessment results, has been one of the most important accountability-enhancing reforms carried out in Brazil. In 1995 the Federal government launched the National Evaluation System of Primary Education (SAEB). This involved cognitive tests and the collection of background data on national samples of 5th and 9th grade primary school students, and 11th grade (high school) students, once every two years. While SAEB did not generate school and student-level information, it did allow the federal

¹³ Indonesia tackled such challenges in an innovative and instructive, if very simple, manner. As has been said, in a move to strengthen its monitoring and evaluation of the BOS programme, the central government introduced an online system for schools to report when they receive BOS funds and the amount they receive. With this system, the central government is able to identify the provinces that experience delays and the banks they use. They report this to sub-national officials and the public during BOS evaluation workshops.

¹⁴ Since 1937, the Statistics Service Division was located at the Ministry of Education. Historically, this division was subordinate to the different structures within the Ministry of Education, which meant it had very little autonomy. Different units and programmes demanded different types of information from the Statistics Service Division, but it generated very little information that was useful for the different tiers of government who sought to make informed policy decisions. In 1996 the Statistics Service Division was moved to the Secretary of Evaluation and Education Information at the Ministry of Education. In 1997, the National Institute of Educational Studies Anisio Teixeira (Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira) absorbed the Statistics Service Division and became the official federal statistic agency.
government to track learning outcomes in each state and municipality in the country.

In 2005 the government expanded the national assessment by testing all public school students in the fifth and ninth grades every two years under a system called Prova Brasil. The government continued to test a sample of 11th-grade public school students and samples of private school students in fifth, ninth, and 11th grades. The school-level assessment results were made available to the public for the first time. The change in the design of the national standardised student assessment created a window of opportunity for introducing school accountability measures. At the heart of these measures was the development of an indicator of school quality - the Index for Basic Education Development (IDEB). This is calculated on the basis of a school's national assessment results and its repetition and pass rates.\(^{15}\) IDEB scores are used to set concrete targets for each school, municipality and state in Brazil. They are also heavily publicised and disseminated in the press, which puts pressure on states, municipalities and schools to make progress towards the targets set by the federal government. IDEB also served as a useful management tool. For instance, the federal government gives tailored support to municipalities and schools with the lowest IDEB scores, and a number of states have used IDEB to design their own accountability measures, such as performance-based incentives for teachers.

By contrast, India developed a set of seven quality monitoring tools (QMTs), to be administered at different levels of the education system, that seek to assess quality through a mix of quantitative indicators and subjective assessments. However, the primary function of the QMTs seems to be to act as an internal implementation tool, as opposed to as an accountability tool. For instance, the QMTs do not seek to provide a composite measure of education quality, nor are the results of these exercises regularly published or disseminated, let alone organised into a school report card.

India has, however, made progress in creating a national EMIS system. An important component of DPEP and the SSA has been the creation of the nationwide District Information System for Education (DISE). This involves the collection of data on hundreds of variables related to school enrolment and inputs. These include various indicators related to school facilities (access to electricity, drinking water, toilets,

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\(^{15}\) The incorporation of both, test scores and pass rates is geared towards mitigating any perverse incentives: the inclusion of test results deters schools from automatically promoting children who are not learning, the inclusion of pass rates discourages them from holding children back just to increase their results on Prova Brasil.
The availability of reliable data on basic indicators like enrolment, teacher numbers and school completion rates is important for planning purposes, and the DISE has made a useful contribution on this front. However, its claim to provide a comprehensive picture of where India stands in terms of meeting the goals of the SSA does not hold, as it provides no information on learning outcomes. The only remotely relevant indicator is grade repetition rates, and even this has little meaning given that the Right to Education Act has made it mandatory for children to be promoted from one grade to the next in the elementary years, regardless of performance.

The same issue applies to the roughly 1.5 million school report cards that DISE produces. These are intended to provide service users with a simple snapshot of the quality of each school. However, much like the state-level report cards, they focus almost entirely on inputs and provide no indication of the extent to which learning is taking place within these schools. This is a significant weakness given that the evidence on learning outcomes strongly suggests that these are not directly correlated with inputs such as pupil–teacher ratios, school facilities or even teachers’ qualifications. Indeed, while DISE data point to steady improvements in such inputs, recent community-based assessments indicate that progress in boosting learning outcomes has been very slow and uneven (Banerji and Mukherjee, 2008).

There have been some efforts under the SSA to measure learning outcomes, but these have not provided a clear picture of improvements in learning levels to date. Since 2001, the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) has conducted three rounds of National Achievement Surveys (NASs) for samples of students in Grades 3, 5 and 8. The NAS are school-based surveys that seek to assess learning outcomes relative to the curriculum for the
relevant grade. The most recent rounds, carried out between 2009 and 2012, assessed just under 1% of Grade 3 and 5 pupils in government-aided schools, and 4% of those in Grade 8. A few factors have limited the usefulness of the NAS results so far — there has been a lag of over a year between the tests taking place and the publication of the results; the three NAS rounds have not been comparable because of technical issues (Oza and Bethell, 2013); and the tests have only been carried out sporadically.¹⁶

The gaps in government-produced data on learning outcomes have been partly filled by the annual tests conducted across rural India by the Annual Status of Education (ASER) Centre since 2005. The ASER survey is a household-based survey that tests basic reading and arithmetic skills amongst children aged 5–16 years, regardless of their enrolment status. Its findings are made available within five months of the survey being carried out. Test results are comparable for all surveys conducted since 2007. The ASER surveys have made a vital contribution to the public debate on education, by providing a source of regular, highly accessible and transparent information on learning outcomes in rural India. The surveys’ findings are easy to decipher because they tell us whether children can perform basic tasks like reading a sentence or solving a simple division problem; as opposed to providing an average test score, which may be harder to interpret. As a result, they have played a pivotal role in bringing the issue of quality to the forefront of the public debate on education. They have also provided stark evidence that the SSA is failing to meet its goal of providing education of a decent quality to all 6–14 year olds. More recently, in east Africa, the Uwezo community-based assessments – based on the ASER evaluations in India – have proven useful and implementable in country contexts similar to Nigeria.¹⁷

In recent years, Nigeria has made progress in building its EMIS, although challenges remain in terms of data quality and timeliness. Like the DISE, Nigeria’s EMIS does not include data on learning outcomes. However, this will be an important next step if the EMIS is to meet key goals like providing a clear picture of progress in basic education, identifying where the system is failing, providing users with information on school performance so they can exercise choice as regards schools (where this choice is available), and providing policymakers with information on school performance so they can hold service providers to account. Although the ASER and Uwezo surveys fall outside the scope of government reforms, it may be worth

¹⁶ The second factor is likely to be less of a constraint in the future as NCERT has begun to use item response theory to analyse test results, which should improve the comparability of subsequent tests. The other two factors could also be addressed as learning outcomes have started to receive greater attention within government.

continuing to explore their suitability for the Nigerian context, partly because their use of simple testing tools that can be easily administered makes them an attractive option for countries where technical capacity is in short supply. ¹⁸

**SCHOOL REPORT CARDS**

Below is an example of one of the early school report cards from the state of Paraná, Brazil, showing each school's performance on state achievement tests compared to other schools in the municipality and state. The report card also includes the results of a satisfaction survey administered to parents, allowing for direct input from parents to the school. It is important that such report cards do what is possible to put student results in a context that parents can comprehend, and that helps them differentiate between the likely effects of student background and those effects that are attributable to the school's value addition.

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**Figure 4: School report card, example from Brazil**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Mean Score</th>
<th>Students Tested</th>
<th>Students in Your Municipality</th>
<th>Students in Paraná</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Portuguese</strong></td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>257</td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mathematics</strong></td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>266</td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Science</strong></td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>255</td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Schools in Paraná</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1: Performance Assessment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>This School</th>
<th>Other Schools in Your Municipality</th>
<th>Parana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st - 4th</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th - 8th</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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¹⁸ This process has been initiated by the Education Partnerships Centre, Lagos.
### Parent Opinions About...

#### Teaching Quality
- 62 of 65 parents (95%) are satisfied with the quality of education their children receive at this school.
- 63 of 65 parents (97%) believe school building and grounds are well kept.
- 60 of 63 parents (95%) believe school building and grounds are proper for teaching activities.
- 61 of 62 parents (98%) agree that teachers in this school are dedicated to their work.
- 62 of 64 parents (97%) are satisfied with teacher assiduity.

#### Parent Involvement
- 61 of 63 parents (97%) would like to be more involved in school activities.
- 63 of 63 parents (100%) believe the school principal fosters the participation of all in the community in the activities of the school.
- 46 of 66 parents (70%) indicate the school promotes activities for parent involvement in teaching matters.
- 35 parents participated in such activities.
- 48 of 64 parents (75%) indicate the school promotes activities for parent involvement in school administration matters.
- 28 parents participated in such activities.

#### Exchange of Information
- 48 of 62 parents (77%) indicate the school promotes regular meetings between parents and teachers.
- 41 of 59 parents (69%) indicate the existence of a regular system of communication with parents.
- 61 of 64 parents (95%) indicate teachers develop homework activities promoting the interest of parents in their child education.
- 51 of 63 parents (81%) indicate being informed about homework activities to help parents monitor their child's work.

#### Safety
- 62 of 63 parents (98%) indicate they are comfortable sending their children to this school.
- 32 of 59 parents (54%) indicate the school has discipline-related problems.
- 19 of 62 parents (31%) indicate the school has safety-related (internal) problems.
- 32 of 62 parents (52%) indicate the school is subjected to safety-related problems of its neighborhood.

#### School Grade
- 9.3 average grade based on the rating of 64 parents.
Figure 5: School report card example and reporting of budget and expenditure, from Kenya

Source: Photos by Luis Crouch, Research Triangle Institute.
However, report cards are only as useful as the data used to construct them. As mentioned above, the 1.5 million school report cards produced by the Indian government focus almost entirely on inputs and provide no indication of the extent to which learning is taking place within these schools.

3.1.7 TEACHER TRAINING AND EFFECTIVENESS

While not widely viewed as effective, the Indian reforms in teacher training do show an instructive subdivision of sub-national and sub-district units in relation to providing the training services. DPEP created the first system of regular in-service training for primary school teachers in the country. This consisted of 6–10 days of training per year, meetings at the cluster level and school visits by a mentor teacher (World Bank, 2007). The programme also introduced changes to the institutional set-up for teacher training. Block and Cluster Resource Centres were created at the sub-district levels to provide locally-tailored support to teachers.

As UBEC works on developing an in-service training programme for Nigeria, some lessons from the Indian experience may be worth noting. First, when advocating new pedagogies, a basic prerequisite is to ensure that teacher trainers themselves are practising these approaches. Second, teacher training needs to be based on a recognition that imparting new pedagogies is not a purely technical process. Trainers need to look out for resistance amongst teachers or a merely superficial adoption of new approaches, and find ways to address this. Third, the content of in-service training should be based on needs assessments and mechanisms should be put in place to check whether teachers are actually benefiting from training.

Some of the operational issues identified above in the case of India, such as the disconnect between training and follow-up mentoring, are fairly easy to fix. Their persistence suggests that staff at the teacher training institutions are unmotivated, lack initiative or do not have the right skills for the job. This is a common malaise in the Indian education system and undermines almost every intervention that the state tries to introduce. The literature suggests that it is also an issue in Nigeria. In line with this, a critical issue that needs to be looked into is what systems can be put in place to attract highly motivated and competent people to positions in the education system, and to keep them there.
This is likely to be a key driver of the overall performance of the system.

3.1.8 CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS AND INCENTIVES

Bolsa-Familia was the centrepiece of the Lula government’s social policies. The programme, which was launched in 2004, provides disadvantaged families with cash transfers on the condition that they keep their children in school and attend health care visits. Proponents argue that the programme was key to helping Brazil more than halve extreme poverty and reduce income inequality. The programme has reduced drop-out rates in primary and secondary school and reduced grade repetition. It has also increased preventative health care visits and immunisation coverage, and reduced child mortality. Critics have argued that the programme may have had unintended consequences, such as reducing work incentives and reducing the promotion of the autonomy of the poor (Lindert et al., 2007; World Bank, 2013). It is surprising, given the prominence of conditional cash transfers (CCTs) in so many countries and the presence of significant wealth inequality in access to schooling in Nigeria, that they have not been a greater part of the policy dialogue in Nigeria. It is also surprising that Brazil is the only country among our case study countries that has a major CCT programme.

3.1.9 SUMMARY: RELATING THE CASE STUDY GUIDEPOSTS TO THE APPLICATION OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK TO NIGERIA

As detailed in the full Nigeria case study, the application of our accountability framework, delineated in Section 2 above, reveals that there are few strong accountability relationships in the provision of educational services in Nigeria. Furthermore, in most cases there has been little or insufficient development of these relationships over time. Figure 2 in Section 2 above shows 14 arrows, each representing a potential flow of information, power and decision-making; that is, each arrow represents an accountability relationship.

The full summary of these accountability relationships is reproduced in the appendix below (Table). Here, we briefly relate the policy reform guideposts developed above to the accountability relationship they would likely improve. Our purpose here is not to suggest a ranking of recommendations. Such strategic prioritisation would need to come out of direct dialogue among all relevant stakeholders in Nigeria.
Rather, we seek to show how and in what areas the Nigerian system needs to improve accountability and how the case study experiences from other countries map onto the various accountability challenges in Nigeria.

- First, it is worth emphasising that a stable overall policy-making environment is crucial. Mandates, goals, laws, and performance expectations are key to fostering accountability and these will beset most effectively by leaders who have the capacity for the planning and stewardship of reform processes beyond the short-term. Continuity of leadership and the empowerment of reform champions were keys to successful reforms in Brazil and Indonesia, for example. Compare, for instance, the eight years in Brazil under a single minister of education to the 19 ministers in 23 years in Nigeria. ¹⁹ Along these lines, strategic decisions must be made regarding the politics of implementation: in particular, the choice of emphasising strong legislative solutions (such as passing laws or constitutional amendments) versus the use of internal ministerial decrees and directives. While neither strategy is categorically better than the other, the latter certainly is unlikely to thrive without continuity of leadership. This is true even in the case of so-called ‘big bang’ strategies like Indonesia’s.

- Without a wide range of data and information school systems cannot be held accountable. As detailed above, governments at all levels in Nigerian are essentially ‘flying blind’. In both Brazil and India great attention was paid to the systematic improvement of the information available for tracking student progress and outcomes, on the one hand, while also analysing and evaluating the performance of schools, on the other. Both countries revamped their EMIS capacity. Brazil went further, developing serious outcome evaluations that allowed for the creation of school report cards and other products likely to foster accountability. India’s civil society driven community- based educational assessments (ASER) have proven to be an innovative and effective model for both gathering information on the performance of schools and also informing parents and community leaders about their (often poor) results.

- SBM and site-based decision-making can improve accountability, but is unlikely to do so unless school site councils and other local decision-making units include real participation by a wide range of stakeholders. In turn, such participation often hinges on stakeholders

¹⁹ As noted above, while continuity should not come at the expense of underperforming ministers being retained in their posts, this can be avoided through the careful selection of ministers who have the capability and commitment to champion reform.
feeling that they have meaningful input into key decisions about some portion of the school budget (e.g. through school grants) and, often, oversight of contract teachers. Indonesia, India, and South Africa all have SBM efforts that are well developed, at least in some areas. In India, we see the important role of NGO facilitators. Also, school report cards dovetail with SBM efforts because they provide stakeholders with the information they need to make sound decisions.

- The structuring of intergovernmental fiscal transfers has clear implications for how incentives inherent in the transfers can foster accountability. Funding formulae can be used in many ways to address fiscal imbalance and equity concerns. Brazil and South Africa have equity enhancing intergovernmental fiscal transfers, and Brazil also has a well established CCT programme. At the risk of being repetitive, these formulae are only as good as the data used to operationalise them – thus once again highlighting the key role of data and information in accountability.

- Decentralisation reforms need strong financial and outcome monitoring and financial management training at all levels of government and service provision. The centre must usually play a strong role in this area. In addition, decentralisation is rarely a cost saving reform process. Finally, Indonesia shows us that, even in a drastic decentralisation, the specific functional assignments across all levels of system governance are complex and involve some centralisation as well. Brazil, too, has developed a complex and varied set of responsibilities for service provision across municipalities, states, and the federal government.

- Educational reforms that do not improve accountability in the teaching profession tend not to improve accountability overall. Our case studies show this through a wide range of examples—from teacher training and incentives for certification in Indonesia and India (which did not take place in an effective manner), to the management of contract teachers, alongside many other examples.

Overall, the individual case studies provide rich descriptions of these and many other aspects of more than three decades of educational reform in Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, and India. This synthesis document has highlighted the key findings, but the cases provide far more detail. The Nigeria case study provides a diagnosis of the nature of the country’s present challenges and their institutional and
historical routes. The election of a new government provides a relatively rare reform and policy window for fostering the kind of fundamental, long-term changes that are necessary in order to establish accountability and, ultimately, to improve educational service provision throughout Nigeria.
REFERENCES


National University of Educational Planning and Administration. 2014. Elementary Education in India: Where Do We Stand? New Delhi.


World Bank. 2013a. 'Spending more or spending better: improving education financing in Indonesia'.

Annex A: Nigerian education reforms in the accountability framework

Table 6: Accountability framework: application of expanded WDR04 framework to Nigerian reforms past, present and future

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability relationship</th>
<th>Start of Reform Period</th>
<th>During Reform Period</th>
<th>Current Situation</th>
<th>Case Study Guidepost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mandates, goals, laws, performance expectations (Central government to Ministry of Education)</td>
<td>Prior to UBE, the key mandate was a commitment to provide free primary education to all Nigerian children.</td>
<td>Following the introduction of UBE, this changed to a legal requirement to provide free and compulsory basic education to all Nigerian children. Performance expectations were not clearly stated.</td>
<td>No significant change. The 4-Year Strategic Plan for the Development of the Education Sector: 2011-2015 explains targets and action plans for achieving various components of education, including basic education, but does not outline performance expectations.</td>
<td>*Brazil &amp; Indonesia: Continuity of Central Leadership *Indonesia: Savvy use of ministerial decrees vs. Strong legal Foundation *South Africa &amp; Brazil: equity enhancing fiscal transfers, details key, range of options—from formulas to budgetary shares.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Information on the performance of schools against expectations (MoE to central government)</td>
<td>Some attempts to collect education data were carried out in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, but these were heavily reliant on donor support, and were not institutionalised.</td>
<td>National EMIS system is launched. The Annual School Census is carried out by each State to collect data on enrolment, school facilities, and other key inputs. However, there are major weaknesses in the reliability and timeliness of the process. Periodic learning assessments (such as NALABE) are carried out by the central government, but there is no systematic process in place to collect regular, comparable data on the extent to which children are achieving grade-level learning outcomes.</td>
<td>Selected ASC data (teacher and pupil numbers, teachers’ qualifications) are collated and published online by UBEC. Gradual improvements are being made in the quality and timeliness of the ASC process, but weaknesses remain. No significant change in the availability of information on learning outcomes.</td>
<td>*Brazil: serious development of both EMIS and assessment systems. *India: DISE data on school enrolments and inputs for state and district reports cards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Information on the performance of schools and other school/student data (sub-national levels of government to MoE)</td>
<td>No system in place to regularly collect education data at the State level or below.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Analysis of school performance (MoE to sub-national levels of government)</td>
<td>Periodic learning assessments are carried out, but these are not systematically analysed to assess the extent to which sub-national governments are performing against set expectations.</td>
<td>No significant change.</td>
<td>No significant change.</td>
<td>India: ASER community based assessment *Brazil: IDEB scores produced and assessed against targets for each school, municipality and state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the interests of concision, we have combined some of the 14 arrows. In particular, we have combined some of the accountability relationships that deal on some level or another with gathering, analyzing and disseminating data on the school population, student assessments, and analysis of school performance.
### 5. Norms, fiscal transfers, training and assistance on budgeting, financial management & data management (MoE to sub-national levels of government)

- The Ministry of Finance disburses funds to the States and LGAs through the Federal Account Allocation Committee. These comprise the main source of funding for education. States have a very high degree of flexibility over how much of this funding to allocate to education, and what to spend it on.

- Norms and standards related to education (e.g. minimum qualifications for teachers, pupil-teacher ratios) are set by the Centre, but these are often not strictly enforced.

- The UBE Intervention Fund is launched to provide States with an additional source of funding for education. 75% of the fund is used to give grants to States that are able to provide matching funding. Many states fail to do this, and are unable to access these grants.

- The UBE-IF formula has been changed so that 50% of the fund is allocated to matching grants. This will have raised the amount of federal funding for education that States are able to access.

* India: decentralization needs strong financial and outcome monitoring
* Brazil: minimum spending requirements for each tier of government, minimum per pupil spending requirement

### 6. Communicate, explain, monitor, evaluate and/or enforce norms and standards, distribution of resources, supervision, HR mgmt. (Sub-national government to schools)

- Norms and standards were in the process of being clarified.

- Standards have been established but are poorly monitored and enforced. Schools continue to have very little control over spending decisions. Resources and facilities are inadequate to meet stated goals and are unevenly distributed, across and within LGAs.

- There are major weaknesses in the quality and regularity of supervision. There are also major weaknesses in teacher deployment (this is often misaligned with schools’ needs) and in the quality of in-service training.

* Indonesia (and other international experience): details of teacher accountability reforms key (and politically challenging)
* School Based Management plays a role
* South Africa: financial management training for school level actors
* India Teacher Training and Effectiveness
7. Analysis of school performance (by sub-national government to schools)

Results of the First School Leaving Certificate exam and Junior Secondary School Certificate exam were measures of students and schools’ performance. These were administered by the state governments. Each school received and published its pupils’ results. Communities learnt of school performance through parents teachers association (PTA)

Around 2004, the First School Leaving Certificate began to be awarded on the basis of continuous assessment rather than a school-leaving exam.

Other periodic assessments (e.g. NALABE) have been carried out by UBEC, but these cover small samples of schools, and results are not analysed at the school level.

The First School Leaving exam (end of primary school) has been abolished. This means that there are now no regular, standardised assessments of pupils conducted by the government till the end of JSS.

Brazil and others: School Report Cards can provide key info for school level decision-making and also to parents to hold schools accountable

8. Information on performance of schools and other school/student data (from schools to sub-national government)

Occasional surveys of school infrastructure and personnel.

A National Personnel Audit of all basic education institutions was carried out in 2010.

Plans are underway to carry out a comprehensive census of all public and private basic education and senior secondary institutions in 2015.

Parents can choose between public schools, but in practice the degree of choice is limited, especially in rural areas. Choice is restricted to public schools – there are no significant voucher schemes.

Parents have little scope to influence school-level decisions or hold providers to account.

SBMCs widely introduced, but not functional in many cases.

Government-sponsored training for SBMCs is scaled up in order to ensure that all SBMCs are functional. However, SBMCs don’t have access to regular funding to implement School Development Plans. They also don’t have the power to hold schools/teachers to account.

*Indonesia and India: School Based Management, School grants – give site councils real control over meaningful funds and other decisions, e.g. contract teachers.

*India: Important role of NGO facilitators
### COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF BASIC EDUCATION REFORMS: PART 1 - SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability relationship</th>
<th>Start of Reform Period</th>
<th>During Reform Period</th>
<th>Current Situation</th>
<th>Case Study Guidepost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>10. Indonesia and India:</strong> School Based Management, School grants – give site councils real control over meaningful funds and other decisions, e.g. contract teachers. <em>India: Important role of NGO facilitators</em></td>
<td>Performance in the First School Leaving Certificate exam and Junior Secondary School Certificate exam.</td>
<td>Performance in the First School Leaving Certificate exam and Junior Secondary School Certificate exam. Other periodic learning assessments have been carried out but these do not cover all schools and results are not disseminated to parents in a format that is easy to access and interpret.</td>
<td>The First School Leaving Exam has been abolished, which means that comprehensive information on school-level learning outcomes is now unavailable until the end of JSS.</td>
<td><em>Brazil and others: School Report Cards</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11. Comprehensible and comparative information on school characteristics and performance (from sub-national govt. to citizens/parents)</strong></td>
<td>Data on school characteristics is collected as part of the ASC, but this is not disseminated to the public in an accessible format.</td>
<td>No significant change.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>12. Governance, watchfulness, disputes, opinion on school performance and satisfaction (citizens/parents to sub-national govt.)</strong></td>
<td>Some increase in trade union and civil society pressure on government accountability.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability relationship</td>
<td>Start of Reform Period</td>
<td>During Reform Period</td>
<td>Current Situation</td>
<td>Case Study Guidepost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>13. Information on progress</strong>&lt;br&gt;(from central government to citizens/parents)</td>
<td>No system in place to collect data on schooling outcomes and share these with parents in an accessible format.</td>
<td>No change.</td>
<td>No change.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>14. Taxes, direct requests, political representation, public opinion</strong>&lt;br&gt;(from clients to central govt' policymakers, Long Route of Accountability)</td>
<td>The quality of education does not seem to be a major driver of voting patterns, which weakens the long route of accountability. Civil society's role in putting the spotlight on the major weaknesses in the education system has been fairly limited. A large share of public revenue comes from oil, rather than taxes paid by citizens.</td>
<td>No significant change.&lt;br&gt;Some funding for basic education was raised through the Education Trust Fund (ETF), to which companies with more than 100 employees contribute 2% of their pre-tax earnings. Until 2012, 30% of the ETF was allocated to basic education.</td>
<td>No significant change.&lt;br&gt;Since 2012, funds raised through the ETF have been used for tertiary education instead of basic education.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex B: Comparative statistical portrait of case study countries

The inception report laid out the rationale for the case study selection, beginning with the criteria that countries selected be large federations with long enough histories of educational reform processes to allow for reflections and potential insights regarding policy reform in Nigeria. The structure of the national and sub-national governments is summarised in Figure 6.

Figure 6: National and sub-national government units in case study countries

In addition, we present a comparative statistical portrait in order to place Nigeria in the context of the countries selected. For instance, Nigeria has relatively low income compared to all of the case studied countries except India. GDP growth (both total and per capita) has been relatively robust in recent years, although Nigeria also has a lower Human Development Index (HDI):

²¹ Note that while Indonesia is technically not a federation, it was deemed to share enough characteristics with a federation to make it an appropriate case study.
**Figure 7: GDP per capita and HDI in Nigeria and the four case study countries**

GDP per capita, purchase power parity (constant 2011 International $), 2013

The size of the population of Nigeria is roughly comparable – except, of course, as regards India.

**Figure 8: Population size in Nigeria and the four case study countries**

TOTAL POPULATION, 2013
The enrolment in primary schools is lower than in the case study countries and there are greater issues with gender parity (not shown):

- Expected years of schooling is lower:
- Literacy rates too, are lower:

Source: EdStats World Bank

Source: World Development Indicators
Annex C: Terms of Reference for the Study

C.1 Summary
Education Data, Research and Evaluation in Nigeria (EDOREN) generates new evidence and understanding of how best to support equitable access and improved learning outcomes for all Nigerian children through innovation and sustainable education systems development.

EDOREN seeks a team of short-term consultants to conduct a comparative review – consisting primarily of a literature review – of basic education reform.

The detailed tasks in these Terms of Reference will be refined during the mission, on the basis of discussions with the relevant stakeholders. The team will interact closely with the EDOREN Project Manager, EDOREN international team leader, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and EDOREN Workstream 5 leader.

C.2 Background
EDOREN embeds high quality data, research and evaluation in DFID Nigeria’s education portfolio and in the education policy of partner Nigerian states. Its primary objective is to generate new evidence and understanding of how best to support equitable access and improved learning outcomes for all Nigerian children through innovation and sustainable education systems development (DFID, 2011). One important strand of its work is to undertake thematic research of direct relevance to the achievement of universal basic education (UBE) in Nigeria.

A recent and substantial review by EDOREN of literature on basic education in Nigeria (Review of the literature on basic education in Nigeria: Issues of Access, Quality, Outcomes and Equity, 2014), a stakeholder consultation (November 2013–March 2014), together with a recognition of DFID’s education sector programme priorities, point to the potential value of research on the evolution and application of Nigeria’s UBE reform strategy.

There has been no systemic review of UBE strategies in Nigeria since the establishment of the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC) (though there have been some assessments of UBEC). With general elections in Nigeria and the UK in 2015 and the renewal of international development goals in 2015, the post-2015 education policy and programme development in Nigeria (federal and state) would benefit from reflective research on UBE.

As a first step towards this task, EDOREN seeks to better understand the experience of basic education reform in countries that are in several important ways similar to Nigeria (i.e. large, low/middle-income and with federal systems of government/governance), to prepare advice for both the Nigerian government following the election in February 2015 and DFID Nigeria as it enters a new programming cycle.

C.3 The objective
The objective is to conduct a review (consisting predominantly of a literature review) of the recent experience of reforms in basic education in Nigeria, Indonesia, India, Brazil and South Africa, highlighting:

1. how reforms have been conceived, introduced, and implemented, with a focus on what has worked well (or not); and
2. The comparative experience and lessons which have relevance to UBE in Nigeria.

The EDOREN literature review on basic education provides some information on the UBE reform experience in Nigeria. However, the review covered a vast range of themes, and did not focus specifically on UBE reforms. The objective of the Nigeria case study will be to clearly describe the underlying characteristics of Nigeria’s approach to achieving UBE, so that meaningful comparisons can be drawn with other countries.

As a first priority, the review will focus on reform episodes in the comparator countries that were similar to Nigeria’s broad-based UBE reforms, in that they encompassed changes to legislation, financing structures, institutional structures and programming strategies. A secondary focus will be to look at specific reforms in basic education that may not have been part of a comprehensive package of reforms. These could include changes to: financing modalities, the allocation of responsibilities across different levels of government, curriculum development, teacher training, the examination system, or processes to promote accountability and transparency. The overarching objective is to understand how large countries with complex federal systems have approached basic education reforms, whether a comprehensive approach has proved effective or not, and whether there have been any effective approaches that could be relevant for Nigeria.

The specific episodes of reform to be reviewed will be identified during the inception phase. The timeframe for consideration will vary across countries, depending on when they introduced major reforms to basic education, although it is likely to span the last 25 years.

The review will focus on changes introduced at the federal level, as opposed to the sub-national level. Given that state/provincial governments often have broad powers in the education sector, one particular area of interest will be to look at how central governments have tried to influence policies at the sub-national level.

C.4 Recipients
The recipients of the services will include, but not be limited to, DFID Nigeria, UBEC and the Federal Ministry of Education.

C.5 Scope of the task
This review will explore the experience, strengths and weaknesses of reforms in basic education in large, federal, resource constrained countries. Specifically, it will:
1. gather available desk material (supplemented, where required, by telephone interviews with key informants), on reforms in the delivery of basic education in Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa and Nigeria; and
2. compare the reform experiences of these countries to generate some recommendations for Nigeria after February 2015.

For each country, this implies the development of the following areas of analysis:
1. Parameters of education reform [Where relevant; some of the questions below may only apply to
major programmatic reforms] What were the processes and structures of basic education reform? On what constitutional and legal basis have they been founded? What were the objectives? What were the political determinants of reform? What structural changes did this imply (pre- and post-reform structures? What staffing or institutional changes did this imply? Have decentralisation or centralisation characterised reform? Why? What were the costs of reform?

2. **Content of education reform** What specific changes were introduced to education policy or service delivery? What were the objectives of these changes?

3. **Results of education reform** Is there any evidence on the outcomes and impacts of educational reform? Have there been any evaluations of basic education reform? Are these rigorous? Is there evidence that reforms have led to improvement in educational outcomes or other benefits (such as improved accountability, scrutiny, budgets, education inputs, etc)? Does this extend to improvements in learning? Have reforms led to more efficient or effective spending on basic education (i.e. same outcomes for lower expenditures, higher rates of out-turn, etc)? Have the benefits of education reform been sustained over time?

4. **Responsiveness of education reform to evidence** Have education reform processes responded to evidence to adjust, change or reverse course, during implementation? What sort of evidence was provided?

5. **Lessons from educational reform** What factors appear to influence the degree of success of attempts to implement significant reforms in the education sector in large, federal countries? Is there a proven model for conceiving, introducing and implementing education reform? What are likely to be the key benefits of this model? What lessons could Nigeria learn from international experience? What could the new government in Nigeria do to improve UBE reform processes post-February 2015? What additional research questions could usefully be asked about education reform processes in Nigeria?

### C.6 Methodology

#### C.6.1 Phase One: Inception

The review team will carry out the following activities during the inception phase:

- Briefly consider whether the comparison countries/reform processes are appropriate for learning for UBE in Nigeria, and decide whether to add or remove case studies;
- Identify specific episodes of reform to be reviewed;
- Flesh out the question areas above with a final list of questions, and key issues to be covered by each country case study;
- Outline the search and analysis strategy, including any key informant interviews;
- Outline how the case study material will be used to identify lessons for Nigeria;
- Make a brief assessment of the political economy of the research (see Section A.9, below);
- Develop a communications plan (see Section A.10, below);
- Note the review’s contribution to capacity development; and
- Set out a workplan that divides tasks between the team.
The inception phase will also involve work in Nigeria by at least one team member, with support from a member of the EDOREN Project Executive Committee, to ensure that the review has buy-in from UBEC/the Federal Ministry of Education. This phase will end with an inception report, to be signed off by the peer reviewer and Workstream 5 leader.

C.6.2 Phase Two: Review and writing
This phase will involve the literature review, key informant interviews, and report drafting for each of the five countries; it will also include the synthesis of these findings to identify potential lessons for Nigeria, following the approach set out in the inception report. The review team will produce a clearly-written report, in EDOREN format (or as specified by the communications plan), to be reviewed by the peer reviewer. Comments from the peer reviewer will be incorporated and the peer reviewer will sign off on the quality of the report before submission to DFID/UBEC and the Federal Ministry of Education, and revision of the final report based on DFID/UBEC/Federal Ministry of Education comments.

C.6.3 Phase Three: Presenting
Unless otherwise specified in the agreed communications plan, it is expected that (some members of) the review team will present findings from the review in Abuja, in particular to UBEC/the Federal Ministry of Education.

C.7 Deliverables
The deliverables for the review are set out in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of deliverable</th>
<th>Proposed Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inception report setting out the list of questions to be researched, the search and analysis strategy, detailed timeline, the proposed structure of the final report, political economy considerations and linked communications plan with details of key stakeholders, and the contribution to capacity development</td>
<td>31 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft report for EDOREN peer review</td>
<td>12 January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft report incorporating EDOREN peer review comments for submission to DFID/UBEC/the Federal Ministry of Education</td>
<td>26 January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of findings in Abuja (to be confirmed in communications plan)</td>
<td>30 January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final report incorporating all comments</td>
<td>09 February</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C.8 Timeframe
The review will be completed between 01 September 2014 and 02 February 2015. The election in February 2015 represents a clearcut-off date for the final submission.

Tentative allocations (in days) for the key stages are proposed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Allocation- Person Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inception</td>
<td>30 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review and writing</td>
<td>30 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presenting</td>
<td>30 Days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C.9 Political economy
UBE reforms in Nigeria are well established and UBEC is a significant player in education policy. As an introductory process to a wider review of UBE, this piece of research should be treated delicately, both so that it does not affect EDOREN’s relationship with UBEC and so that members of government are interested in, and likely to use, the findings. As the major purpose of this review is to help the post-February 2015 government consider the direction of basic education reform and strategy in the light of the most comparable international experience, it is important that some members of UBEC, and ideally the Federal Ministry of Education, are aware of, and interested in, the review before it commences. It is expected, therefore, that the team will engage with policy-makers in UBEC and the Federal Ministry of Education to ensure that the research has some traction with government following the election. Engagement with DFID will help this process.

The political economy of the research should be discussed with the EDOREN Country Director, Oladele Akogun, and the team leader before starting, in order to ensure there is a plan to deal with this political economy.

C.10 Communication plan
The team should engage with the EDOREN knowledge management workstream leader Louise McGrath to devise a communications plan for the review, before starting. This should relate to the political economy discussion referred to above. The communications plan should be specified in the inception report and should detail who the key stakeholders are, how they should be involved in the research process from the start, and how and in what way the results of the research should be disseminated. This dissemination is
expected to take the form of a technical report and a shorter, more digestible, policy brief, together with a brief presentation, but these should be confirmed in the communications plan.

C.11 Contribution to capacity development
All of EDOREN’s activities should contribute to EDOREN’s second objective: ‘to enhance national capacities to generate and use quality educational data, research and evaluation for policy and strategy making’. The contribution of this piece of research will be principally made through the research outputs: the literature review will itself contribute to the Nigerian government’s capacity to organise itself to improve education policy-making. This will be maximised through engagement with the Federal Ministry of Education/UBEC at the start of the research, to ensure that they are engaged with, and interested in, the findings.

However, it also is expected that one of the team members will be part of EDOREN’s Nigerian team of researchers (whether in the EDOREN office or as an external researcher), and as such the process of producing the research should build the capacities of this person by enhancing their understanding of basic education reform processes, and as a result of their working with an international team of researchers that set exacting standards for research.

C.12 Proposed skills mix of the team
The team will need to have expertise in the following areas:
- basic education reform processes, particularly in India, South Africa, Indonesia, and Brazil;
- basic education in Nigeria; and
- literature review and report writing.

C.13 Proposed team
The proposed team is outlined below. The team should ideally include at least one person with knowledge of/experience of working in each of the comparator countries. The allocation of days is a rough indication only and is subject to revision during the inception phase:

b. [Shefali Rai] – [29] days – [Manager, Analyst, India]

C.14 Reporting
The manager will be responsible for ensuring that the required inputs are made by all consultants in order to produce the final deliverables.
The team will report on a day-to-day basis to IanMacAuslan, Workstream 5 leader.
The team will provide its final report to IanMacAuslan, Workstream 5 leader, who will organise peer review and feed comments back to the team members for revisions.
The revised draft report will then be submitted to DFID and UBEC, who will provide comments.
The task will be signed off once the team members have satisfactorily responded to DFID and UBE’s comments.
C.15 Coordination and logistics
Chidi Ezegwu will coordinate processes in Nigeria, through the EDOREN Abuja office, under the direction of the EDOREN Country Director Oladele Akogun.

Any further logistical arrangements will be confirmed by the project manager, Florian Friedrich.

C.16 Additional background information about Nigeria and education
Nigeria is a large and diverse country, with a federal administration that determines policy. It is divided into 36 states. Educational progress in each state is largely determined by the level of commitment shown by each state governor and his/her state authorities. The Nigerian system as a whole is characterised by under-investment in education, insufficient monitoring and evaluation, high drop-out rates, lack of parental confidence and pupil literacy and numeracy levels that are below international norms.