

PRIMARY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE IN THE WAKE OF CONFLICT IN BORNO, NIGERIA

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Case studies from
two communities
in Maiduguri

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Executive summary

The education system in north-east Nigeria has been devastated by nearly eight years of armed conflict between Boko Haram and the Nigerian government. Targeted attacks on schools and teachers, multiple forced displacements and a protracted food security crisis have further weakened a school system in Borno that was already struggling to attain significant school attendance and learning outcomes at the primary school level prior to the onset of conflict. As a result, it was estimated that only 17% of primary school-aged children attended primary school in Borno State, the epicentre of the conflict, in 2015 (National Population Commission (NPC) and RTI International 2016a).

Although the acute humanitarian crisis and armed violence persists in many parts of Borno, the security situation has significantly improved in other areas since early 2016 and decision-makers in both government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are beginning to turn their attention from emergency response to early recovery in these more stable areas. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) therefore commissioned this research to understand the drivers behind low primary school attendance in Borno State in the wake of violent conflict and identify gaps in support to improve primary school attendance.

Research design

This report presents findings from two case studies of communities in and near the city of Maiduguri, Borno. It builds on the findings of a survey commissioned by DFID and carried out by Girl Effect that examines parents and children's attitudes toward primary school in the same two communities. Both communities suffered a high intensity of violence and received large inflows of internally displaced people (IDPs), but have experienced a significant improvement in security over the past year. The research draws on participatory rural appraisals with 104 community members and 69 interviews carried out in January and February 2017. This qualitative research study was not designed to generate findings representative of Borno or north-east Nigeria as a whole, but its findings may be transferable to other urban and peri-urban communities in Borno that have experienced similar reductions in violence.

Findings

The conflict has presented a critical juncture for primary education in Borno State. While 'western education' was widely resisted prior to the crisis according to community members, the situation has now radically changed. The conflict has increased demand for formal primary education and this presents a window of opportunity for decision-makers and funders seeking to improve school attendance in Borno.

Demand for formal primary education has increased ...

There is overwhelming demand for formal primary education in both communities. This challenges the image of north-east Nigeria as a hotbed of resistance to formal education that has been perpetuated by the dissemination of Boko Haram's agenda. In an ironic twist, the conflict in fact appears to have increased demand for formal education compared even to pre-crisis levels.

Respondents believed that a lack of education was a root cause of the violent conflict. This has in turn generated a determination among community members to increase primary school attendance both to reduce the vulnerability of their own children to recruitment into Boko Haram and contribute to broader efforts to prevent future outbreaks of violent conflict.

Displacement has also increased the exposure of many IDPs from rural areas to urban life, which has boosted their demand for formal education. Furthermore, these changes have been reinforced by the changing attitudes and behaviours of religious and traditional leaders, who are reported to have a more positive attitude toward formal education than previously. These demonstration effects and peer pressures

have in turn increased demand (and in some cases school attendance), thus initiating a 'virtuous cycle' in demand for primary education by publicly signalling the acceptability of formal education. Nonetheless, some pockets of resistance are reported to persist in more rural areas.

... but financial factors continue to present a major barrier to accessing primary education ...

Despite massive increases in school attendance compared to mid- and even pre-crisis levels, financial barriers are by far the most widespread and significant reason why children do not attend primary school. The direct costs of attending government schools account for some of this. The cost of uniforms, schooling materials, packed lunches and unofficial school fees all add up to deter or prevent parents from investing in their children's primary education.

At the same time, household incomes have been sharply reduced due to the destruction of local markets, restricted access to farmland, insecurity of trade routes and mass displacement. The rising concentration of demand and more limited supply, particularly of food, have all led to inflation that has further eroded parents' purchasing power and reduced the 'spare' money they have to cover the costs of 'optional' expenses such as education.

Deaths resulting from the conflict have also further cut incomes for some households and increased the number of orphaned and vulnerable children, who are sometimes taken in by relatives but represent an additional burden on households and communities' limited resources. In the face of these hardships, many parents or guardians choose to send their children to cheaper religious schools where they are not taught basic literacy or numeracy but do benefit from a 'moral' education that is still valued by communities.

... and sharp increases in school attendance threaten to overwhelm the school system

The primary school system is severely struggling to absorb the sudden increase in parents choosing to send their children to primary school. In part this is due to limited capacity that predates the conflict, but the destruction of school facilities and attacks on and exodus of government school teachers constitute particular challenges to providing quality primary education in this context.

While these challenges are at the top of the government agenda for strengthening the capacity of the education system in the post-conflict period, additional challenges remain. These include the introduction of measures to address the trauma experienced by both teachers and children during conflict, as well as concerns about the competence and attendance of teachers in government schools.

There is a danger that the additional strain on government primary schools resulting from the sharp increase in school attendance will undermine any gains in learning outcomes. Furthermore, parents' nascent demand for primary education may risk being undermined by delivery of low-quality education.

Recommendations

The armed conflict in Borno has opened a window of opportunity for increasing primary school attendance in the state. However, there are gaps in existing support that currently prevent this opportunity from being effectively realised. These gaps can be addressed through the following interventions:

1. Reducing financial barriers to access through cash transfers or school feeding programmes that bridge early recovery and longer-term development strategy;
2. Strengthening non-formal primary schools' ability to provide quality primary education in basic literacy and numeracy to relieve pressure on government schools in the short term; and
3. Creating and communicating clear transition pathways for students and teachers between non-formal and formal education in the medium term.

The final section of the report outlines topics for further research.

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List of abbreviations

CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CJTF	Civilian Joint Task Force
DFID	UK Department for International Development
ECR	Education Crisis Response
EDOREN	Education Data, Research and Evaluation in Nigeria
EiEWGN	Education in Emergencies Working Group Nigeria
EVET	Extremism, Violent Extremism and Terrorism
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGA	Income-generating activities
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ISWAP	Islamic State West Africa Province
JAS	Jamā'atu Ahl as-Sunna lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād (also known as Boko Haram)
JSS	Junior Secondary School
KII	Key informant interview
LGA	Local Government Area
LGEA	Local Government Educational Authority
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MMC	Maiduguri Metropolitan Council
MPTFO	Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office
MRRR	Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
NAR	Net attendance ratio
NEDS	Nigeria Education Data Survey
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NCE	National Certificate in Education
NECO	National Examination Council

NEDS	Nigeria Education Data Survey
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency
NFE	Non-formal education
NFS	Non-formal school
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPC	National Population Commission
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OOSC	Out-of-school children
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
OVC	Orphaned and vulnerable children
PCNI	Presidential Committee on the North-East Initiative
PINE	Presidential Initiative on the North East
PRA	Participatory rural appraisal
PSS	Psychosocial support
PTA	Parent-Teacher Association
RCRP	Regional Curricular Renewal Project
SBMC	School-Based Management Committee
SEL	Social and emotional learning
SEMA	State Emergency Management Agency
SMWASW	State Ministry of Women’s Affairs and Social Welfare
SSI	Safe Schools Initiative
SUBEB	State Universal Basic Education Board
TEGA	Technology Enabled Girl Ambassador
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UBEC	Universal Basic Education Commission
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WAEC	West African Examination Council

1 Introduction

1. **Ongoing armed violence in north-east Nigeria has devastated the lives of many Nigerians.** Even before the conflict with Boko Haram, states in this part of the country had extremely low socio-economic and education indicators relative to the country as a whole and the continent more generally, and the armed conflict has only curtailed children's education further (NPC and RTI International 2011). However, the intensity of conflict in many communities in the region has reduced significantly since mid-2016 and the attention of government agencies, external funders and communities themselves has begun to turn from emergency response to post-conflict recovery in some areas. In the context of this shift, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) requested EDOREN to identify the reasons why children at primary level are out of school in the wake of violent conflict and to understand the emerging responses to addressing these barriers to school attendance.
2. **This report examines the perceptions and experience of primary education in two communities around the city of Maiduguri, Borno State.** It intends to provide a useful addition to existing research in three main ways. First, previous research has focused on interviewing key informants in the education system (including teachers, civil servants and NGOs), whereas this study complements key informant interviews (KIIs) with a bottom-up, participatory research method to understanding dynamics in the education system at the community level. Second, previous research has tended to focus on the impact of conflict on the 'supply' of and 'access' to education, whereas this research takes advantage of the community-level focus to explore changes in the 'demand' for education. Third, although most local government areas (LGAs) in Borno remain accessible to the United Nations (UN) and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) only with military escort (OCHA 2017a), data collection for this research took place after significant localised improvements in the security context and thus is instructive in its explicit focus on communities emerging from violent conflict.¹

1.1 Education in Borno State and the north east

3. **North-east Nigeria is made up of the six states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe.** While the region has consistently underperformed compared to Nigeria as a whole, Borno State stands out as having some of the lowest education indicators in the country.
4. **The Nigeria Education Data Survey (NEDS) reports found that in 2015 only 16% of parents or guardians sampled in Borno State were literate,** compared to 28% in the north east overall and a national literacy rate of 47% (NPC and RTI International 2016a). By contrast, the 2010 National Literacy Survey found that adult literacy *in any language* in Borno is at 58.6% compared to 71.6% nationally, though this is self-reported so likely not an accurate assessment of ability (NBS 2010). A similar pattern is observed on other dimensions of educational attainment, such as numeracy, which stood at 24.6% in Borno compared to 54.5% for Nigeria as a whole in the 2015 NEDS. What is clear is that Borno State lags behind




¹ Note that the selection of these two communities and the associated limitations regarding transferability of findings are discussed in more depth in Section 2.

other states when it comes to literacy and numeracy rates and consistently ranks among the five poorest performing states.

5. **While Hausa is the *lingua franca* of northern Nigeria, a significant proportion of Borno State residents are ethnic Kanuri and have Kanuri instead of Hausa as their primary language.** However, this does not convincingly account for the lower educational attainment, as the NEDS found that only 10% of the adult respondents in Borno were literate in their own native language, compared to 34.3% nationally (NPC and RTI International 2016a; NPC and RTI International 2016b).²
6. **In part underlying the low educational attainment are the relatively low attendance ratios for both primary and secondary school in Borno State.** Whereas ‘only’ 24.3% of children in Nigeria aged 4-16 surveyed as part of the 2015 NEDS had never attended school, in Borno this figure is the highest of any state at 74.8% (NPC and RTI International 2016b). Figure 2 below shows the stark difference in net attendance ratios for primary school-aged children in Borno (which decreased between 2010 and 2015) and the country as a whole (which increased over the same period).³

Figure 2: Comparison of net attendance ratios (primary school) in Borno and Nigeria: 2010 and 2015



Source: National Population Commission and RTI International (2016a)

7. **The statistics for Borno in particular should, however, be treated with caution.** In addition to the usual caveats about the representativeness of statistics at the state level, insecurity in Borno has limited access for data collection and meant that a significant minority of clusters were dropped from the samples of the studies cited. If accessibility is positively correlated with access to education and attainment (which seems plausible), then educational attainment in Borno may be even weaker than is suggested by the figures presented above.

1.2 Conflict in Borno State and the north east

8. **The *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS)*⁴ was founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri, Borno State as a religious sect advocating a conservative interpretation of Islam.** Also known as Boko Haram, which is often incorrectly translated as ‘western education is forbidden’, the group attracted a significant following among youth in the north east.⁵ The group preached a strict

² Some respondents are literate in English despite not being literate in their native language.

³ Note that the standard errors on these statistics mean that changes over time may not be statistically significant and should be treated with caution, particularly for Borno State where limited access meant several clusters were dropped from the sample.

⁴ Which translates to ‘People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad’ in Arabic.


⁵ The Hausa word ‘boko’ is ‘an indigenous Hausa word originally connoting sham, fraud, deceit, or lack of authenticity’ and not a loanword derived from the English ‘book’, although is now widely understood as such in the context of Boko Haram. See Newman (2013) for an in-depth discussion of the etymology of the word ‘boko’.

interpretation of the Quran and that ‘western education’ promotes an un-Islamic way of life.⁶ Although Sharia law was extended in twelve Muslim-majority states in northern Nigeria following democratisation in 1999, members of Boko Haram were frustrated with the pace of implementation and pushed to establish a ‘real’ Sharia state (Pantucci and Jespersen 2015). To provide consistency with the vocabulary used in the testimonies of community members later in the report, the term ‘Boko Haram’ is used instead of the group’s official name JAS or ISWAP (which was adopted following the group’s alignment with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in 2015).

9. **In 2009, Boko Haram increased the frequency and intensity of its attacks** on churches, government buildings and other noteworthy sites and incited a government crackdown during which up to 1,100 people were killed and that culminated in the death of the group’s leader, Mohammed Yusef, in police custody (Menner and Miller 2013). After a brief respite in 2010, there has been an escalation in violence characterised by greater radicalisation and an ineffective and in some cases counterproductive government response. Under the new leadership of Abubakar Shekau, the Boko Haram conflict has been characterised as a systematic and widespread human rights abuse that includes abductions, sexual abuse, forced conscription into the insurgent group and human trafficking.
10. **Although the causes of the violence are complex and have evolved over time**, there is no doubt that patterns of poverty and unemployment, lack of access to services, and a consequent sense of marginalisation from the Nigerian state helped to create an environment in which armed groups were able to build support and recruit through a combination of material incentives (i.e. payments in kind or in cash) and the lure of a sense of purpose that comes with belonging to a group with a strong ideological narrative. At various points, competitive patronage politics, support from transnational jihadist movements and the heavy-handed government response have further fuelled the conflict (Agbibo 2013; Asfura-Heim and McQuaid 2015; International Crisis Group 2015). The response of the Nigerian military against Boko Haram has also raised concerns of human rights violations and is said to have contributed to the displacement and insecurity in certain areas (Amnesty International 2015).
11. **In May 2013, the government declared a state of emergency in the most severely affected states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, intending to give the federal government and military more powers to tackle the violence.** By 2015, 24.5 million people had been affected by the Boko Haram armed conflict (OCHA 2015). Borno State has been worst affected, with between as many as 26,862 media-reported deaths between May 2011 and February 2017 (Council on Foreign Relations 2017) and over 4,556 civilian fatalities at the hands of Boko Haram and the Nigerian military at the peak of the violence in 2015 alone (ACLED 2017). Figure 3 below shows the escalation of violence from 2011 as well as the significant reduction in fatalities from late 2015 onwards. Since then, Boko Haram has lost territory, resources and fighters in the face of a stronger military response, greater regional and international coordination, new leadership and infighting between rival factions (ICG 2016).
12. **Eight years into the conflict and despite the recent reduction in fatalities, insecurity and armed conflict related to Boko Haram and government counter-offensives have caused multiple forced displacements**, with 187,000 Nigerians seeking refuge in neighbouring countries and an estimated 14 million Nigerians needing humanitarian assistance in the north east. Although it has been recorded that 1 million people had already returned to their homes by the last quarter of 2016, there are still 1.8 million internally displaced people (IDPs) in north-east Nigeria alone, of which 1.4 million are in Borno. Of these 1.8 million, an estimated 79% live with host communities; this is placing immense strain on limited infrastructure, resources and basic services (OCHA 2016).

⁶ The concept of ‘western education’ is vague and weakly articulated, but reflects a curriculum focused on English, mathematics and science initially introduced through missionary schools during colonialism that is now taught mostly in government and private schools.

Figure 3: Fatalities relating to Boko Haram or other police/military activity in the north east (2009–2016)



Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (2017)

13. **The present crises in the north-eastern states of Nigeria have caused widespread food shortages and malnourishment that has worsened over the past year.** Labelled as the worst man-made, under-funded crisis in recent years, in January 2017 UNICEF warned that 900,000 children in total or 240 children daily may starve and die of Severe Acute Malnutrition over the following twelve months if calls for funding were not met (Independent 2017a). Save the Children has further noted that many of these malnourished children are unaccompanied minors (ibid.). The sector as a whole provided support to 1.1 million people in Borno and Yobe through in-kind food transfers or cash-based transfers in January 2017, but the UN predicts that the number in need will increase through the year so that around 5.1 million people will face ‘emergency’ or ‘crisis’ levels of food insecurity in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe between June and August 2017 (OCHA 2017b).

1.3 Impact of conflict on education in Borno State and the north east

14. **The impact of conflict on education in north-east Nigeria and Borno State in particular has been devastating.** In 2015, UNICEF estimated that 37% of the IDPs in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states were between 6 and 17 years of age (UNICEF 2015). Although precise numbers are very difficult to generate, the Education in Emergencies Working Group Nigeria (EiEWGN) estimates that more than 800,000 school-aged children were displaced in late 2015, with more than 650,000 of these in two LGAs in Borno (Maiduguri and Jere) (EiEWGN 2015). It is therefore highly likely that the armed conflict and recurring displacements have significantly increased the number of out-of-school children (OOSC).

1.3.1 Attacks on schools: destruction and closures

15. **Boko Haram has targeted government facilities and especially public schools for attack.** Human Rights Watch reported that over 910 schools had been destroyed with 1,500 schools forced to close in north-east Nigeria since the Boko Haram incursion between 2009 and 2015 (HRW 2016). Over a period of just two weeks in February 2012, Boko Haram burned down at least twelve schools around Maiduguri, the Borno State capital (HRW 2012).
16. **By 2013, well-planned and coordinated attacks became more brazen during daylight with increased brutality and a greater focus on the education system.** In May 2013, anonymous government officials reported that Boko Haram had burned or destroyed 50 schools and an additional 15,000 school

children in Borno State had stopped attending school due to the continuous waves of Boko Haram's direct attacks on educational institutions targeting teachers and school children (IRIN 2013). This violence led the Borno State Government to close all public schools in 22 out of 27 LGAs for at least two years, and public secondary schools across the state for even longer (HRW 2016). This blanket closure has since been lifted.

17. **In March 2016, Borno State authorities reported that 512 primary schools, 38 secondary schools and two tertiary institutions had been totally or partially destroyed in the state since 2010** (Daily Trust 2016; HRW 2016). School destruction and the lack of school infrastructure have resulted in classes being conducted outdoors (UNICEF 2016a).

1.3.2 Impact of armed conflict on children

18. **Attacks on education have caused injuries, deaths and possibly lifelong psychological trauma to children and adults alike.** By early 2016, an estimated 952,029 school-aged children had fled in north-east Nigeria and consequently had little or no access to education (HRW 2016). Past government statements indicate that an estimated 49,000 children have been orphaned in Borno alone due to the armed conflict (Leadership 2016).
19. **The increased focus of Boko Haram attacks on schools has been attributed in part to the harsh government crackdown and offensive in late 2012, which led the group to target schools as grounds for abducting and forcibly conscripting new recruits** (HRW 2016). An infamous attack in 2014 was the abduction of 276 girls from a boarding school in Chibok, Borno, which caught the world's attention and led to global condemnation (CNN 2014). By March 2015, a regional military troop composed of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger pushed Boko Haram into the Sambisa forest, leading to it yielding most of the towns under its control and freeing hundreds of captives upon their escape. By April 2016, approximately 11,000 abductees had been released from Boko Haram captivity. Negotiations between the Nigerian government and Boko Haram brokered by third parties had secured the release of 103 girls from the Chibok abduction and an additional 60 had escaped by May 2017, leaving 113 of the 'Chibok girls' still unaccounted for (BBC 2017). Released abductees, especially girls, have often experienced sexual, physical and psychological violence, which presents challenges to their reintegration into education.
20. **While men and boys were abducted into the insurgent group as fighters, the abducted women and girls were enslaved and generally either used as domestic servants to support Boko Haram, given as brides to Boko Haram fighters, or sold in human trafficking markets.** Since 2016, Boko Haram has increasingly used abducted children, especially girls and young mothers carrying children who are seen as less 'likely' perpetrators of violence, as suicide bombers (Independent 2017b).

1.3.3 Impact of armed conflict on teachers and other education service providers

21. **In 2015, the President of the National Union of Teachers issued a statement declaring that 611 teachers had been killed, over half of which were in Borno State, and that 19,000 teachers had been displaced across the north since 2009** (Daily Trust 2015).
22. **Teachers and school staff stated that insurgents quietly started harassing and intimidating them in parts of Borno and Yobe from late 2012.** The initial targets of the Boko Haram visits were teachers from government public schools. Teachers of perceived 'western' subjects such as science, geography, English and Christian religion were said to be top of their kill list. There were suggestions that teachers were targeted because if there were no teachers no-one would go to school. Reports of Boko Haram insurgents hunting former teachers, head teachers and examiners and gunning them down surfaced

from various places. Eventually, clerics and Arabic teachers whose sermons or teachings were contrary to the belief and ideology of Boko Haram were also added to the kill list (HRW 2016).

1.4 Purpose of this research

23. **While the humanitarian need is still overwhelming relative to the response, the security situation has gradually improved since mid-2016.** In Borno, six LGAs⁷ were fully accessible to the UN in early 2017, whereas an additional 17 LGAs were accessible with military escort and/or had limited access to one or two major towns. This leaves four LGAs in Borno completely inaccessible by any humanitarian response (OCHA 2017a). Relative security has returned in particular to Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (MMC) and Jere LGAs, despite a continued threat from suicide bombings. Although displacement continues, there has been some voluntary return and ‘facilitated’ resettlement⁸ of IDPs to their communities of origin. Given these changes, the Government of Nigeria and international organisations are increasingly considering the prospects and challenges of transition from humanitarian emergency assistance to early recovery in some areas.
24. **This research aims to identify the reasons why children remain out of school in communities emerging from violent conflict, examine the response of the education system to these challenges, and present potential options for strengthening support to tackle this challenge.** Although the intended audience is decision-makers in government, international organisations, donors and INGOs considering an expansion of their education programming in Borno State, it is hoped that the research will also provide a useful insight for other stakeholders in the education system and broader post-conflict recovery in north-east Nigeria.
25. **The report builds on previous research commissioned by DFID and carried out by Girl Effect’s Technology Enabled Girl Ambassador (TEGA) programme that aimed to understand parents and children’s self-reported reasons for not attending government-supported primary schools** (Girl Effect 2017). The Girl Effect research was carried out in the same two communities in Maiduguri where this research took place and, where relevant, the report highlights similarities and differences between the findings of these two linked pieces of research.

1.5 Research questions

The main questions and sub-questions for this research are as follows:

Table 1: Research questions and corresponding report sections

Question	Section
1. Why are some primary school-aged children out of government school in Borno State?	
a. How does/has conflict and displacement affected communities’ demand for primary education?	3.2
b. How does/has conflict and displacement affected communities’ access to primary education?	3.3
c. How does/has conflict and displacement affected the delivery of primary education by different education service providers?	3.4

⁷ These six LGAs are MMC, Jere, Bayo, Kawayo Kusar, Hawul and Shani.

⁸ In some cases due to government decisions to close IDP camps.

d. What are the differences in access to and demand for primary education for boys and girls?	3.2, 3.3
2. In what ways does the primary education system in Borno State address community members' self-reported reasons for not attending government-supported primary schools?	
a. What activities or systems are in place to encourage access to and demand for primary education?	3.5
3. How could the education system be strengthened to respond to potential gaps in support to improve school attendance?	
a. What are the gaps in the existing education delivery system in responding to limited access to and demand for primary education?	Table 5
b. How could additional support most effectively respond to the challenges and gaps identified to improve school attendance of OOSC at the primary level?	4

1.6 Report structure

26. This section has provided an introduction to the research and context. Chapter 2 provides a short overview of the research method and is supplemented by additional detail on research ethics in Annex A. Chapter 3 presents the findings in five subsections, which correspond to the research questions as outlined in Table 1. Chapter 4 presents the policy implications and recommendations derived from the research and highlights areas for future research.

2 Method

27. **This chapter presents the research method and is structured in chronological order from design (Section 2.1) to analysis.** Section 2.2 summarises the process for recruiting and training researchers. Section 2.3 outlines the case selection and provides an overview of the two communities in Maiduguri that are the focus of this research. Section 2.4 discusses the process for sampling respondents within these two communities. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 provide an overview of how data were collected and analysed respectively. Finally, some of the limitations to the research are discussed in Section 2.6.
28. **The research is part of a two-phase study commissioned by DFID and completed by Oxford Policy Management (OPM) and Girl Effect.** As noted in Section 1.4 above, the first phase of the research was conducted by Girl Effect through its TEGA programme. The TEGA approach trains teenage and young women to conduct structured data collection and record data using a custom-made mobile app. The focus of the first study phase was to explore the perceptions of access to and barriers to government primary school from the perspective of OOSC at the primary level and their parents in two communities in Maiduguri in Borno State (Girl Effect 2017). The second phase of this research, the findings of which are presented in this report, seeks to confirm and enrich the findings of the Girl Effect research from the perspective of key informants in the same communities, including community leaders and community-based organisations (CBOs)/NGOs. It also seeks to approach the issue of OOSC from the perspective of key informants in the education system at community, LGA and state level to understand how the education system is responding to the barriers identified by the rest of the community and the challenges they face in doing so.

2.1 Research design

29. **This research utilised a primarily qualitative research method, although quantitative data were also collected through a short literature review that provided a situational background to the state of education in Borno.** A qualitative research method was employed in this assignment due to the exploratory nature of the research. While themes were tentatively identified through the literature review and researchers' prior experience of research on education in conflict-affected environments, it was deemed important that the research design should be flexible enough to capture and respond to new and unexpected themes. Furthermore, the research was focused on individual decision-making processes (i.e. whether to send children to attend government primary school or not) that necessarily take place beyond a positivist paradigm of 'objective' truths. Instead a social constructivist paradigm is better suited to gain insight into how individuals' values, beliefs, motivations and experiences interact with others and the environment to shape their perceptions of the world and influence the decisions they make. A primarily quantitative approach would not have provided the level of flexibility and insight into subjective processes necessary to answer the 'why' and 'how' questions being asked.
30. **The study adopts a multiple case study design to answer the research question.** The cases were the education systems⁹ in the two communities, as will be discussed in greater depth in Section 2.3. Within each of these cases, individual respondents were conceptualised as sub-cases. The inclusion of 'why' and 'how' questions, the need to understand contextual conditions relevant to the cases, and the unclear boundaries between the case and the context (i.e. other phenomena in the communities) made the selection of a case study approach an appropriate choice (Yin 2003). As noted in sections 2.6 and 2.7, the generalisation of findings outside the cases should be treated with caution – although some findings are likely transferable given similarities in context.

⁹ The education system in each community was defined as 'the set of actors who are involved in shaping patterns of school attendance and learning'. These include both community-level actors (such as school teachers, parents, community leaders and CBOs) and actors providing direction or oversight from a senior level.


2.2 Research team and training

31. **Researchers were selected from a pool of EDOREN researchers, mostly either with direct experience working with communities or who had prior qualitative research experience in education.** The research team was composed of six people with equal gender parity, including four national researchers and support from two international researchers. All four national researchers were from north-east Nigeria, with three from Borno and one from Adamawa.
32. **Fieldwork activities commenced in Adamawa in January 2017 with a three-day researcher briefing and training session culminating in a research pilot in two communities in Yola accompanied by the international researchers.** It was decided early on that it would be best to conduct the training and research pilot in a location with a similar-enough context to ensure interviews and activities made sense but with enough difference to facilitate an exploration of researchers' personal biases and greater understanding of the importance of the context of a particular location. The better security conditions in Adamawa compared to Borno were also more conducive to a pilot.
33. **Training was conducted in a participatory manner, immersing the researchers in activities they were to eventually conduct themselves.** The training provided an opportunity to develop a common vision, strategic research approach and terminologies among the team. Research tools were translated by the researchers into Hausa. The pilot was conducted at the end of the training and a debriefing was held after to discuss the process and tools. Revisions were made based on the feedback from the pilot.

2.3 Case selection

34. **The education systems of two communities in Maiduguri were selected as the cases for the research and data collection was conducted primarily in these communities but also the city more widely.** These cases – Kabar Maila and Kushari – were selected by Girl Effect due to the presence of a local partner who could facilitate access in an otherwise high-risk environment. However, these communities also have a number of characteristics that make them interesting cases to contrast.
35. **Both communities were severely affected by armed violence during the insurgency,** with many respondents reporting being personally threatened by members of Boko Haram, being forcibly displaced and losing close family members. However, both communities have also experienced significant improvements in their security over the past year. In this respect, they present ideal cases for studying the dynamics in communities emerging from violent conflict and where attention is beginning to shift from emergency assistance towards early recovery. The two communities have also received a significant inflow of IDPs as a result of the conflict.
36. **There are also some notable differences between the communities.** Whereas Kabar Maila is an old district of the city located near the heart of the city, Kushari is a relatively new, peri-urban district located on the outskirts of the city at the southern edge of the 'safe

Figure 4: Map of cases within Maiduguri



Source: Adapted from UNICEF (2016b)

zone' (see Figure 4). Some maps place Kushari in MMC whereas others place it in neighbouring Jere LGA.¹⁰ The nature of the IDPs living in each community is also different: in Kabar Maila, IDPs live in a UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)/National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)-managed IDP camp and amid the host community. However, in Kushari there is no formal IDP camp but rather an informal settlement where IDPs have constructed temporary shelters on open land. Furthermore, the education system in Kabar Maila is much more established, with a government-run primary school and several other schools nearby, whereas there is no public or private primary school offering a government-recognised curriculum in Kushari, meaning children must travel further to school. The boxes below provide a summary of each case in more detail. Information on the communities was gathered based on researchers' ocular observations, historical and/or local knowledge and KIIs in the community.

Box 1: Summary of Case 1 – Kabar Maila

The community of Kabar Maila¹¹ is located in Shehuri North ward near the city's centre. Meaning 'Royal Cemetery' in Kanuri, it is one of the city's older districts and is a densely populated residential area. Although still poor, the community maintains strong links to wealthier and educated elites given its well-established nature and proximity to city landmarks, such as the Shehu of Borno's Palace and Government Residential Area. Residents are primarily ethnic Kanuri.

The education system in Kabar Maila comprises one government-run primary school and several informal providers such as religious schools (*Islamiyya* and *tsangaya*). The government-run school reports to the MMC Local Government Education Authority and Borno State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB). There are no commercial schools in this community.

Kabar Maila was severely affected by the conflict with Boko Haram. Community members note that Mohammed Yusuf, leader of the sect, lived near this community in the mid-2000s and built up a significant following there. The area was a flashpoint for clashes between Boko Haram and the Nigerian military, during which many civilians were killed and fear pervaded residents' everyday lives. It experienced a high intensity of violence until the community was purged by the military and residents were forcibly displaced from the community *en masse* in 2012 for over two years before gradually returning from 2015 onwards. The security situation has significantly improved through 2016, to the extent that respondents reported that regular attacks or bombings were no longer a major concern.

The community has a formal IDP camp receiving government and UN support but also a significant number of IDPs living with host families and that are renting or have occupied vacant houses that were abandoned during the displacement. Although there are no reliable data, community leaders estimate that IDPs make up a small majority of residents in the community and come mostly from Kukawa in northern Borno State. The IDP camp has a school operated by UNICEF for residents of the camp, although access to this was not possible due to the lack of permit and limited time available.

Box 2: Summary of Case 2 – Kushari

The community of Kushari provides a contrasting case to Kabar Maila.¹² It is located on the far southern boundary of Maiduguri City on the border between MMC LGA and Jere LGA. The area was a forestry reserve until the late twentieth century, when a decision was taken to allocate the land as farms and later as residential plots. The size of the community has increased, although it still lacks many government services.

¹⁰ For example, UNICEF's maps depicting the needs of different wards in Maiduguri and surrounding areas places Kushari IDP camp in Jere LGA.

¹¹ Researchers encountered multiple alternative spellings for Kabar Maila, including Kavar Maila and Kawarmela. These in part depend on the language, i.e. Hausa or Kanuri, and dialect.

¹² Researchers also encountered multiple alternative spellings for Kushari, including Kusheri and Koshari. This report uses Kushari, which appears to be marginally more common than the others.

There is no government-supported primary school in the community. Although a site was selected and classrooms constructed ready for a public primary school to open several years ago, the land is subject to a property dispute that has prevented the school from opening. As a result, children wishing to attend a government primary school must walk 45-60 minutes to the nearest school, Mafoni Liberty Primary School. The boundaries of the school system in Kushari are therefore particularly blurred and extend geographically into neighbouring communities. In addition to pre-existing religious schools, an INGO has stepped in to fill the gap left by the lack of government primary school by providing non-formal education (NFE) in Kushari. There are no commercial schools in this community.

Kushari has seen a huge influx of IDPs, who live with host communities or in makeshift tents in an informal settlement that has sprung up. Most of the IDPs in Kushari that were interviewed are said to be from rural areas, and from southern Borno, such as Bama, Damboa, Gwoza, Chibok, Michika and Dikwa, something that is borne out by our field observations. IDPs in Kushari were ranked as facing the third most severe protection issues out of IDPs at 26 sites assessed in Maiduguri by the Protection Sector Working Group in 2016. This was reflected in the high numbers of civilians rescued from Boko Haram, commonplace sexual exploitation (including 'survival sex'), some reported hostility between Kanuri and Bura ethnic groups over food distributions, and their being more targeted for attacks/bombings relative to other communities (PSWG 2016). Researchers noted that most of the IDPs were once farmers and that, due to the insecurity, they have been unable to continue farming in Kushari. Trade, another source of income for people of this region, has been adversely affected by conflict and has led to this population being pushed into severe poverty.

2.4 Sampling

37. **Respondents in each case were sampled purposively for the research.** Participants in the participatory rural appraisal (PRA) were either key informants identified by researchers in advance based on their roles in the community or community members selected by the community leader on the basis of the sampling framework, which was designed by the research team to ensure inclusion of a broad range of individuals. The sampling criteria in this framework were:

- Inclusion of key informants in the education system, including: head teacher; male teachers; female teachers; parents; School-Based Management Committee (SBMC) members; Local Government Educational Authority (LGEA) representative; local security provider (e.g. member of Civilian Joint Task Force or local police); women's group leader; representative of NGO/CBO);
- Inclusion of additional community members to increase the number of total participants to 25, with an approximate balance between:
 - Men and women;
 - Original residents in the host community / IDPs who had been displaced to the community;
 - High(er) income / Low(er) income.

38. **Two PRAs were held in each community on different days and in different locations.** In total, 104 people participated in the four PRAs, all of whom were contacted and convened by the community leader. Although this may increase the risk of sampling bias, this was necessary to ensure safe access in an environment where insecurity and distrust of outsiders are real concerns. Sampling bias was reduced by combining this with a snowballing approach to identify additional respondents for follow-up KIIs. Some participants in the PRA were subsequently interviewed as key informants.

39. **Table 2 below shows the breakdown of the 67 interviewees by role and location.** Note that some interviewees were considered part of the education system of both communities (for example, because they operate at the LGEA/state level) and these are labelled as 'shared' across the two communities.

Table 2: Interviewees by role and location

Role	Kabar Maila	Kushari	Shared (i.e. LGEA/state level)	Total
Community leaders ¹³	5	3	0	8
Teachers (govt.)	3	3 ¹⁴	0	6
Teachers (non-govt.) ¹⁵	3	2	1	6
Government representatives	0	0	6	6
Local NGOs, CBOs and philanthropists	0	1	4	5
Community members	15	16	1	32
INGOs, international organisations and bilateral donors	0	0	5	4
Total	26	25	17	67

40. Seventeen out of the 67 respondents (25%) interviewed were women and 12 (18%) were *currently* internally displaced. Snowballing was also utilised in following up important or interesting cases mentioned in the PRAs or KIIs. Although children are the ultimate intended beneficiaries of primary schooling and this research, this group was not included given that they were the focus of the first phase of research carried out by Girl Effect.

2.5 Data collection

41. **In addition to a short literature review undertaken primarily to inform the design of the research questions, data for this study were collected through PRAs, KIIs, informal discussions with community members, ocular observations and researchers' field notes.** The actual fieldwork and data collection was conducted from 16 to 28 January 2017. An average of five days was spent in each research community. During this timeframe, KIIs with government officials, CBOs and local NGOs were held toward the end of the research, or depending on availability. Where appropriate, factual information about events and trends in the community was triangulated for credibility and validity.
42. **Data translations and transcriptions were ongoing throughout the data-collection period.** Recognising the amount of time and effort needed to translate and transcribe interviews, transcripts were completed by 24 February 2017. Data cleaning started upon receipt of the initial transcripts and involved the removal of sensitive information, including personal data that may make respondents easily identifiable.

Box 3: Research ethics

In conducting this research, the following guiding principles were followed:

- Informed consent;
- Do no harm;

¹³ Including traditional community-level leaders (Bulama) but also others in leadership positions recognised by the community, such as leaders of women's or youth groups.

¹⁴ Although Kushari has no operational government-run school, three teachers from government-run schools were interviewed: one from the nearest government-run school 4–5km away (which some children in the community attend) and another two who had been displaced from their jobs at government-run schools elsewhere and were currently volunteering at *Islamiyya* or NGO schools.

¹⁵ This includes teachers at *Islamiyya*, *tsangaya* and NGO-run schools, as well as volunteers teaching outside school settings in the community.

- Inclusive and participatory research;
- Privacy and confidentiality.

These principles were discussed during training and are outlined in more depth in Annex A.

2.6 Analysis

43. **Analysis began through debriefs and informal interaction between researchers during the fieldwork.** Emerging findings were used to identify gaps in data and additional respondents, as well as to guide further questioning. These discussions were consolidated during a two-day debrief during which PRAs and KIIs were discussed, personal biases explored, assumptions challenged, and tentative conclusions drawn.
44. **Transcripts were uploaded to the online analysis platform Dedoose¹⁶ for thematic coding based on a code structure that was adapted during the coding process.** Transcripts were also tagged with ‘descriptors’ that reflected meta-data (gender, location, role, displacement status) to facilitate a more rigorous approach to identifying similarities and differences in responses within and across different groups.
45. **The data represent a snapshot of the perceptions and dynamics as reported by sampled individuals in each of the cases at a given moment in time.** While most questions asked respondents for their *own* views (i.e. ‘what do you..?’ , ‘in your perspective...’, ‘why do you think...?’), responses were often framed in general terms as trends within the community as a whole (i.e. ‘people here...’, ‘the community...’, ‘we think...’). Findings therefore pertain primarily to the sub-cases but were framed by respondents as general trends within the broader case (i.e. community).¹⁷ By identifying common patterns in responses, some findings have been presented as relating to the communities as a whole rather than individuals, albeit keeping in mind the implications of sampling bias.
46. **The research design does not allow for generalisations from the cases to other communities in Borno more broadly.** However, by gaining a thick description of the context of each case and discussing with respondents and researchers how the contexts likely relate to the findings, some findings may – tentatively – be transferable to similar contexts (Guba and Lincoln 1994, Shenton 2004). The advantage of the multiple case study approach selected here is that context-specific features that may have influenced findings have already been identified through comparison of the two cases. This report has provided detail on the context of each case (in boxes 1 and 2 above, and in the findings themselves presented in Chapter 3) in an attempt to provide readers with a proper understanding of the context that will allow them to consider the transferability of the findings to their own contexts with which they are more familiar. Where possible, we offer their own comment on the transferability of particular findings.

2.7 Limitations

47. **There are a number of limitations to the research design.** Most notable is the risk of respondent and researcher bias, which influence the nature of the data collected and the quality of inferences made respectively. An explanation of the most important types of bias in this research and our response is summarised in Table 3 below. However, even after addressing this bias there are still significant

¹⁶ Version 7.5.15.

¹⁷ Note that research from psychology finds individuals tend to over-emphasise individual characteristics in explaining others’ behaviour but tend to over-emphasise situational factors in explaining their own behaviour. This raises the possibility of some forms of attribution bias in making the inferential leap from sub-case to case.

limitations that prevent the drawing of robust conclusions that are generalisable across Borno and north-east Nigeria.

Table 3: Addressing bias in the research design

Type of bias	Explanation	Response
Social desirability bias	Respondents may tend to give answers that they believe will be well received by researchers (e.g. 'western' education is good, low school attendance is a problem, girls deserve to be educated as much as boys, etc.).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National researchers in our team were from Borno or elsewhere in northern Nigeria. Comparison of results with Girl Effect study where young women did interviews. More sensitive questions were phrased in the third person, allowing respondents to distance themselves from socially undesirable views.
Sponsor bias	Knowing that the research is commissioned by DFID and feeding into a policy process, respondents may tend to give answers that they believe will enable them to derive the most benefit.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We explained that they are not decision-makers and this is only one piece of evidence that will be used to inform decision-making.
Selection bias	Respondents may be 'atypical' of the group they were selected to represent (e.g. a teacher could be selected who has views that are not widely shared by other teachers).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Selection of respondents with different backgrounds (roles, genders and displacement status). Selection of multiple respondents for each sampling group. Triangulation/verification of factual information.
Confirmation bias	Media coverage of the alleged negative impact of conflict on education has been widespread. Responses and inferences may be disproportionately influenced by and therefore 'confirm' this coverage instead of being based on their own experience in their community.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We adopted a critical approach to probing to seek concrete examples that support assertions. Critical group reflections drawing on our different backgrounds (both Nigerians and international) and biases.
Habituation bias	Researchers or respondents have become desensitised to conflict and have ceased to recognise how it does or could influence their lives.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Training conducted in Adamawa State to increase researchers' focus on how and why context and conflict matters. Critical engagement from international researchers.
Questioning bias	The order or structure of questions may influence responses. For example, leading questions may encourage acquiescence or confirmatory answers from respondents.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Open, non-leading questions. Broader questions about education and community in general were asked before questions about the impact of conflict in particular.

48. **Overall, the researchers consider the findings of this study to be trustworthy insofar as they are credible** (i.e. the phenomena have been accurately recorded), **dependable** (i.e. similar results would be generated if the research were repeated in the same place and in a similar timeframe) **and confirmable** (i.e. findings are the result of experiences and ideas of informants and not those of the researchers) (Shenton 2004). As noted above, in some instances the findings may also be transferable.
49. **It is important to recognise that, although this research attempts to contextualise patterns of OOSC over time in Borno, it nonetheless relies on data collected at one point in time**, i.e. January and February 2017. This does not make the research less relevant on the whole, but the constant evolution of the conflict, humanitarian situation and early recovery efforts should be considered when drawing inferences from this research. Readers are therefore encouraged to read this report in conjunction with other key reports (including NBS and UNICEF 2015, USAID 2015b, and HRW 2016).

3 Findings

50. **This section presents the findings of the research in five parts.** The first section explores community members' understandings of education and the different forms it takes, and is intended to provide additional context to facilitate the interpretation of subsequent sections. The second section highlights a perceived surge in demand for formal education since the Boko Haram conflict began, and contrasts this to the historically low level of demand prior to the crisis. The third section explores the barriers to accessing formal education in the two communities and the key drivers behind this access. The fourth section highlights some key challenges in supplying formal education following the conflict and how this interacts with the trends in demand and access that are the focus of the research. The final section discusses existing responses to strengthen primary education provision. The alignment of these sections with the research questions was outlined in Section 1.5.

3.1 Understandings of education

51. **It was critical to recognise at the onset of this research that Nigeria has several forms of educational system.** Community members' perceptions of a particular kind of school and their decisions on whether or not they send their children to this school must be situated in the context of these broader education system(s). As such, one of the most basic questions asked during the research is how respondents define the word 'education'.¹⁸

52. **Very few respondents in Kushari and Kabar Maila immediately associate the word 'education' with government-supported or formal education.** Although many distinguish between 'western education' and 'religious education', they tend to emphasise that education can be attained through a variety of means:

Education is '*ilimi*' in Hausa. The meaning of the word is 'changing someone's condition' and it involves many things. – *Male teacher at government school in Kabar Maila.*

Education is the acquiring of knowledge whether western or the traditional Quranic, *Tsangaya* or *Islamiyya* system of education ... When we talk of education, it is the process of acquiring knowledge. – *Male community leader in Kabar Maila.*

Education to me is knowledge. Anything that will be beneficial to a human being in his day to day livelihood and life. – *Male community member in Kabar Maila.*

Some people have this notion that if you have religious education but cannot speak English and write then you are not literate, which is not true. Education is anything that helps you to live a better life. – *Government official at the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), Borno State*

If there is no education, there is nothing ... Knowledge could be whichever type, whether it is that of western or Islamic education. – *Other male community leader in Kabar Maila.*

53. **A small minority of respondents (mostly education providers and government officials, who tend to have received more formal education themselves) defined education more narrowly.** They often related education to the attainment of literacy and by implication with formal education:

Education is in short to know how to write and read. – *Male IDP teacher in Kushari.*

¹⁸ Note that there is no direct translation of the word 'education' in Hausa or Kanuri. The closest word is '*ilimi*', although this also covers 'knowledge' more broadly (i.e. the 'output' of education). Asking 'why is education important to you?' in Hausa is therefore semantically very similar to 'why is knowledge important to you?'. The word '*ilimi*' was used in PRAs and KIIs.

Any person who did not attend the western education... there is a gap in his life. – *Male government official at the State Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Welfare (SMWASW)*

54. **These broad understandings of education as a 'process' or 'knowledge' clearly indicate that individuals do not consider formal schooling as the only means of acquiring education.** This has important implications when explaining the existence of out-of-(formal)-school children. Although the international education policy community may consider children who are not enrolled and/or do not attend schools with curricula focused on literacy and numeracy as not accessing education, this understanding is not necessarily shared by residents of Kushari and Kabar Mailar.

3.2 Demand for education

55. **As discussed in Section 1.1, Borno State has some of the historically lowest levels of formal school enrolment and attendance in both Nigeria and globally.** Although it is challenging to explain empirically to what extent this observed behaviour is driven by a lack of demand for (i.e. willingness to attend) formal education or a lack of access (i.e. inability to attend), there is broad consensus among respondents in Kushari and Kabar Mailar that residents of these communities and Borno more generally have undervalued formal education in the past. This view is held by both those in government and community leadership positions and community members. However, there is also an almost unanimous perception that the conflict has increased demand for education and formal education, in particular relative to pre-conflict levels. This section discusses some of these trends and the drivers behind these changing attitudes.

3.2.1 Setting the scene: low levels of demand for formal education in Borno State

56. **Respondents in the two case communities noted several drivers that have contributed toward the historic low demand for formal education.** Many of these factors are rooted in the long-term absence of formal education in Borno State. Prior to the construction drive of government-run formal schools in urban centres in Borno in the 1960s and 1970s, education was acquired mostly through the non-formal *tsangaya* schools, through which children and adolescents memorised the Quran through recitation and writing in Arabic. Although practices vary between *tsangaya* schools, overall the *tsangaya* system is not regulated and often consists of a transactional relationship between a '*mallam*' (teacher) who provides Quranic education in exchange for the income-earning labour of his '*almajiri*' (students).

Education came to my area, Korede ward in Damboa, in 1974. I mean western education but before then we used to have the *tsangaya almajiri* system. When western came, that one gradually ceased to be relevant. – *Male IDP teacher in Kushari.*

57. **There is some suggestion that the attachment to 'traditional' forms of Quranic education and the *tsangaya* schools is greater in Borno State,** possibly in part due to citizens' pride in Borno's pre-colonial history of resistance to the Sokoto Caliphate and a regional seat of Islamic learning under the Kanem-Bornu Empire.

Borno State is known by everyone as an area that acquired Arabic/Islamic education more than any other part in this country. – *Senior male government official, Borno State Ministry of Education.*

58. Reinforcing this point, 25.8% of Muslim children surveyed as part of the 2015 NEDS attended *only* religious school, although higher proportions in this regard were found in Bauchi and Yobe states (NPC and RTI International 2016b).

Historical resistance to formal education

59. **The introduction of formal education to Borno State was met with a resistance that was prevalent until relatively recently.** Association with ‘western education’ was frowned upon by some community members as something imposed by ‘outsiders.’ This perception in part explains the low enrolment rate in the past:

Some people see formal education as paganism. Even at the beginning, if you try to acquire western education you are seen as someone who partakes in paganism. – *Male Tsangaya teacher in Kabar Maila.*

The suspicion [toward formal education] did not allow some parents to easily allow their children to go school ... And not only that, before recently some parents felt that western education is synonymous with Christianity. So, if you are to go and acquire western education there is every tendency that you will lose your culture and you may even lose your religion and sacrifice your religion and culture for western education. – *Senior male government official, Borno State Ministry of Education.*

60. **The perception that formal education is ‘anti-Islamic’ has also taken on a cultural dimension,** with some Kanuri respondents noting that resistance to formal education has been specific to their ethnic group.¹⁹

This [resistance] is mostly attributed to the tradition and culture of the Kanuris. They have an old ideology that despised western education, which they believed was not meant for them. They preferred the *Tsangaya* and *Islamiyya* schools even before the period of Boko Haram. Then Boko Haram came and built on those beliefs. Education is considered as ‘*kira nasara*’, meaning white man’s knowledge. – *Male teacher at government school in Kabar Maila.*

61. **There is suggestive quantitative evidence from a 2012 study that confirms this belief,** since ‘coming from a ... Kanuri family reduces the probability of attending secular [though not religious] school relative to coming from a Hausa family’, although the effect is not statistically significant after controlling for other factors (Antoninis 2012).

Geographical variation in demand for formal education across Borno State

62. **Respondents noted that longstanding resistance to western education varies by area within the state, in part reflecting its religious and ethnic heterogeneity.** While Christian missionaries extended their presence to southern Borno and consequently ethnic groups in the south of the state tend to be Christian and reportedly have less resistance to western education, the opposite can be said of the north:

People in northern Borno who were deeply rooted in Islamic education were suspicious of western education and so do not allow their children easy access to western education – *Senior male government official, Borno State Ministry of Education.*

63. **In addition to the north-south variation, respondents noted the variation in demand for formal education between urban and rural areas that is commonplace in many low-income contexts:**

¹⁹ The Kanuri ethnic group make up a majority in Borno State and are the largest (mostly) Muslim ethnic group in Borno. It is therefore unclear whether respondents are therefore using ‘Kanuri’ as a marker for ‘Muslim’ or whether respondents are emphasising that there are socio-cultural traits specific to the Kanuri population that make them resistant to western education relative to other Muslim ethnic groups.

Borno State people, especially in the rural communities, are not so much inclined to western education. – *Senior male government official, SUBEB.*

Gendered aspects of demand for education

64. **One final pattern in the historical level of demand for education is the preference for formal schooling for boys but not girls:**

In most of the local areas, they do not like to send their female children to school. That is why I am telling you that they believe that Islam said women are supposed to stay at home. – *Male host community member in Kushari.*

The boys' demand is higher. You know for the girls once they feel they are matured they get married, especially the Kanuris. – *Male IDP teacher in Kushari.*

65. The purpose of this section is not to argue that a majority or even significant minority of the population of Borno State do not value formal education. Indeed, repeated 'sensitisation' and 'enrolment' campaigns have gradually increased demand to the point where formal schools are in many cases at (or over) capacity. Instead, these long-term trends highlighted by respondents merely set the backdrop for a discussion of more recent changes in demand for formal education in the two communities examined here.

3.2.2 Increased demand for formal education in the wake of armed conflict

66. **Despite the long-term resistance discussed in the previous section, there has been a significant increase in demand for formal education since the outbreak of the Boko Haram conflict.** This perception was shared by all stakeholder groups consulted in both Kushari and Kabar Maila (including parents, community leaders, teachers from both formal schools and non-formal schools (NFS), and government officials) and therefore constitutes one of the strongest findings of the research.

67. **Although it was noted above that adult community members recognise the value of sending their children to school, what strongly came out in this research was that it was the children themselves who wanted to attend primary school.** This finding was strongly corroborated by the earlier research conducted by the TEGAs, who conducted interviews with 85 children in the two communities (Girl Effect 2017). In several instances, the children (especially of displaced families) themselves were the ones who talked to their parents or other family members to ask for their help enrolling in government schools. Other times, it was reported that the children themselves got enrolled in school while for others it was an older sibling who enrolled them in primary school:

...parents may not enrol their children in school. But now even if one's older children have not been educated, he will enrol the younger ones because of what the crisis has caused... – *Male host community member in Kabar Maila.*

...boys have more access to education than the girls and they strive more... some boys for instance, like those sitting here, their parents were not the ones who enrolled them in school... At this age, they will just learn how to read and write and then enrol themselves into schools without the knowledge of their parents... – *Male host community member in Kabar Maila.*

This section will examine the drivers of this change in the context of the two cases.

Education as a force for peace building and conflict prevention

68. **Interviewees and PRA participants from a cross-section of stakeholder groups shared the perception that a ‘lack of education’ was a key driver of the Boko Haram insurgency.** This perception has led to increased demand for formal education in several ways.

69. **First, respondents commented on the ‘moralising’ force of education that is conducive to conflict prevention.** Considering the present insurgency, the prevailing belief is that, if a person is educated in the ‘western’ way, s/he will not be as impressionable and indoctrinated, s/he can think for themselves, reflect on the consequences of his/her actions and make the right decisions. This was echoed in both PRAs and KIIs from all research communities, but more so from Kabar Maila:

If someone is educated he wouldn’t engage in fighting or provoking crisis and if you tell an educated person anything he will think and reflect about it. But for the uneducated whatever he is told he will believe it and fight about it. So, there is nothing better than education. If one isn’t educated he is just like a donkey. – *Male host community member in Kabar Maila.*

Before the utility of education wasn’t taken very seriously until the conflict engulfed all of us; so why it affected the desire for schooling now is because of the realisation that ignorance is one of the causes of this tragedy and calamity. That is why now everybody wants to be educated. – *Female community member in Kabar Maila.*

70. **These sentiments may constitute a vernacular, ‘everyday’ parallel to discussions of the importance of ‘critical thinking’ skills in preventing violent conflict in some education policy circles.** Despite these perceptions within the community, however, other evidence suggests there is no clear link between the type of education received and violent extremist attitudes or behaviours in Borno. For example, recent qualitative research into former youth members of Boko Haram and youth who resisted recruitment efforts suggests there was no clear pattern that distinguished the two groups. Former Boko Haram members came from diverse backgrounds, with some having attended secular school, others Islamic school, and others having dropped out altogether (Mercy Corps 2016). Indeed, community members, education providers and government stakeholders in this study commonly emphasised that proper Islamic education also played an important role in moral education and conflict prevention. These findings suggest a more nuanced analysis is required in which ‘critical thinking skills’ are recognised as neither necessary nor sufficient in countering violent attitudes and behaviours, although ultimately more research is needed into this issue.

71. **Second, some respondents noted that youths with low incomes were more vulnerable to joining armed groups.** Given the value placed on formal education as a means of skills acquisition that yields economic dividends, respondents implied (though did not state explicitly) that formal education also made youth more resistant to joining Boko Haram because of its economic effects:

It is largely fed by poverty; if you are in poverty and have no self-control when you see money you may be tempted. Many youths in our village who were suffering from deprivation in their lives were easily enticed into joining [Boko Haram] once they were shown the money. – *Male IDP community member in Kushari.*

72. **Finally, a minority of respondents implied that the Boko Haram insurgency had (perhaps ironically) introduced a new stigma to those who resisted formal education.** Community members who might otherwise have expressed resistance to formal education now embrace ‘western education’ as a way of distinguishing themselves from an armed group with a more radical agenda:

Since the crisis everyone wants to get educated. So many even go just because they don’t want to be the odd ones out ... So they are now rushing ... Now even the grown-up boys want to go to

school so that they wouldn't be viewed as those who disdain education and then be seen as Boko Haram. – *Female IDP community member in Kushari.*

Changing attitudes of religious leaders and educators

73. **Religious leaders (imams) and teachers (*malams*) are highly respected and influential in both research communities, which are predominantly Muslim.** With the initial resistance to attending government-sponsored formal schools or 'western' schools coming in part from Islamic religious leaders and imams, their recent change in attitude by enrolling their own children in formal schools has helped promote 'western' education and influenced the attitudes of many of their followers:

There were some *malams* (religious scholars/teachers) who used to think that if you take your child to school it is as equal as taking the child to hell. They have started bringing their children to school here. You see that there is change. I will never forget, at the time I completed the Qur'anic school and joined western school, there were some of our colleagues, mainly the senior ones who were in deep hatred with western education ... But nowadays they have changed their minds because I help them in such a way that their children could not help them. – *Male teacher at government primary school in Kabar Maila.*

74. **This change in attitudes has also led to a willingness on the part of some malams to enrol girls in formal education too:**

Currently, the girls' demand is higher than that of the boys. I told you two of my children are in school and both are girls, Fatima and Maryam. The girls kept disturbing me that I should enrol them in formal school, saying that other girls are going to school. I have noticed that in other people's homes, the girls are more interested in going to formal school. When I visited the primary school, I noticed there are more girls than boys. When I spoke to some parents they also confirmed it. – *Male Tsangaya teacher (malam) in Kabar Maila.*

75. **It is possible that religious leaders and teachers have softened their earlier resistance to formal education as an attempt to differentiate their own religious teachings from those of Boko Haram.**

Support of traditional leaders in mobilising communities

76. **In addition to the role of religious leaders and educators, traditional leaders have also played a key part in stimulating community members' demand for formal education.** In many cases, traditional leaders act as intermediaries between philanthropists, outside organisations and beneficiaries of this support. This intermediary role may be achieved through the involvement of community leaders in enrolling children, persuading (and in one case coercing) parents who are otherwise resistant to sending their children to school, or the disbursement of funds that local philanthropists (including politicians) deposit to provide scholarships to parents or orphaned and vulnerable children (OVCs) in the community. The success of the education campaigns of the government and NGO partners in Maiduguri may be traced to them getting the 'buy-in' of traditional leaders who are well respected and even revered in their respective communities:

Addressing the problems starts from the *Shehu* (the paramount ruler of Borno/Maiduguri and environs), down to the *Ajiya* (district head), and then to the *Lawan* (ward head) and down to the *Bulama* (community/village head). The *Shehu* gives directive and the *Ajiya* and *Lawans* conveys the directives and it reaches the *Bulamas* and then the *Bulamas* enlighten the community that education is very important and that nobody should be left behind. Everybody should send his children, both boys and girls, to school. That is public enlightenment. They will gather people and tell them all the messages. – *Male host community member in Kushari.*

77. The respect for and influence of traditional leaders is evidenced by the fact that nearly all respondents recommended that any new support to the education sector should receive prior approval and support from the local *Bulama* or *Lawan*.
78. Our interviews reveal that traditional leaders in communities that were infiltrated by Boko Haram for a long period of time were incredibly vulnerable to attack and placed under significant physical and psychological pressure to comply with Boko Haram demands restricting formal education. It is possible that in newly 'liberated' communities, traditional leaders will moderate their support for formal education for fear of possible reprisals from remnants of Boko Haram.

Displacement has increased demand for formal education

79. **In both Kabar Maila and Kushari there are significant numbers of people displaced from other LGAs who are now living in either IDP camps, with relatives, squatting or renting accommodation.**

Although displacement has undoubtedly exerted a strong negative shock on the economic and psychosocial wellbeing of these people, there is significant evidence that it has increased the demand for formal education.²⁰

80. **There was a common perception among community leaders, community members and CBOs that IDPs on the whole had lower demand for education than members of the host communities.** This partly reflects the fact that IDPs have been displaced from more rural areas where children are required to input into agricultural labour or girls tend to be married off at an earlier age. However, moving to Maiduguri has exposed IDPs to new ways of thinking and there is some evidence that this has started to shift their social norms to be more accepting of formal education:

In the past, IDPs didn't want to send their children to school; instead they preferred them to go to farm. But now they want to send their kids to school having seen the urban lifestyle compared to the rural life. Although they have no shelter and other things, they regret not enrolling their children early enough. – *Young male host community member in Kushari.*

Even the rural people who didn't know the value of education do value education now, especially since they came to an urban community and they want to go to school but they can't. – *Female IDP teacher at non-formal INGO school in Kushari.*

81. **This growing demand for formal education among IDPs is also reflected in the findings of the TEGA research,** which concludes that moving to the 'city' of Maiduguri had led to a realisation that 'a different way of life' existed (TEGA 2017).
82. **However, IDPs' uncertainty about where they will be based in the future has in some cases mitigated against this increase in demand for formal education.** The possibility of being able to – or being required to – move away from the host communities has led some IDP parents to not enrol their children despite being able to:

They are IDPs and their stay is temporary in this community. As a result, some of them do not even enrol or try to access education – *Male host community member in Kabar Maila.*

83. **Two factors are likely to increase this uncertainty for IDPs.** First is the proposal by the State Government of Borno that IDP camps will be closed down in mid-2017 and IDPs will then be required to return home. Second, discussions among researchers revealed that there is no widely implemented and

²⁰ There is also evidence, of course, that displacement has increased *access* to education as well as demand. For example, 'more especially the children of the displaced wouldn't have had access to education in their localities if this problem had not arisen.' – *Senior government official in education system.*

recognised mechanism for transferring pupils between schools (e.g. certification or transfer letters), meaning re-entry to a certain grade is often at the discretion of the head teacher.

Poor economic prospects in the context of conflict have limited some parents' demand for formal education

84. **A minority of education providers, government officials and community leaders in the two communities noted that some parents and youth are less willing to invest time and resources into formal education** because they do not believe that there are sufficient job prospects to reward this investment. This has likely been exacerbated by the economic fallout from the conflict and possibly by the downward pressure that reduced global oil prices have placed on the Nigerian economy:

They have seen those that have graduated from school are jobless, which has discouraged them a great deal. They ask why should they waste their time studying since the end result is unemployment. It is better to sell things in the market and make money. – *Male Tsangaya teacher in Kabar Maila.*

If you send your child to school he will expect that after finishing he will get something to do, but if he has finished schooling and he can't get anything to do then it is frustrating and discouraging to parents. – *Senior male government official, Borno State Ministry of Education.*

85. **It is interesting to note that no community members noted this dynamic, which is likely more relevant to demand for secondary and tertiary formal education (where expectations are higher) than primary education.** However, it is possible that teachers have a vested interest in blaming parents for not sending their children to school in order to deflect the possibility that the inadequacy of the school system itself may play a role.
86. **Despite the overall increase in demand for formal education for girls, there is a strong gender dimension to this dynamic,** whereby a small section of girls weigh the options of 'career' and 'marriage' and, in the context of conflict and reduced job prospects, may find the option of marriage more appealing:

When we remember the past up till now some parents have it in their mind. See what happens, we train this, we train this, no job, see the ones that finish school – some went to university and finished, no work. So they are not willing to push their children to school ... [Girls] say they are better off marrying than going to school and what is the value of school after all because of what we see. – *Female displaced community leader in Kushari.*

Even if they don't go to school or get an education if she comes of age she will end up in her marital home. For some, even if they do get an education it is possible that her husband will not allow her to complete a higher level of education or even get a job. – *Male host community member in Kabar Maila.*

3.2.3 'Western education' is not seen as a substitute for 'religious education'

87. **Nearly all respondents continue to emphasise the importance of Islamic education as a complement to (and in some cases substitute for) formal education.** This is reflected in both their responses to questions and their behaviour in terms of schooling preferences. All community members that commented on the issue noted that they continued to send their children to either *Islamiyya* or *tsangaya* schools even if they also attend government formal school:

[Despite the growing support for formal education], the child that goes to school in the morning, in the evening, he goes to the *tsangaya*. On Saturday and Sunday too, the children will go to *tsangaya* school. – *Male community leader in Kabar Maila*.

In the morning we send them to the formal school and when they are back they eat and pray then we send them to either *Islamiyya* or *tsangaya* ... You know if you have the Islamic knowledge, you can learn the formal one but you cannot learn Islamic knowledge from western education. If you acquire Islamic knowledge well then you can easily acquire the western knowledge. – *Female community leader in Kabar Maila*.

There are different types of education: there is the Islamic education and that of the white man. Each of them is very beneficial to the society. – *Male host community member in Kabar Maila*.

Allah encourages us to search for knowledge, both the western and the religious one. – *Male tsangaya teacher in Kabar Maila*.

If you look at local areas, they believe in Islam, and in Islam, if you didn't go deep in the knowledge of Islam, you will not understand some things. Because when you say 'Mallam [an Islamic teacher] said...' it is not the best. That is why we need education, both the western education and the Islamic education, because if you know something, you will be able to trace (the truth) and nobody will tinkle your head. – *Male host community member in Kushari*.

88. **Though it was not the objective of this research to compare the different educational systems children are sent to, evidence shows that presently there is a demand for a combined formal and Islamic education for families that can afford to send their children to both.** Despite the tendency to continue to send children to *tsangaya* schools, there is some concern when a child is solely sent to a *tsangaya* school and it is the only source of education. Specifically in Kabar Maila, there has been a relative increase in demand for *Islamiyya* schools. Aside from the fact that *Islamiyya* students learn a deeper understanding of Islam beyond the memorisation of the Quran, 'many of the first Boko Haram recruits from Maiduguri' reportedly came from the *tsangaya* schools, which has reportedly made it less popular to families in certain communities.

Islamiyya schools are currently more accepted and liked by the community. However, the disadvantage of *Islamiyya* is related to the funding. For example, I want my child to go to the *Islamiyya* school but the fees... At Ali Adam Qur'anic school, the monthly fee is NGN 1,000. Every month is NGN 1,000. I have seven children – it is not possible for me to pay out NGN 7,000 from my salary for the *Islamiyya* school. For that reason, despite my desire for them to study there, I had to take them out and bring them to *tsangaya* school. And the problem with *tsangaya* school is that, unlike an *Islamiyya* where once a child gets in he must be attentive to study, the *tsangaya* isn't like that ... They cannot be compared. *Islamiyya* is more acceptable to the people. – *Male community leader in Kabar Maila*.

3.2.4 Persistent pockets of resistance to formal education

89. **In spite of the reported increase in acceptance of western education in the research communities, it is equally important to recognise that there are still families that do not believe in sending their children to 'western' school.** Indeed, as noted in Section 2.7, there is a risk that respondents that prefer *tsangaya* school may be reluctant to admit this given that social norms are currently pushing them more toward formal and *Islamiyya* schools:

There are some people who believe that western education is not the best and it is better for them that their children stay with them and attend Quranic education and that is the end. And this has to do with norms and values. Up till now there are some areas, mostly in northern Borno, not

Maiduguri, where they still hold that belief [against western education]. – *Male government official at SMWASW.*

90. **This ongoing resistance was particularly noted by INGOs and NGOs that were involved in implementing projects in the education sector**, although it was emphasised that only a small minority of community members remained resistant:

There is still a small percentage of parents and their children that still resist it, even though the school is next door, just on their doorstep. They will not take their wards for reasons that we know and some we don't know ... They just don't believe education is a good thing. – *Senior representative of major international organisation in education sector.*

There are those within the community that want to destroy the process. That's one of the challenges we have. Those who are not really educated enough. – *Senior representative of major international organisation providing non-formal education.*


Some people are now trying to sabotage our effort, saying that we give the children biscuits to suck their blood. These are some insinuations that our [learning] centre is a cultist centre and it belongs to a Shia group and that we give the children cups for drinking water because we don't want the children to share drinking cups. We have heard so many negative things about our centre and we tried to refute it by telling the children not to believe that it is so, and even the parents should not to think so since they have not heard this from us. – *Representative of local CBO network supporting education sector.*

In all these instances, the engagement of community leaders was seen by INGOs and CBOs as crucial in overcoming this opposition.

3.2.5 Summary

91. **This section has shown how respondents in the two communities report a significant increase in their demand for formal education since the beginning of the Boko Haram conflict.** Interviewees repeatedly talked about 'becoming enlightened' or 'having their eyes opened' to the value of education, and this seems to be largely driven by each communities' experience with conflict. Figure 5 below summarises the mechanisms through which the conflict has exerted both upward and downward pressure on the demand for formal education.
92. **However, demand for formal education still varies between different groups.** There is still resistance to formal education from some individuals, and IDPs in particular are perceived as having a lower demand for formal education. However, this conclusion should be treated with caution. The perception that IDPs have a lower demand may be being made on the basis of observed behaviour (i.e. whether IDPs actually send their children to formal school), whereas in reality it is likely that IDPs' more limited *access* to formal education rather than lower *demand* for formal education explains this difference. This is discussed in more depth below. Further, Islamic education is still highly valued by a range of stakeholders and, to the extent that time and resource constraints limit children's attendance of both forms, Islamic education continues to be prioritised in a significant number of instances.

Figure 5: Short-term drivers of demand for formal education in Maiduguri, Borno State²¹



3.3 Access to education

93. The demand for formal education is no guarantee of access. Parents and children may *value* education highly and *prefer* to attend formal school but may be *unable* to attend education due to various obstacles imposed by the external environment. This section discusses the nature of these obstacles to accessing education.

94. This research reveals that, although there is a renewed understanding and belief that ‘western’ education is important, access to formal education in government schools is low in the two communities we visited. The conflict has brought challenges for many, particularly given the economic consequences of the conflict and pockets of insecurity, but it has also opened opportunities for some. Below is a list of both the positive and negative ramifications of conflict on access to primary education.

²¹ Darker shades indicate dynamics for which there is stronger evidence in terms of the frequency with which they were mentioned and triangulation between different types of respondents. The feedback loop between high demand for formal education and low demand for formal education through classroom overcrowding is discussed in more depth in sections 3.4.1 and 4.1.3.

3.3.1 Setting the scene: low levels of access to formal education in Borno State

95. **As noted in section 1.1, primary school attendance ratios in Borno lagged well behind the national average even before the Boko Haram problem escalated.** The NEDS estimates that the primary school net attendance ratio in Borno was 23% in 2010 and had fallen to 17% by 2015, compared with 63% and 67% respectively for Nigeria as a whole (NPC 2015).²² Moreover, 75% of respondents in Borno reported never having attended school at all.
96. **It is unlikely that Borno's low attendance ratios can be attributed to lower demand alone.** Instead, the relatively more rural nature of Borno, the higher-than-average incidence and intensity of poverty in the state, and the higher-than-average number of public primary school pupils per public primary school in Borno (possibly reflecting a lack of primary schools) are longstanding structural factors that have limited access to formal education in the long term.

3.3.2 Decreased access to formal education in the wake of armed conflict

97. Respondents in Kabar Maila and Kushari overwhelmingly focused on two barriers to accessing education: financial barriers to access and persistent insecurity.

Financial barriers to access: The cost of education

98. **A large majority of respondents in both communities reported that a lack of resources was a significant reason why parents did not send their children to formal school, especially for those living in extreme poverty.** Although the Universal Basic Education Act of 2004 declares a commitment to providing free basic education for all, there are still costs associated with attending school.
99. **The most commonly mentioned direct costs were learning materials (notebooks, pens, pencils, etc.), school uniforms, registration fees, parent–teacher association (PTA) fees and pocket money for children to buy breakfast or lunch.** School registration fees were reported to be between NGN 500 and 1,000, with smaller top-up fees monthly. Less frequently mentioned were direct costs, including exam fees (mostly for secondary education and the West African Examination Council (WAEC) examination), brooms for sweeping, and registration forms. Although individually relatively small costs, these expenditures quickly accumulate for those who have limited or no source of income. In Kushari, where there is no government primary school nearby, parents complain more frequently about the transportation costs incurred when sending a child to school:

Education is not free. They are not providing us with chalk and there are also textbooks which we are not provided with. They are only providing us with subject textbooks like the English, mathematics, social studies and science while other relevant subjects are neglected. Therefore, we have to source the money to enable us to buy the other subject [materials]... We also buy markers, school registers, chalk and books so on. These things are supposed to be provided by the government and we cannot do without them – they go about on air telling people that education is free. I have no choice but to collect a little levy of NGN 100–150 to enable us buy this item and run the school. – *Senior teacher at public primary school near Kushari.*

It may be understood as free of charge officially, but the teachers demand money, mostly without the knowledge of the headmaster. And some parents cannot afford even as little as NGN 100. – *Male community leader in Kabar Maila.*

²² Note that these statistics should be treated as estimates given the challenges involved in developing a statistically representative sample at the state level in the context of conflict and limited access.

100. **There is some evidence that these direct costs of attending education are higher in Borno than in neighbouring states**, and it is possible that this has partly resulted from weakened government capacity and the conflict itself. First, teachers have to buy many materials themselves and often pass these costs onto parents. This is particularly surprising given that both Kabar Maila and Kushari are located in and on the outskirts of Maiduguri respectively, and therefore might be expected to have better access to the SUBEB, which controls distribution of teaching materials in the state (assuming it has the resources to do so). For communities in more remote parts of Borno that are cut off from Maiduguri by the conflict, teachers may be even more dependent on mobilising community funds to purchase teaching materials. Second, some respondents noted that these direct costs had increased, possibly reflecting inflationary forces resulting from the higher concentration of demand and lower supply of materials in the context of conflict:

In the past, uniform was 'not for sale' and books too were 'not for sale' but now are there any 'not for sales'? There are none – you will have to buy it... That alone will hinder one from getting an education. – *Female displaced community member in Kushari.*

101. **This is supported by the findings of the NEDS**, which found that the mean cost of books and learning supplies was on average nearly four times higher in Borno than the average for the north east as a whole, while the mean cost of uniform and clothing was nearly 2.5 times higher (NPC and RTI International 2016a).²³

Financial barriers to access: Increasing poverty

102. **The direct costs of education are a particular obstacle to accessing formal education in the context of the increasing poverty and decreased purchasing power of many households in the wake of the conflict.** These are common problems faced by host community members but for IDPs living in informal settlements such issues are further compounded by their displacement, lack of productive assets and more limited access to labour market opportunities.

103. **People experiencing poverty prior to the insurgency are now in an even more vulnerable situation due to the ongoing conflict coupled with multiple displacements of communities.** The destruction of farms and displacement of farmers from their land to safer urban areas has led to a large spike in the cost of food, which means little is left over for expenditure on education. This is especially reflected in the comments of IDPs:

You look at the current situation now and it is difficult to even buy what to eat talk more of education. – *Female displaced community member in Kushari.*

You will buy school uniform, books, pay school fee and the rest. Parents are struggling to feed their families because of the hike in prices of goods, so they are more concerned with feeding their families than buying school materials. Most of them have enrolled their children in the *tsangaya* school because it is closer to them so they don't have to pay transport fares or provide lunch money since children can go home and eat. – *Female host community member in Kushari.*

There is no hardship like this time around. Before you can say no fear, children can trek to go to school without any problem. Food was everywhere – you could give your children food. But now just eating is a problem. Poverty is now all over. Before you could buy spaghetti for children for NGN 80 but now spaghetti is NGN 180. Books were NGN 20 before, now... Hah!... it is not easy for parents. – *Female leader of displaced community in Kushari.*

²³ Despite this, annual average expenditure total per pupil in Borno remains lower than both the north east and the rest of Nigeria. This is because many families do not send their children to school at all and thus these OOSCs lower the average expenditure total.

104. **The majority of the IDPs from Kushari come from rural areas where most are subsistence farmers.** Maize, millet, rice and cowpeas are mainly grown in this region aside from the small gardening of vegetables. Even displaced teachers from these communities talked about supplementing their salaries with farming. Because Kushari is located further away from the centre of Maiduguri, people do not venture away into the fields to farm for fear of being attacked, abducted or killed. With the prolonged conflict, people also do not have the money to buy seeds and other basic needs for farming. Reports indicate that for over three years the conflict and displacement has affected the farming sector, which has resulted in food crises in Borno (IRIN 2013b).
105. **Prior to the conflict, the host community of Kushari reportedly had an active trading business, markets and a number of small shops due to its location on the main route into the city.** Due to the destruction of markets and infrastructure in armed confrontations and the persisting security problems, businesses and trading ceased and have now only partially resumed; local markets are now smaller and prices higher. People in the community do not have the same purchasing power and there are very few jobs available. Interviews indicate that a great number of IDPs and host community members have no or very little source of income and rely mostly on NGO support.
106. **Following infiltration by Boko Haram and the subsequent military crackdown, the entire host community of Kabar Maila were themselves IDPs for approximately two years and only returned to the area early last year.** A number of KIIs with IDPs indicated that they had been displaced ‘multiple times’ before arriving in Kushari or Kabar Maila. As noted in Section 3.2.2, frequent displacement and the assumption that their present living situation is a ‘temporary’ arrangement were also cited as reasons why some families do not send their children to school. Although IDPs increasingly recognise that formal education is important, their daily struggle for survival means education is often the last thing on their minds.
107. **In this context, children of both IDP and host families help augment the family income through hawking.** This means there is an ‘opportunity cost’ in sending children to school, as parents must forego the potential income that children would have earned through hawking if they decide to send their children to school instead:

It is mandatory that the children must hawk to meet the needs of the family. Once they do that, they will not be punctual at school and they might be sent home by a teacher who might not be well experienced to understand these issues. – *Senior teacher in Kabar Maila.*

Increase in the number of female-headed households and orphans

108. **A large number of respondents had suffered the death of close family members as a result of the conflict, and a significant minority had lost the main breadwinner in the family** (in most cases their husband or father). This has resulted in a negative shock on the income of new single-parent households and further diminished their ability to meet the monetary costs associated with formal schooling. This is particularly the case if widowed women and their children have no relatives in the communities they migrate to, as daily survival and having food on the table is the priority. The lack of or limited skills of many female heads of households, as well as the lack of seed money to start up petty trade businesses coupled with the responsibility of caring for children, mean female heads of households in particular face an exceedingly vulnerable situation.
109. **Recent reports in IDP camps also show the high number of unaccompanied children and/or orphans** (IRIN 2013b). Interviewees in both research communities told us that there are ‘so many orphans in the community’ and that ‘no-one is responsible for them.’ These orphans are often left to fend for themselves and do not have the financial means or parental oversight to enable/encourage them to attend school. Unlike in IDP camps, where there are specific programmes for unaccompanied minors and/or orphans, those living outside the camps are left at the mercy of host community members or

IDP community members who would be willing to help them out. During the field research, there was no information gathered on any systematic support or registration for unaccompanied minors or orphans.

My problem is that my children don't have jobs and I am a widow. Most of the support comes from the NGO but I don't have access to this because one has to have their [registration] cards, which I am yet to get. I have six children with no father. I want my children to go to school but I don't have the resources and that has given me sleepless nights. – *Female displaced community member in Kushari.*

Children want to go to school but their parents are not financially capable and others have lost their parents ... Now they are interested in education but unfortunately there is no sponsorship or money. – *Male host community member in Kabar Maila.*

Because many men were killed, a lot of women became widows. They were left with orphans to cater for but most of the women have no jobs or occupation. Many resort to begging for alms on the streets. So this has affected the women badly because it is mostly the women who are here with the children. – *Female displaced community member in Kabar Maila.*

My brother was killed by Boko Haram right in front of our house. He left behind four wives and 12 children. Had it been he was still alive, he would have catered for his family but now they are a liability to us. That is the truth. – *Male tsangaya teacher in Kabar Maila.*

Orphans' lack of access to education is recognised as a major problem by community leaders and government officials alike.

Lack of or weak parental engagement and oversight

110. **Related to this, communities identified the lack of or weak parental engagement and oversight as another reason why there are many OOSCs.** As community members stated, parents may think that their child is in school whereas in reality the child may never have gone to school, but parents do not follow up so they are unaware that their child is missing classes. Some were concerned that their children would become involved with the 'wrong group', with social vices and frequent absences possibly leading to them dropping out of school.
111. **It was mentioned that, at times, it is the lack of information on or understanding of how the school works that prevents parents from sending their children to school or participating in the education of their children.** Other times it is the lack of entry points – though willing, parents do not know where to start and how to be involved, lacking awareness of the kind of contributions they can make in supporting the education of their children. Sometimes, parents are just too busy and do not have time to monitor children's behaviour. As stated above, some may not believe that western education is what their children need (reflecting a lack of demand) or they may be so busy with work that their children hardly have any parental oversight. Either way, lack of parental engagement may limit children's access to formal education.

Insecurity, fear and suspicion of 'outsiders'

112. Nearly all respondents noted the climate of fear that had resulted from the conflict with Boko Haram and the negative effect this had in the past on education. This dynamic has been covered in depth in other reports (HRW 2016) and repeated attacks by Boko Haram on government schools led to the complete closure of schools for 18 months from March 2014 until September 2016, leaving more than 250,000 primary and secondary school students were without schooling for more than two years (Premium Times 2016a).

Anytime there is a bomb mishap all the roads are blocked and a curfew is imposed immediately. This has on many occasions stopped the children from going to school; and when in school they find it difficult getting home. Some children were missing like this and up to now we don't know where they are. You can imagine such trauma even with the parents. – *Male host community member in Kushari.*

113. **However, it is worth noting that the majority of respondents emphasised that this fear had reduced or been mitigated to the extent that it was no longer considered a major barrier to access.** This is partly the result of broader gains made by the Nigerian military against Boko Haram and specific measures taken by the community to increase security in schools (such as hiring members of the Civilian Joint Task Force and police to guard schools and introducing bag checks).

In the past people were afraid to go to school but not anymore. In the past people hardly bothered about security in schools but now, because of the conflict, every school you go to you will see military men checking bags and children's socks for safety. So there is security now. – *Female displaced teacher now teaching at an NFS in Kushari.*

Those from the rural places don't have the opportunity to send their children to school and they are afraid Boko Haram attacks will happen again, though the attacks have greatly reduced and even the insurgents that hid have been fished out so there is security now. – *Male displaced teacher in Kushari.*

114. **Nonetheless, there is a persistent fear of 'outsiders' coming into a new community that has sown mistrust.** This was further reinforced by their recent history,²⁴ given that Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, was regarded as an outsider from another state who set up a 'different school of thought' and lived among them in Maiduguri. This was further reinforced with the arrival of the military in the region who dealt with the insurgency with a heavy hand, which directly affected many local people.

115. **There is a sense of uncertainty and fear with the arrival of the IDPs, not knowing who they are, and what their affiliation is/was, especially if they support(ed) Boko Haram.** The 'fear of outsiders' is also evident in schools and even with children, particularly given the recent use of children as suicide bombers:

It affected all the schools very much because of mutual mistrust – no-one trusts anyone anymore. When they go [to school] they are all nervous. Before the students intermingled a lot and were engaged in so many extracurricular activities like quiz competitions, etc. But now all those are no more. Perhaps soon those will be restarted since normalcy is returning. – *Female displaced community member in Kushari.*

There is an issue of insecurity because we don't know who belongs to which family anymore or which child belongs to which parent. Since the IDPs came in, the population has increased and you cannot differentiate and identify persons. – *Male host community member in Kushari.*

116. Although respondents from both the host community and IDPs reported positive relations between the two communities, there is a danger that this fear may lead to marginalisation of the IDP community and increase tensions in the medium term.

²⁴ Though this may be traced further back during the colonial time as explained above in one of the quotes in relation to how children were being forced to go to 'western schools.'

Discrimination and stigma

117. **In some cases, demand for formal education is limited by the experience of discrimination and stigma.** Similar to the findings of the TEGA report, children from very poor families – especially IDPs – with no change of clothes experience bullying and a sense of shame. This experience may also affect parents' interest in sending their child to school or the child's interest in going to school:

In the past, IDPs didn't want to send their children to school; instead, they preferred them to go to farm. But now they want to send their kids to school having seen the urban lifestyle compared to the rural life. Although they have no shelter and other things, they regret not enrolling their children early enough. Unfortunately, they are not financially capable now. And the appearance of the children matters too. Because some wear clothes that ought not to be worn in public, so even when enrolled in school people will not trust them. If the child is dressed in tattered clothes, people will not trust the child when in school and will suspect him to be Boko Haram. The stigmatisation has discouraged them, so now they want to enrol but don't have the opportunity. – *Young male host community member in Kushari.*

118. **Those abducted by Boko Haram – particularly young women and their children – trying to re-integrate in communities are also targets of discrimination and stigma,** although this tended to be commented on more by (I)NGOs than members of the two focus communities. Though some are said to be accepted back by their families or relatives, the general community may not look kindly on the girls and their children, with children of abducted girls reportedly called 'the Boko Haram child'. The same sentiments were echoed in PRAs and KIIs:

In some places there is a problem re-integrating into communities. They have been considered as 'bad seed' or... something like that. They have been stigmatised. But the 47 [abductees who were victims of sexual and gender-based violence] we are working with now, we are so fortunate that most of them are living with relatives and some of them are living with their parents. But you see, since their parents and relatives have accepted them it doesn't mean that the generality of the community have accepted them. So that is why we are engaging also the community. But we have received reports from other communities that we have not been to that some of them have had problems re-integrating. Sometimes even the parents deny or reject their children. – *Representative of INGO working in the education sector in Borno.*

These patterns of marginalisation potentially undermine access to formal education even among those who would wish to attend in other circumstances.

Non-compliance with school policies as a barrier to access

119. **A small number of respondents also complained that strict or bureaucratic school policies and processes limit access to education in some circumstances.** A critique of school policy is also implicit in community members' complaints that they cannot afford the uniforms required to be accepted into government school:²⁵

If your child has no uniform or has not paid the fees, he or she will be sent back even if they go to the school. That is the problem. – *Male displaced community member in Kushari.*

120. **There is some evidence that teachers consciously limit enrolments of new students as a strategy to limit school overcrowding,** whether by only enrolling new students at particular times or imposing proof of residency checks. These barriers are often imposed at the discretion of the head teacher:

²⁵ Despite this, there is also suggestive evidence that school uniforms are valued by community members as they promote discipline and instil a sense of identity. Abolition of school uniforms is not therefore necessarily an appropriate policy response.

At a point in time I have to stop giving out admission because I have almost 6,000 pupils in the school ... because of the high demand due to the enlightenment and the IDPs' children coming *en masse*... There is no way you can stop admission but there is no way you can admit a child and allow to him to go and sit on someone's lap. When the classrooms are not there we have to face reality. – *Senior teacher at government school near Kabar Maila.*

The greatest challenge is increase in demand which entails increased number of enrolments and there is nowhere to accommodate the pupils. People are desperate to enrol their children in schools and there is no vacancy; therefore, this is a great challenge. *Senior teacher at government school in Kabar Maila.*

There are differences because in the schools they check indigene letters. Most of the IDPs are from local governments outside Maiduguri and there is a high rate of enrolment and very few vacancies for even children from the host community, so it is difficult for IDPs' children to access school except in the camps. – *Male host community member in Kabar Maila.*

Absence of nearby schools and distance to school

121. **In some communities the fact that there is no government primary school nearby presents an obvious barrier to accessing formal education.** In many communities, this has been worsened by school attacks and temporary school closures, though schools within Maiduguri may have been repaired multiple times, as was the case for the public primary school in Kabar Maila.

Over 512 primary schools were completely destroyed²⁶... and over 4,000 classrooms destroyed in the whole of Borno. – *Senior male government official at SUBEB in Borno.*

122. **In Kushari, there is no primary school close to the research community.** The nearest primary school is approximately 4km away or a 45–60-minute walk from the community. Although there is a government school structure within the Kushari research community, it is not functional and has been embroiled in a land dispute in court as the school was allegedly built on private property. Respondents in Kushari therefore mentioned transport costs much more frequently than those in Kabar Maila as a financial barrier to accessing education.

123. **The lack of or limited number of government-supported schools has long been a chronic problem and dates to before the insurgency.** With the increasing number of displaced communities and the arrival of NGOs in Borno, some (I)NGOs have started to fill the gap in providing access to NFE through their own schools in areas where there are no government schools or providing education to those who cannot enrol their children in primary school for whatever reason. Children who are unable to enrol in government-sponsored schools enrol in NFS, which are mostly free:

Some communities don't have schools... We are working in five communities and, out of those, three have schools and two don't have schools. – *Representative of INGO working in the education sector in Borno.*

124. **Since there is an unutilised school structure in Kushari, an NGO identified by respondents as the International Rescue Committee (IRC) is said to run a NFS there.** Interviews indicate that 10 volunteer teachers were trained and recruited from the community. The class is said to run for about two to two and a half hours with an estimated 500 children, both from the host community and IDPs. After the NFE class in the morning, the children return in the afternoon for *Islamiyya* class. Data indicate that there are two *Islamiyya* schools that hold classes in the same location in the afternoon, but no other INGOs

²⁶ For contrast, there were 1,334 primary schools in Borno in 2010 (UBEC 2010). This implies that approximately 38% of primary schools in Borno were completely destroyed at some point during the conflict.

operate NFS in Kushari. Lastly, for community members NFE is seen as a foundation that will help their children when they are finally able to afford to send them to school. Interviews with community people indicate that the NFS is likened to a 'bridge school' for formal school by parents sending their children to it. More on the NGO and community response is discussed in Section 3.5 below.

125. **It was further reported that there are two private schools 'around' Kushari, though they are expensive.** Given the economic condition of most of the respondents, both from the host and IDP community, sending their children to a private school is presently unfeasible.

3.3.3 Increased community and parental engagement in facilitating access to education

Improved access to education for those coming from rural areas

126. **For respondents coming from (very) rural communities, or what some respondents refer to as 'the bush', conflict and displacement has brought one positive result.** The present migration trend of IDPs has been from rural areas toward the city of Maiduguri, which has a larger, more organised military presence and is deemed to be relatively safer. Despite the trend noted in the previous section, these IDPs are therefore presented with the opportunity to live in closer proximity to a government school and potentially have access to some form of formal education.

Ensuring safety along the route to school

127. **The majority of the respondents were directly affected and had experienced violence first hand. Respondents still talked about their continuous fears of possible child (and adult) abductions, roadside bombs going off and, more recently, suicide bombings.** The community has taken the initiative, especially on the part of the adolescent children, in looking after the younger ones and walking them to and from school for safe passage. This proved to be the first step in promoting the 'sense of community' that ensures children's safety and protection. Going in big groups was a coping mechanism that adolescents and a handful of adults used in ensuring that children went back to school and that they feel safe. Interviews reveal that parents walking children to and from school to ensure that children have safe passage still occurs today:

...we had to wait to return to our neighbourhood and resettle down... then we heard that school has been reopened... all the children should start attending. But even after hearing that we in Kabar Maila were still panicking because there were soldiers all over the place – so many parents just felt it was safer to keep their children at home. But later the matured grown-up kids around offered to take or accompany the little ones to school and bring them back home to their parents at the end of the school day; the volunteers were largely teenagers and secondary school students... it was just a cooperation and understand among the young people of this area. – *Female host community member in Kabar Maila.*

128. **With the initial need for safety, and in safeguarding what children are learning in school, there is a higher awareness among the community of the importance of parents' involvement in the education of their children.**

Parental support to improve children's school attendance

129. **With the very low literacy level in Borno, many of the parents themselves have never been to a government school and are unaware of 'what happens in school'.** Being aware of how things work in school is important in terms of gaining parents' continued support for sending their children to school, and may be as simple as sharing the class schedule. The example below is a community, youth initiative:

For example, I don't have grown-up kids so they volunteered to look after my little ones ... teenagers in the next house look after my little kids ... parents generally panic when some kids return from school and others haven't returned. The older ones would then explain to us the difference in closing time for different classes [grades]. That was what gave many parents the courage to send their kids to school. Gradually our confidence in the safety [of children] increased and even became assured such that if the children do not go to school we chase them out of the house and insist they must go. Even if they don't return all at once we understand that different classes finish school at different times. We no longer panic. – *Female host community member in Kabar Maila.*


130. **The research was unable to capture systematic and more meaningful ways of involving parents in school by actively participating in the education of their children aside from the collection of school fees.** Most information gathered about PTAs is linked to the collection of school fees and there was no evidence of associations exercising an oversight function over school or teacher activities. Due to recent events, parents are now more vigilant about their children's education and there is a desire for more involvement in it. In one KII with a community leader, a plan to meet with community members to help address the high number of out-of-school orphans in the community was raised.

3.3.4 Summary

131. **This section has shown that despite the high demand for formal primary education in the two communities, access to formal primary school remains low and has reduced significantly as a result of the economic impact of the conflict.** The twin trends of increasing food/rent prices and the reduction in household income mean that many households do not feel they can cover the costs of schooling. These and other dynamics identified through the research in Kushari and Kabar Maila are summarised in Figure 6 below. As before, the darkest shades indicate the dynamics for which the research found the strongest evidence.²⁷
132. **Interestingly, and in contrast to other studies (HRW 2016, NBS and UNICEF 2015), insecurity and fear were no longer considered major obstacles in the two communities under review.** This finding likely reflects the dramatic reduction in armed violence in the two communities since mid-2016 and the introduction of coping strategies specific to the education sector (discussed in more depth in Section 3.5). It is likely that insecurity and fear remain relatively more significant obstacles in more recently liberated areas in other LGAs in Borno where Boko Haram have greater capability to continue sporadic attacks. It is also likely that the indirect (i.e. opportunity) costs of education will be higher in more rural LGAs, where farming is a more common livelihood and child labour is thus more valuable to parents.
133. **Interestingly, an NBS and UNICEF Multisector Assessment carried out in 2015 identified the lack of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) facilities in schools as the most common challenge cited by teachers in Borno and Yobe (NBS and UNICEF 2015).** Although this was not explicitly tied to the issue of access and school attendance, it is perhaps surprising that the lack of WASH facilities did not feature at all as a reason for low demand or low access during our research, even among female respondents.

²⁷ The strength of evidence was assessed on the basis of the frequency of reports, the consistency of reports, the breadth of different types of respondents (e.g. community members, education providers, government officials, CBOs, etc.) reporting the same point, and its occurrence across the two communities.

Figure 6: Short-term drivers of access to formal education in Maiduguri, Borno



3.4 Supply of education

134. **The focus of this research is on OOSC and the reasons why parents do not send their children to school.** However, the study also identified a number of issues relating to the supply of education that provide important context for the study and that should be considered as part of any attempt to increase school attendance.
135. **By ‘supply’ of education, we refer to the delivery of teaching and facilitation of learning within schools and supporting the education infrastructure.** This includes in-school activities such as the number and quality of classrooms, teacher attendance, provision of appropriate teaching and learning materials, and other factors that influence the learning environment (including psychosocial support (PSS), social and emotional learning (SEL) and school security). It also includes some activities that take place outside of school, such as teacher training, monitoring and oversight of teachers, and curriculum design.

3.4.1 Community perceptions of short-term trends in the quality of education

Lack of school classrooms and overcrowding

136. **Like many other parts of northern Nigeria, teachers complained that primary schools were overcrowded and this was confirmed by researchers in Kabar Maila with ocular observation.** However, the destruction resulting from school attacks by Boko Haram has exacerbated the problem in Borno. In Kabar Maila, repeated attacks on the only public primary school had dealt damage to school infrastructure that had been repaired by the SUBEB, but two classroom blocks (four classrooms) remained unused and were filled with debris with the external walls severely damaged. Head teachers complained that the enrolment drives that had led to increased school attendance had exacerbated this problem, as discussed below.

Insufficient number of teachers and growing class sizes

137. **Teachers were purposely targeted during the insurgency, with many teachers fleeing for their lives and displaced.** A representative from the Nigeria Union of Teachers stated in 2014 that teachers from the region were ‘psychologically and spiritually down’ (Watchlist 2014). The deaths and displacement of many teachers have left a void in the battered education sector:

About 530 teachers... this is the [number] we were able to get a hold of... maybe it could be thousands... we are yet to see the communities up to now. Over 530 teachers have been killed by Boko Haram, this is the one we know; the one we don’t know [is those] abducted, conscripted are also there... This has ghastly brought about a great set back to the educational system where teachers were traumatised even in the cities before the Boko Haram went back to the villages. – *Senior government official at SUBEB in Borno.*

138. **During an informal discussion with a school director in Kabar Maila, one of the challenges mentioned, aside from the infrastructure, was the need for more teachers with the increasing number of students per class and the reports of increase in demand for education.** Teachers have adopted several coping strategies to manage this influx. In one case, the high number of students in a comparatively small school with few teachers led the head teacher to put prospective students on a waiting list for enrolment. In other cases, certain subjects had been dropped from the curriculum to ease the workload on teachers or head teachers referred prospective parents to other schools further away that they believed to have greater capacity to enrol new students:

... when I came I tried to mobilise the community on the value and the importance of education, that is why the enrolment has increased to almost 4,000 pupils in this school compared to when I came into this school. The enrolment is 3,824 pupils on ground ... We are really under-staffed and therefore we need more. You can see the situation now in this school – we have over 150–170 pupils per class. ... There is no way you can control them, mark their work and so on within 30 minutes or so. That is why instead of having the whole eight subjects per day, we only offer four or five subjects. – *Senior teacher at government school near Kushari.*

The day schools which are operating cannot accommodate the number of students and so on. Therefore, this affects the level of improvement and the quality of education. – *Senior teacher at government school near Kabar Maila.*

To address this challenge is to try to accommodate them into other nearby schools and then also try to look for a way forward due to lots of complaints from parents as to why they have to take their children to schools outside their community. – *Senior teacher at government school in Kabar Maila.*

139. Field interviews reveal that there are teachers who are part of the IDP communities who still have not been posted to a ‘new school.’ In some cases, however, these people had been absorbed into NFS:

I used to be a primary school teacher in Bama before we were displaced. But I don’t have any job now apart from this school where we play with the children. – *Female displaced teacher working at NFS in Kushari.*

In December 2015, President Buhari announced the plan to hire 500,000 new teachers to address the chronic primary school teacher shortage across the country (The Guardian 2015a). In November 2016, the federal government announced the hiring of 150,000 new graduates for teaching, though it was not mentioned if any would be posted in Borno (Vanguard 2016).

Need for qualified teachers

140. Only 42% of primary school teachers in Borno were formally qualified (i.e. possessed a Nigeria Certificate in Education (NCE)) in 2010, compared with 59% of primary school teachers in the north east of the country (UBEC 2010). At all levels – early childhood development, primary and junior secondary school (JSS) – among all north-eastern states, Borno State has the lowest number of teachers registered with the Teachers Registration Council of Nigeria at 11%, with Gombe State having the highest at 55% (UBEC 2010). The issue of unqualified teachers predates the insurgency but the conflict has further aggravated and highlighted matters.

141. Education is only as good as its teachers. With almost 60% of primary school teachers without formal teaching qualifications, parents are concerned about the quality of education their children receive and whether their investment, in spite of many challenges, will lead to students’ attaining basic literacy and numeracy skills by 6th grade and thus open job opportunities for the future. Even the government recognises the need for teachers who are NCE holders.

142. The need for a better monitoring system and constructive feedback on teacher performance from the school director and school inspector was further emphasised in improving the quality of teaching of all teachers:

As for the quality of education, it is still very low because, by the time you measure the standard, maybe 60,000 sat for their WAEC and NECO [National Examination Council] examination²⁸ and only 20% or 30% of them passed. You know there is a problem. – *Male government official at SMWASW.*

The willingness [of parents] is affected. When we remember the past up till now some parents have it in their mind. See what happen, we train this, we train this, no job, see the ones that finish school – some went to university and finished, no work. So they are not willing to push their children to school. – *Female displaced community leader in Kushari.*

143. **With the attacks against education in Borno, it will remain difficult to attract and recruit qualified teachers for the state due to the fear of being posted in a highly conflict-affected area where they are at risk.** Greater professionalisation of the teaching workforce through training and accountability may address community concerns that public school teachers are underqualified, however, which currently undermines the demand for formal education.

Teacher attendance, salary payments and motivation

144. **Despite (and perhaps in part underlying) the shortages, community members complained that the existing supply of teachers is not managed effectively.** The most common criticism was that delayed or partial salary payments forced teachers to seek employment elsewhere and that this undermines school attendance. This in turn undermines the demand for education, as parents raise doubts about how much their children really learn. At the peak intensity of the conflict, teacher salaries were delayed by three months or stopped completely, although this is a problem recognised by some senior government officials and improvements to salary disbursement have apparently been made since then:

Most of the teachers are not motivated due to low pay. Their salary is not sufficient to support them through the month so they have to work elsewhere, which affects their school attendance. Because of the low pay they don't consider a teaching job as a proper job since they have to supplement it. – *Male government official at SMWASW.*

The problem with teachers now and why they don't teach is because their payment is very poor. A teacher is paid only NGN 8,000,²⁹ which is not enough to take care of their family or take him through a week. Why will he waste his time with hunger? He would rather go and search for alternatives. – *Male host community member in Kabar Maila.*

145. **Indeed, salary payments in public schools are regarded as low by the teachers, community members and government officials we interviewed during the research.** Addressing these incentives will be vital in helping attract and retain qualified, quality teachers to ensure demand for formal education is sustained.
146. **However, contrary to this dynamic, a small number of respondents noted that the growing importance that communities are attaching to education in the wake of the insurgency had given teachers a new sense of purpose.** This has allegedly meant 'many teachers are now taking their roles seriously' and were seen in classrooms teaching more:

The situation has now changed. Unlike before when you visited the primary school, you would see the women teachers sewing the caps, knitting and selling of groundnuts, but recently if you go to the same schools you will see all the teachers in the classroom most of the time. – *Male host community leader in Kabar Maila.*

²⁸ WAEC and NECO are two different tests to obtain a secondary school diploma to be accepted into a Nigerian university.

²⁹ This is 40% of the minimum wage, suggesting that part of their salary is not disbursed by the Ministry of Education.

Psychosocial impact of conflict and support to education providers

147. **The need for PSS and training for teachers is critical given the intensely violent nature of the conflict that many teachers and students directly witnessed.** Many teachers and community members interviewed noted the negative impact that fear and psychological trauma had on teachers' and students' ability to focus on teaching and learning respectively:

Normally after school hours teachers go home to revise and plan their lessons but, without security or peace of mind, how will they think of the topic to teach the next day? So they just enter the class and tell stories and that is how the school ends ... They just jest with the pupils. The reason why the teachers still go to school is just to show their presence – it is not to teach. – *Male host community member in Kushari.*³⁰

There is a realisation from the government that this [i.e. PSS] is what is needed ... Teachers who are traumatised themselves cannot teach. They even lack skills on how to support a traumatised child. ... A teacher will not teach, a learner will not learn. – *Senior representative of major international organisation in education sector.*

148. **Based on KIIs, the term PSS is loosely defined and has perhaps become a kind of jargon meaning different things to different stakeholders.** The meaning and the depth of PSS training and support provided and/or received by individuals varies and needs to be further clarified. In some contexts it was used to refer to direct counselling, in others training to provide counselling, and in others still the term was used to refer to activities aimed at 'distracting' victims from trauma.

149. **Although there were reports that some teachers were trained in psychological support, none of the teachers interviewed had received PSS training themselves.** Teachers in Kabar Maila handling students who experienced (extreme) trauma and exhibited this through socially, emotionally or behaviourally disruptive ways during class hours were unsure of how to handle the situation. A specific example given by one teacher during an informal conversation was a child suddenly crying uncontrollably in the classroom. The child was then sent by the teacher to the school director's office where 'he talked to the child and had the child sit in the office until the child stopped crying.' Many teachers and community members we spoke to recommended that the 'old' style of school discipline was no longer appropriate given the trauma children had faced, and 'softer' style of classroom management and school discipline was required in the wake of conflict:

The teachers had a horrific experience. Most of them were considered 'soft' targets and they have been killed several times. We know of cases of teachers in Sanda Kyarimi, Lamisula and others where the teachers and students were killed right on the school premises, while others experienced bomb blast on their way to school. – *Male host community member in Kabar Maila.*

150. **As discussed in the debriefing with researchers, field reports, the PRAs and informal discussion between researchers and children in Kushari showed children's 'hatred of the Boko Haram.'** A number of children apparently said that when they grew up they wanted to join the military to 'kill all members of the Boko Haram'. Such hatred and anger is a manifestation of post-traumatic stress disorder and psychosocial training and support will be important in the recovery of those involved; however, equally important is the need to have a curriculum or programmes that promote peace, understanding and respect for others. These issues are reflected on in the recommendations below.

³⁰ Lack of teaching due to low teacher presence in classrooms are common problems elsewhere in Nigeria (De et al. 2016), suggesting that some scepticism is warranted in attributing poor quality or lack of teaching to insecurity or psychosocial trauma.

Improved school security

151. **The improvement in security in primary schools in Maiduguri is said to have contributed to the increase in the demand for and access to education, and this was evident in the primary school in Kabar Maila.** The government's support in protecting schools and improving the sense of school safety with the presence of the local Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in schools was well received in the research primary school in Kabar Maila:

Dr Shettima [the Governor of Borno] has really supported all the primary schools by providing the security men... he has been deploying CJTF to take care of the primary schools. Some of them are sleeping in the schools. So right now most of our primary schools are very much safe before the government commences employment of security guards... as of now he has done all temporary measures and he has provided security gadgets that would detect any metallic object or any bomb or whatever thing that is explosive on anybody. So he has provided all the metal detectors and some of the security gadgets in most of the primary schools in the safe areas...as well as perimeter (school) fences. – *Senior male government official at SUBEB in Borno.*

...all schools now have the CJTFs that do checks at the school gates before you gain access to the school environment... – *Female host community member in Kabar Maila.*

3.4.2 Summary

152. **The nature and quality of the supply of education matters for understanding and tackling the issue of OOSC.** First, there was suggestive evidence that parents in the two communities decided how many children to send to which schools on the basis of their perceptions of the quality of education provided. Although the emerging social norm that schooling is 'the socially expected thing to do' may constrain the responsiveness of parents' schooling decisions to their personal concerns about quality,³¹ it was still a driver of low demand for formal education in some cases. Second, there is a concern that the recent increase in demand for formal education and rising school enrolment is putting increased strain on the education system and this may have adverse effects on the amount of learning taking place in schools. As well as being undesirable in itself, this may also undermine the sustainability of the increase in demand. Any strategy seeking to reduce the number of OOSC should take account of these dynamics and identify ways of mitigating the negative impact where possible. This section also highlighted the challenge of teaching and learning against a backdrop of conflict and the trauma that this has inflicted on both teachers and learners.

3.5 Responses to challenges facing the education system

153. **This section of the report is divided into three parts focusing on the responses to the challenges presented above by i) government, ii) selected non-governmental actors, and iii) communities themselves.** In each section, the 'reports' are separated from 'reality', which tends to be a messy picture of overlapping and incompletely implemented projects. The 'reports' refer to documents that are publicly available online and were identified and reviewed through a hand (rather than systematic) search. Wherever possible, data collected through KIIs and PRAs was used to triangulate policies and plans in project and media reports, which are referenced separately. However, the fact that a project is not referred to here does not mean the project was not implemented as planned given that only two communities in/near Maiduguri were selected for research. The methodology therefore prevents the drawing of strong conclusions that are transferable to other contexts.

³¹ In the language of economics, this responsiveness might be referred to as the 'quality elasticity of demand'.

3.5.1 Government response: Reports and reality

154. **There has been a proliferation of commitments by the Federal Government of Nigeria and State Government of Borno to transform the education system in the wake of conflict.**

The Safe School Initiative (SSI)

155. **The SSI was jointly launched by former President Goodluck Jonathan and the UN Special Envoy for Global Education, former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, in May 2014.** The programme consists of a government-led Safe Schools Fund and a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) managed by the UN and with funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (US\$ 2 million) and DFID (US\$ 737,389). Other funding came from non-profit organisations (US\$ 12,852), the Nigerian government and the business community (MPTFO no date). The SSI MDTF's funding is for an initial period of three years, lasting until December 2017 (MPTFO 2016).

The SSI includes the following components:

- Transfer of secondary students to safe areas and boarding schools in other states;
- Piloting a 'safe school model' in 10 schools in each of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states; and
- Provision of quality education to conflict-affected children living in IDP camps and host communities.

156. **Previous research has noted that the SSI encountered a number of challenges in implementing its plan.** Pledges were also made by the Nigerian government and business leaders but the programme had difficulty converting these pledges into actual contributions (HRW 2016). These included the shortage of teachers, inadequate teaching materials, a shifting IDP population that hindered accurate data collection and needs assessment, insufficient funding and high turnover in government counterparts (HRW 2016). Despite this, the SSI was able to achieve some results, having reportedly trained and enlisted 320 teachers to teach in IDP camps in Maiduguri (EiEWGN 2015).

157. **However, interviews conducted as part of this study indicate that the current status of the SSI is unclear.** Few respondents referred to the programme and those who did were not sure if it was ongoing, with some suggesting it had been completed and others suggesting it had been subsumed under more recent initiatives such as the Presidential Initiative for the North East (PINE) and Presidential Committee on the North-East Initiative (PCNI).

Presidential Initiative for the North East (PINE)

158. **PINE was launched by President Goodluck Jonathan in 2015** with a short-term emergency assistance and economic stabilisation plan and a five-year strategy for economic reconstruction and redevelopment in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states. 'Educational transformation' was hailed as one of 10 focus areas for the programme.

159. **Table 4 shows planned programmes specific to education under PINE in descending order of value.** The estimated cost for these programmes is NGN 90 billion over five years, of which only NGN 10 billion was appropriated in the federal budget by July 2015. This leaves a funding shortfall of NGN 80 billion (PINE 2015). Although an initiative of the federal government, PINE's budget also includes contributions from state governments, international organisations and donors such as DFID, the Norwegian Government, the African Development Bank, the World Bank and the Islamic Development Bank. The programme also incorporates and continues some of the long-term work of the SSI. There may therefore be some duplication when calculating the total pledges across programmes.

160. **PINE works closely with NEMA in providing for the immediate, short-term needs of IDPs in camps.** Since July 2016, it has provided non-food items and basic needs to IDPs across the north east.

Table 4: Planned education interventions under PINE in 2015

Name	Est. total budget (years)	Notes
Teacher Recruitment and Recertification Programme (TRRP)	NGN 76.9bn (3 years)	Aims to recruit 10,000 teachers across six states in north-east Nigeria; financial aid grants to best students graduating from teacher training; in-service teacher training. No clear focus on primary education.
Mass renovation and reconstruction of schools	NGN 56.6bn (2 years)	Includes rehabilitation and renovation of 295 primary and post-primary schools in Borno.
Primary School Feeding Programme (PSFP)	NGN 47.8bn (5 years)	Intended partnership with UN FAO with monitoring by PTAs. Targets 300,000 primary school students in Borno over 5 years.
SSI's long-term component	NGN 23.5bn (5 years)	Fences, training and provision of armed guards, security planning, community engagement, mobile schools, etc.
Regional Curricular Renewal Project (RCRP)	NGN 21.8bn (2 years)	Including integration of countering violent extremism principles, <i>Tsangaya</i> and <i>Islamiyya</i> schools, and bilingual education.
Higher Institution and Technical School Participation Grant	NGN 21.6bn (4 years)	Sponsorship of 2,000 secondary students from each state into local tertiary institutions.
Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa Special Programme	NGN 6bn (2 years)	Establishment of three model institutions for special needs children (including two primary schools) in each state.
North-East Study Abroad Programme	NGN 2.1bn (3 years)	Scholarships for under- and post-graduate study (including 20 students from Borno).
University Product Development and Commercialisation Partnership	NGN 600m (3 years)	Fosters partnerships between universities and the private sector.
Presidential E-learning Platform	NGN 450m (3 years)	Provision of electronic syllabus and tablets/computers to aid teaching and learning.
Shining Light Programme	NGN 208m (4 years)	Aimed at turning two secondary schools per state into adult education programmes.

Source: PINE (2015)

161. **In October 2015, through PINE, the government launched mobile containerised schools in IDP camps in Maiduguri.** The mobile schools are 50-foot containers acting as a single classroom, which can hold 35 students. The mobile classrooms are complete with tables, chairs, blackboards, projector and metal storage cabinets. They are fully equipped with basic educational materials and furnishing including solar panels for electricity to power lights and fans (Premium Times 2015a).

162. **With the exception of SUBEB-led renovations of classrooms damaged by attacks in Kabar Maila, this research found no evidence of these programmes having been implemented in the two communities, nearly two years after the publication of the PINE strategy.** However, representatives from the SUBEB and SEMA noted that the UBEC and SUBEB were working ‘tirelessly’ to introduce a school feeding programme that would provide children with one meal a day to improve enrolment. The SUBEB representative noted that this was only for *tsangaya* schools, although official documentation does not reflect this. This raises questions about the effectiveness of the school feeding programme in improving access to formal education.

Presidential Initiative for the North East

163. **With the change in government, President Buhari in October 2015 set up the PCNI with the aim of coordinating and harmonising all relief and development initiatives for the north east.** The PCNI is mandated with coordinating the activities of the Victims Support Fund, PINE, SSI and elements of the Buhari Social Safety Net programme, among others (Premium Times 2016b).

164. **There is very limited understanding among education providers, (I)NGOs, CBOs and government officials interviewed about the activities that take place under the SSI, PINE and PCNI.** This is perhaps not surprising given the proliferation of projects funded and implemented by different agencies within these programmes, as well as the incomplete funding pledges and disbursements and different implementation stages.

165. **For example, in September 2016 the Borno State Government awarded NGN 11.6 billion to construct nine ‘mega’ primary schools.** These new institutions are boarding schools aiming to provide access to education to 49,000 orphans, and are equipped with kitchens and sports facilities (Premium Times 2016c). Of the most recent government response to the high number of orphans in IDP camps, in February 2017, the State Government of Borno pledged that it will offer free nursery and primary school places to 23,000 displaced orphans that are take refuge in the IDP camps in Borno (Premium Times 2017a).

166. **These two initiatives are part of the government’s efforts to overhaul the present education system in Borno; however, it is unclear whether these reflect existing commitments under the SSI, PINE, PCNI, are entirely new initiatives and earmarked funds, or represent the reallocation of previous funds.**

State Government of Borno

167. **Of the NGN 183 billion budgeted for the 2017 fiscal year, 60% of the state budget (NGN 33 billion) was allocated to education for the reconstruction of schools destroyed by Boko Haram and the construction of new schools.** The health sector received NGN 19 billion and the State Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (MRRR) received NGN 13 billion and agriculture NGN 7 billion. The state government also allocated NGN 5.4 billion to jump start economic activities in rural areas. Governor Shettima has also announced a state government initiative that will provide a quarterly distribution of rice and other food staples free across 27 LGAs, which has been nicknamed ‘stomach infrastructure’ (Pressreader 2016).

168. **At the time of the field research, the recent announcement of the budget allocation was well received** but there was some doubt about whether all these funds would be disbursed. It was too early to see any result of this effort at the time of writing.

Borno State Universal Basic Education Board

169. **The Borno State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB) is responsible for basic education in Borno, which covers pre-primary school, primary school and JSS.** SUBEB works with the SMWASW, State Agency for Mass Education and sometimes with the Ministry of Water and Rural Supply to expand access to quality education and improve school facilities. The priorities of SUBEB in light of the insurgency is to re-open all schools, rebuild or renovate damaged schools, provide a safe zone for learning, supply school materials, and train teachers. Safe learning zones include perimeter fencing for schools as well as the posting of local vigilante groups (CJTF) in schools.
170. **As part of the effort to increase school attendance in the wake of armed conflict, SUBEB spearhead the Back to School campaign with the support of UNICEF and the other relevant ministries.** The enrolment campaign run by UNICEF and SUBEB between November 2016 and the end of February 2017 resulted in a total of 405,722 children being newly enrolled in schools, marking a huge increase in school attendance (UNICEF 2017). SUBEB works in collaboration with various education partners but has a particularly close working relationship with UNICEF, who also lead the EiEWGN. It has reconstructed, rebuilt and built schools in light of its campaign to get children back to school in relatively safe areas. The funding for this initially came from the SSI and was later repackaged under PINE and PCNI.
171. **SUBEB has also reportedly supported five integrated *tsangaya* schools with instructional materials, cooking utensils, slates, generators and VIP toilets.** It was also revealed by the respondent that qualified teachers are teaching in *tsangaya* schools and that model integrated *tsangaya* classrooms have been constructed. KII records show that SUBEB provided over NGN 5 million to five *Islamiyya* schools for classrooms and the necessary facilities. Although some government officials noted that the SUBEB had attempted to integrate the *tsangaya* system with public schools in KIIs, this was not verified in the communities in which the research took place. This may be due to the fact that the selected research communities were not part of the pilot sites or due to the limited field time we had to explore the issue through further snowballing.
172. **Some interviewees noted that the role of LGEAs will increase as the IDPs move back to their places of origin.** Whereas education coverage had contracted at the peak of the crisis and many of the more remote LGEAs were effectively abandoned, new schools are now being erected in newly liberated areas.

State Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Welfare

173. **The Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Welfare (SMWASW) worked with the federal government in school enrolment drives and conducted the mapping in all camps for the enrolment of children into nearby schools.** With the change in government in 2015, however, the planned programme did not proceed as planned. This was followed up by the present government's Back to School Programme in 2016, which has been spearheaded by SUBEB with the support of the SMWASW with emphasis on the importance and benefits of girls' education.

National Emergency Management Agency

174. **The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) works mainly in IDP camps by coordinating camp and partner activities.** NEMA's partners include NGOs, UNICEF, businesses and philanthropists providing assistance in the form of financial support, non-food essentials and programmes. For example, one respondent noted that a lunchtime school feeding programme funded by UNICEF and co-managed with NEMA led to an increase in school attendance in the IDP camps. NEMA is also supplying food in various IDP camps with its own resources.

State Emergency Management Agency

175. **The main role of the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) is to respond to state emergencies.** SEMA manages IDP camps, monitors the movement of IDP communities and collects data on host communities. It has also assisted in collecting the biometric data of IDPs in camps. SEMA worked with NGOs, UN agencies and other government ministries in moving IDPs out of schools they had previously occupied, which paved the way for school renovations and re-opening of schools.
176. **NEMA and SEMA's roles were not widely recognised by respondents in the two research communities.** This is perhaps not surprising given that NEMA and SEMA's programmes focus more on IDP camps (which were not visited as part of the research). Among all the KIIs, only one community leader from Kabar Maila mentioned receiving training from SEMA.

MRRR

177. **The Borno State Government created the new MRRR in September 2015 as part of its strategy for transitioning from emergency response to early recovery.** Its primary focus has so far been on reconstruction of markets, government buildings (including schools alongside SUBEB's efforts) and housing, although additional support has sought to deliver technical and vocational education and training to vulnerable youths and facilitate the return of IDPs (MRRR 2015). The activities of MRRR were not mentioned by interviewees.

LGEA and school-level responses

178. **Interviews with education providers and school directors also point to innovative ways of addressing pressing problems.** A senior teacher from a school nearby to Kushari³² stated that, due to the high demand for education in his school catchment, to accommodate more children, especially IDPs they also held classes under the trees due to the lack of classrooms. The LGEA addressed the infrastructure problem by converting an *Islamiyya* school located 'across the road' into a primary school, presently named Sunkufari Primary School.
179. **As discussed above, head teachers in the two communities also exercise discretion in enrolling prospective students who cannot afford to pay** the (usually obligatory) PTA fees and in some cases have liaised with community leaders or local philanthropists to provide disadvantaged children with uniforms and school materials. However, the coverage of this support appears narrow and at the same time head teachers complained about being overwhelmed with students as a result of the enrolment drives run by the SUBEB.

3.5.2 Selected key players in the education sector: Reports and reality

UNICEF

180. **UNICEF and Save the Children are the lead agencies of the Global Education Cluster**, which is an open forum for coordination and collaboration on education in humanitarian crises, along with the Nigeria and Borno specific EiEWGs. UNICEF was one of the first organisations to respond to the emergency in Borno, has since worked closely with the government and is said to be one of the first and only organisations that have responded in assisting in newly liberated areas. Although members of the EiEWGN are listed on the webpage and in documents, interviews with UNICEF Borno shows that there is limited information or coordination occurring in the response in emergency education on the ground. Interviews with UNICEF staff (together with a handful of government respondents) echoed a shared

³² Another primary school mentioned during the PRA where children from the research community went because the closer primary school 'was very overcrowded.' This school is farther away from their community.

perception that UNICEF is the only organisation working in education in Borno and frustration that other organisations were engaged only superficially (or not at all) with the EiEWGN at the state level.³³

181. **UNICEF's support is by far the largest provided by any international organisation or INGO.** Although much of its support is delivered in and through camps, it also delivers support directly to IDPs living in host communities, public primary schools, and even non-IDP children (UNICEF 2015). This makes UNICEF's mandate in regard to education potentially very broad.
182. **One major element of its support to the education system includes distribution of schooling materials** (including school uniforms, exercise books and school bags). By January 2017, UNICEF had provided educational materials to 180,481 learners in Borno and uniforms to 29,614 girls in the state (OCHA 2017b). UNICEF also provides 'schools in a box' and desks, and had built 95 semi-permanent shelters to provide learning spaces in Borno by January 2017 (OCHA 2017b).
183. **UNICEF was by far the most frequently cited organisation providing support in Kushari and Kabar Maila and was widely praised by respondents.** Although this may in part reflect the greater visibility of UNICEF relative to support from the government and other actors (e.g. the prominence of its logo and branding), the magnitude of UNICEF's involvement did seem to be much greater than that of other organisations.
184. **During the field research, the government primary school that is 4–5 kilometres away but that children from Kushari go to is said to have received a school in a box.** In the primary school in Kabar Maila, a handful of students coming for their *Islamiyya* class were seen to be carrying UNICEF (plastic) school bags. Also in Kabar Maila, one senior teacher mentioned that while 'some teachers were trained in PSS by UNICEF', it would be good if all teachers were trained (including himself) given the prevalence of personal trauma and classroom management problems. Because the focus of the research was in informal IDP settlement areas and UNICEF is actively engaged in IDP camps, research results showed that the presence or support of UNICEF was limited in the two research communities.
185. **As touched on above, teachers have been trained to provide PSS by UNICEF.** One senior government official from the SUBEB noted that UNICEF had trained around 3,000 teachers on how to provide PSS and appropriate pedagogy. The PSS training was praised as highly relevant by both government officials and teachers in Kabar Maila given the trauma experienced in many of the communities where UNICEF is delivering support.
186. **Following the listing in July 2014 of Boko Haram by the Security Council for attacks on schools and hospitals and maiming and killing of children, UNICEF is also leading the establishment of a monitoring and reporting mechanism to document violations of children's rights in the north east** (UNICEF 2015).
187. **One representative from UNICEF interviewed during the research emphasised the importance of having a comprehensive needs assessment in the education sector in Borno,** which was due to start in March 2017. This will be an important starting point in mapping out various activities in the education sector from all partners and its contributions to achieving education for all.

Education Crisis Response (ECR) programme

189. **The ECR is a US\$ 20 million programme funded by USAID launched in 2014 and due to run until 2017, which was expanded by an additional US\$ 4.1 million in 2016** (USAID 2015a, The Nation 2016). The programme is led by Creative Associates in partnership with the IRC and 30 other NGOs/CBOs

³³ UNICEF conducted emergency preparedness training with various federal and state government workers at the onset of the insurgency in 2014.

including the Civil Society Action Coalition on Education for All and the Federation of Muslim Women Association in Nigeria. The ECR's goal is to expand quality education opportunities to IDPs and OOSC aged six to 17 years of age through the creation of non-formal learning centres (HRW 2016). ERC is presently being implemented in 36 communities with 300 non-formal learning centres, and was expected to scale up to an additional 38 communities with a target of 300 more non-formal learning centres in early 2017. It is the largest provider of NFE in Borno and the wider north east.

190. KIs with staff implementing the ECR revealed that the programme is split into two main activities.

The first provides NFE focused on a basic literacy/numeracy curriculum and SEL (essentially a kind of PSS) to children aged six to 13, with most beneficiaries consisting of IDPs (80%) and the remainder from the host community (20%). Classes are held in non-formal learning centres, which may be in an existing government school, mosques, Qur'anic schools and in some cases community leaders' houses. Classroom teachers (known as 'facilitators' given their lack of comprehensive teacher training) are selected from the communities in which they reside and are provided with a crash course in teaching. The training focuses on teaching in a student-friendly, interactive manner through group exercises in an encouraging and positive environment. From the onset of the programme, State Ministry of Education officials have been involved from the planning stage through to the selection of communities. For every learning centre, the ECR also intends to have trained two local government education officials to serve as mentor teachers whose job is to work with the facilitators and provide feedback (Creative Associates 2015). Class times are flexible and agreed upon with the community based on their need. In some communities the classes are held in the afternoon in order to give children time to 'search for a means of survival', which helps address the family's problems in terms of providing for basic needs, such as food. The ECR reportedly works with the Borno Agency for Mass Literacy to transition children into the regular school system. Staff representing the ECR noted that the provision of light snacks in school 'keeps enrolment very very high', though the programme did not have resources to provide full meals.

191. Community members spoke highly of one such ECR learning centre in Kushari, particularly given the lack of public primary school in the community. NFE is a popular option after western or formal education not only because it is free but also because of its flexibility and adaptability to the changing needs of the community. In the absence of a formal school, the NFS established under the ECR in Kushari not only provides access to education for children from both the IDP and host communities but also a safe learning environment that gives traumatised children some form of structure and routine, especially important for those who have been out of school for a while and those who have never been in a classroom. It is also intended to help prepare students for a transition to western or formal schools. However, some respondents made it clear that they did not regard it as providing 'proper' education and noted that the children only went there 'to play'. A small group of education providers interviewed expressed doubts over the value of NFE in addressing the education gaps within the present education sector in Borno:

The school is more of a play and games ground. Children are just gathered ... to forget the sorrows they passed through. – *Male host community leader in Kushari.*

In the first place [the ECR school] was not meant to be a regular school so I cannot point out their weaknesses. Had it been a proper school, I could have spoken about the quality of teaching. We don't teach a lot. You know their intention was not for studies but it was meant for children to play and have fun. – *Female displaced teacher now teaching at an NFS in Kushari.*

192. Although ECR has formal pupil-to-classroom ratios in place to prevent overcrowding, there is still a perception among some respondents that the NFS in Kushari is overcrowded:

You see even the children to the IDPs are too much, not less than 500. Now even this IRC school has been overcrowded. – *Male host community leader in Kushari.*

193. **The second ECR component involves the establishment of youth learning centres and adolescent girls learning centres for boys and girls aged 13–17, which provide vocational training and some catch-up literacy and numeracy training.** There did not appear to be such a centre in either of the two communities visited as part of this research, although gathering information about technical and vocational training was not the primary objective guiding the snowball sampling. At the time of writing it was not clear whether funding would be available to enable continuation of the ECR programme after it is due to end in 2017.

Plan International

194. **Plan International has a programme across five communities in MMC and Jere LGAs, which is delivered through a local NGO.** The Plan programme focuses on the reintegration of abducted girls into communities, the reintegration of children back into government-supported schools and life skills training. Plan works with children aged seven to 17 years old. Life skills or what they call vocation training programmes are for children aged 15–17 and selected parents of the beneficiary children and has as a condition that children attend and remain in school. Abducted girls who are unable to go back to school are encouraged to attend an NFS where they are taught by volunteer government teachers. It is an accelerated learning programme in basic literacy and numeracy combined with a vocational training aspect. Children are also provided PSS and counselling. In terms of the gender split, 70% of the programme participants are female while 30% are male. Plan also help address sexual and gender-based violence and works with community-based child protection committees.

Future Prowess Islamic Foundation School

195. **Future Prowess Islamic Foundation School is a school established with an endowment from Borno-born barrister Zanna Mustapha in 2007 to provide free-of-charge primary education to OVCs in Maiduguri.** The head teacher of the school, which is not based in either Kabar Maila or Kushari, was interviewed during the research. The school presently runs classes from nursery to sixth grade for 540 students with 36 staff, with an additional 2,248 children on the waiting list to enrol. The school teaches both 'western' education (mathematics, English, quantitative and verbal reasoning, agricultural science and health education) and Islamic studies (*tahfiz* [recitation], *hadith* and *fiqh*). Western education is taught from 8:00 to 10:30 followed by Quranic studies from 11:30 to 13:30. According to an interview given to international media, approximately 20% of students are related to members of Boko Haram and would likely suffer stigma outside the welcoming environment that Future Prowess provides (The Guardian 2016).

196. **The school serves breakfast to students and this was noted by the head teacher as one of the reasons why the school was so popular.** Due to the widespread hunger in communities, parents want to enrol their children in a place that serves food and this is made possible through top-up funding from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and SEMA. The school is mostly self-supporting, with the majority of its funds coming from Mustapha and the three fishponds located in the school premises. The Future Prowess (Widows) Association trains parents or caregivers of vulnerable children on training and/or small business and gives them NGN 200 each. The International Islamic Youth foundation committed to providing scholarships for about 300 orphans in 2011, although the insurgency appears to have disrupted the disbursement of these funds.

197. **Some students continue their education upon graduation by joining JSS, suggesting that the quality of education is high enough to be recognised by at least some higher-level schools in Maiduguri.** One mechanism intended to improve the quality of education is the requirement for all staff to enrol their own children in the school as students. Children and their mothers are also entitled to receive free psychotherapy to address their trauma (The Guardian 2016). This impressive achievement has only been made possible with the funding from Mustapha, and plans are in place to open a second site for the school and also expand the provision to secondary school-aged students.

Herwa Community Development Initiative

198. **Herwa Community Development Initiative is a CBO in Borno that works with several INGOs in health and nutrition, peace building and conflict resolution programmes, with the aim of reintegration of abducted women and girls into communities and education.** In the education sector, Herwa assisted female-headed households by enrolling 60 OOSC who dropped out because they lost their fathers in the government-run primary school in Kabar Maila. The CBO provided the children with school uniforms.
199. **Herwa also implemented a programme on ‘Vulnerability Reduction for Out-of-school Youths and *Tsangaya* Students’ for six months in 2014/15.** *Tsangaya* students were provided with food so that, instead of begging in the streets, they could focus on what is being taught either in *tsangaya* or western education. In 2015 in Kabar Maila, Herwa implemented a programme with the International Civil Advocacy Network facilitating the reintegration of widowed women in Kabar Maila whose husbands were killed by insurgents in MMC. The most vulnerable among the women attended skills training programmes on knitting, sowing and cap making. Upon completion of the skills training programme, women were given a small grant to start a business. Male youths were enrolled in a generator repair programme. Women also attended literacy classes and were fed three times a week. Other interventions implemented by Herwa include a ‘Know Your Neighbour’ project encouraging collaboration between the CJTF and volunteers through social media to report and address suspicious behaviour or security concerns.

3.5.3 Community responses

200. **Communities themselves lie at the heart of any effort to transform the education system in the wake of the conflict.** Several examples of ‘self-organisation’ without external funding or impetus have been noted above during the discussions of the drivers of demand, access and supply of education. These include the central role played by community leaders in supporting sensitisation and enrolment campaigns, the changing behaviours of religious leaders, and the allocation of CJTF guards to schools to reduce the extent to which fear undermines attendance. In addition to these, several community groups have organised more formally in the two research communities to improve school attendance and student performance.

Project Give Back

201. **One such community response is Project Give Back. The objective of the project is to impart knowledge directly or indirectly to the less privileged children and to make a difference through school.** The programme has been operating for a year. This is a group of 15 trained teachers and graduates volunteering their time and expertise in IDP camps and some public schools in selected communities, such as the government-run school closest to (but not in) Kushari. Volunteer teachers teach English, social studies, mathematics, civic education, agricultural science and Islamic religious knowledge. Through this project, the Project Give Back team met the Chairman of the Borno SEMA and agreed to register and fund 200 children from the teacher’s village’s IDP camp (the Bakassi camp) and the NYSC camp, all of whom missed taking the WAEC or NECO in their final year due to the conflict.

Individual philanthropists

202. **Another example of a community response is from individuals who have run informal classes voluntarily.** A known person in Kaibar Malia is Mr. Ben. He is an IDP who provides informal adult literacy classes to both IDPs and host community members alike. He helps OOSC by teaching basic literacy and numeracy. Sometimes children come to him for help in school. There has also been reports of youths teaching children ‘how to read and write.’ These informal classes vary greatly; sometimes

they are spontaneous and other times they are planned. Some are conducted in houses while sometimes it is a group of children sitting under lamp posts. There is no set curriculum.

3.5.4 Gaps in support and coordination mechanisms

203. **This section has provided only a brief snapshot of some of the major interventions aimed at tackling the key barriers to primary education in the literature**, whether these were notable in the communities visited, and any other more locally driven interventions implemented at a smaller scale. The research design and scope did not allow for a comprehensive mapping exercise of which organisations are delivering what support in what volumes and in what areas over what timeframe, although such an exercise would undoubtedly be useful. In particular, we had to limit the scope of the enquiry to interventions that sought to influence the education system. In reality, our research has found that the most significant barriers to primary education in the two communities in Maiduguri are grounded in food insecurity and lack of livelihoods, so much of the broader (non-education) humanitarian and development support could in fact be highly relevant to the education sector, although it was not specifically covered by this review.³⁴

204. **A huge amount of political will, financial and human resources will be required to rebuild and transform the primary education system in Borno and reduce the number of OOSC and promote their learning.** The scale of the need is reflected in the size of the funding gaps identified by PINE (80% in 2015) and the UNICEF humanitarian appeal (62% in September 2016) (PINE 2015, UNICEF 2016a).

205. **Even understanding the gaps in support on paper is challenging given the overlapping programmes, unclear funding structures and commitments, and lack of comprehensive needs assessment, as well as the lack of clear forward planning by many organisations who are currently reviewing their strategies.** In practice, understanding the gaps is even more challenging given the shifting need, difficult operating environment for delivering support, and complex dynamics with feedback loops linking demand for, access to and supply of education. Table 5 below attempts to summarise how the programmes and projects mentioned above align with the barriers to demand, access and supply discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.

Table 5: Alignment of major responses to barriers to primary education

	Barrier	Government response	International organisation and INGO actor response	NGO, CBO and other local responses
Low demand	Perception of lack of job prospects for school graduates	-	-	-
	IDP uncertainty about future resettlement plans	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Government-facilitated return 	-	-
	Lack of WASH facilities			
	Pockets of resistance to formal education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Back to School enrolment campaigns by SUBEB (in partnership with UNICEF and SMWASW) 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ongoing mobilisation by

³⁴ Examples of such projects mentioned during the research include an unconditional cash transfer of NGN 17,000–23,000 each month ‘for those that are in great need’ provided by the International Organisation for Migration (Kabar Maila), food assistance and a NGN 17,000 cash transfer provided by the Norwegian Refugee Council (Kabar Maila), Save the Children (Kushari) and IRC (Kushari), and unspecified volumes of support offered by ICRC, World Food Programme, and Action Contre la Faim.

			community leaders	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PINE: RCRP school integration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ECR engagement of community leaders 	
Low access	Direct costs of education (fees, uniform, books, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNICEF (in partnership with SUBEB) provision of school materials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Future Prowess School for OVCs • Discretionary fee waivers by head teachers • Individual philanthropists' donation of uniforms and teaching materials • Volunteers providing free NFE (e.g. through Project Give Back) 	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Borno State Government commitment to build nine 'mega' boarding schools for OVCs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ECR non-formal learning centres 	
	Indirect costs of education (inflated living costs, child labour, poverty)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NEMA (in partnership with UNICEF) school feeding in IDP camps 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Plan International livelihoods support to students' parents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Herwa skills training for widows
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PINE: PSFP 		
	Fear and insecurity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PINE: SSI long-term component 	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CJTF liaison with schools • Herwa 'Know Your Neighbour' project
	Obstructive school policies	-	-	-
Distance to nearest formal school	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PINE: mass renovation and reconstruction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ECR non-formal learning centres 	-	
Poor quality supply	Perceived lack of trained teachers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PINE: TRRP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ECR recruitment and rapid training of NFE 'facilitators' 	-
	Poor teacher attendance	-	-	-
	Lack of school classrooms and overcrowding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PINE: mass renovation and reconstruction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ECR non-formal learning centres 	-
	Psychosocial trauma for teachers and students	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNICEF training of teachers on PSS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Future Prowess PSS

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ECR/IRC provision of PSS • Plan International creation of 'child-friendly spaces' and PSS 	
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Note: Interventions in *italics* are those where no primary evidence was collected that the intervention had been implemented (in the two case study communities or Maiduguri more widely), which are instead drawn from project documents or media reports.

206. The complex and shifting landscape of interventions was reflected in a frustration voiced by most respondents representing government agencies, international organisations and INGOs that there was insufficient coordination between organisations providing (or planning to provide) support to the education sector:

There are a lot of duplications in the work from the NGOs. You see one NGO trying to address adolescent and youth [although] another NGO is addressing it. They should know their roles and submit their plan of action to us ... so that there shouldn't be any duplication. – *Male senior representative of the SUBEB in Borno.*

Really we don't collaborate much with the government. They have a lot of protocols; at the end of the day you find out that the project suffers because you are trying to involve the government ... But we collaborate with traditional rulers through the Shehu and a lot with the Bulamas and the rest of them. – *Female representative of a local NGO working in the education sector in Maiduguri.*

207. Although the relationship between the government and UNICEF was positive, tense relations between government and some INGOs culminated in January 2017 with a declaration from the Governor of Borno that 118 'non-performing' NGOs (out of a total of 126 NGOs) should leave the state (Leadership 2017). Frustration also extended to relations between different government agencies:

Although there is a collaboration between these bodies, it is not enough. It is not enough in the sense that you will find that the Federal Ministry of Education is operating in the state without even the knowledge of the State Ministry of Education. And at times you will discover that some donor agencies in education are working in the state without the Ministry of Education or the SUBEB knowing. – *Male senior representative of the State Ministry of Education in Borno.*

208. In theory, a coordination mechanism has existed for the education sector in Borno for many years, originally as the State Coordination Committee for the SSI but later with expanded membership as the EiEWGN in Borno.³⁵ As noted above, UNICEF and Save the Children are co-leads on the EiEWGN, although in reality the majority of the convening function is carried out by UNICEF. However, not all the organisations or representatives of major education projects participated in the EiEWGN, which does limit its ability to coordinate interventions. An Inter-Sectoral Coordination Group also exists to facilitate coordination on some of the more cross-cutting barriers to education such as WASH and food insecurity, but specific examples of inter-sectoral coordination cited by respondents tended to refer to coordination within organisations (e.g. UNICEF) rather than between organisations focusing on different sectors.

The following chapter discusses the implications of this research for future education programming in Borno State.

³⁵ The EiEWGN also has counterparts in other states in the north east and at the federal level in Abuja, which tends to be more inclusive of donors and funders.

4 Conclusions

The image of the north and northern people nationally and internationally is an image of people that are opposed or resistant to western education. – *Senator Shehu Sani (Premium Times 2015b)*

209. **As noted in Senator Sani’s reflection above, the low enrolment rates seen across the northern regions of Nigeria are often attributed to historical resistance to ‘western’ education** (The Guardian 2015b; Hoechner 2015). Although this is undoubtedly important contextual detail to understand long-term trends, this research has found a radically different picture emerging in the two communities studied here. Instead, rapid increases in demand for formal education are being ultimately frustrated by financial barriers to access and a primary education system weakened by conflict that struggles to absorb this increased demand effectively. This potential shift in demand presents both opportunities and challenges to the policy-makers and implementers that are tasked with improving primary education in Borno.

4.1 Findings

210. **There is a great irony to the findings presented in this report. Whereas Boko Haram has denounced and attacked the education system as a symbol of the encroachment of a ‘western’ state that was seen to have failed to ensure a basic quality of life for many of its citizens, the ensuing conflict has in fact ended up increasing the demand for formal education in a number of ways.**

4.1.1 Summary

211. **Respondents in both communities and in Maiduguri more broadly believed that a lack of education was a root cause of the violent conflict.** A lack of religious and formal education was perceived to have led youth to be easily influenced by Boko Haram and also contributed to the poverty that left them vulnerable to economic incentives to join armed groups. This has generated a determination among community members to increase primary school attendance both to reduce the vulnerability of their own children to recruitment into Boko Haram but also to contribute to broader efforts to prevent future outbreaks of violent conflict. Displacement has also increased the exposure of many IDPs from rural areas to urban life, which has also boosted their demand for formal education. These changes have been reinforced by the changing attitudes and behaviours of religious and traditional leaders, who are now reported to have a more positive attitude toward formal education than previously. These demonstration effects and peer pressures have in turn increased demand (and in some cases school attendance), thus initiating a ‘virtuous cycle’ in demand for formal primary education by publicly signalling its acceptability.

212. **However, this research shows that financial barriers to access have prevented the potential of this increased demand from being fully realised in terms of increased primary school attendance.** Although longstanding patterns of (extreme) poverty no doubt account for some of this, the conflict has further reduced parents’ ability to pay for school fees, uniforms and school materials. First, household real incomes have been negatively affected by the destruction of markets and livelihoods. Subsistence and commercial agriculture have been particularly badly affected due to disrupted access to land, which has led to inflation in food prices and a severe food crisis. The death of income earners – in particular male heads of households – has further reduced household incomes for many of those interviewed or increased the burden on existing household heads as they need to take responsibility for the orphaned children of relatives killed during the conflict. Second, there is evidence that the direct costs of schooling have increased in some instances, possibly due to increasing distance to schools and increased reliance of teachers and schools on school fees as income given the disruption to supplies of

teaching materials and teacher salaries. Interestingly, most respondents no longer considered fear and insecurity as reasons why children were not able to access primary school in the two communities.

213. Despite these financial barriers, nearly all respondents reported that primary school attendance had increased dramatically compared to the pre-crisis period. While a positive development in many respects, this influx of primary school students has put significant strain on the ability of the education system to deliver quality primary education. First, both teachers and community members complained of overcrowding in schools and teachers complained that this presented problems in terms of classroom management and teaching style. In some instances this problem had been worsened by both the destruction of classrooms and enrolment drives that did not take into account schools' capacity to absorb more children. There were also many complaints of a lack of trained teachers and about the quality of the existing teachers posted to schools. A major challenge for the State Ministry of Education will be to find a way to reconcile the urgent demand for new teachers in schools and the need for sufficient subject knowledge and pedagogical training that will improve the quality of teaching. Finally, there is widespread perception of a need to address the psychosocial impact of conflict on many teachers and students, which currently acts as a barrier to effective delivery of education.

4.1.2 Transferability

214. Although the research team believes these findings are likely transferable to other urban or peri-urban situations in north-east Nigeria that have experienced similarly significant improvements in security, the transferability of findings outside these areas may be more limited.

215. First, it is likely that demand for formal education is lower among those in more rural areas and in particular those who stayed behind in areas controlled by Boko Haram. These groups would not have been subject to the increased 'exposure' to urban life and formal education that their displaced counterparts experienced. Furthermore, groups living in fear in these areas may not have had the freedom to engage openly in discussions that have contributed to a shared perception in the two cases examined here that a lack of education is to blame as a root cause of the conflict. Moreover, it is less likely that the 'demonstration effect' dynamic could have played out in more rural communities where influential figures may have themselves fled or have been less inclined to send their own children to school as a result of the insecurity. Finally, those who 'self-selected' to remain in more rural areas may have views that are less opposed to Boko Haram and therefore had higher levels of resistance to begin with compared to those who decided to leave their communities in the face of threats from Boko Haram.

216. Second, regardless of the level of demand, it is highly likely that fear and insecurity are more significant barriers to accessing education outside Maiduguri than inside Maiduguri. Indeed, the fact that this research deliberately focused on communities emerging from violent conflict may explain why the findings of this research are different to reports with samples that include a wider range of LGAs in Borno, which tend to emphasise insecurity as more of a barrier (USAID 2015b, HRW 2016). However, some tentative support is offered for the findings of this research by research carried out by the NBS and UNICEF, which found that only 6% and 18% of household heads interviewed in Borno and Yobe states considered the security situation as a reason for unhappiness with education in their communities, although it was still considered a major concern among teachers (2015).³⁶

217. Third, the findings regarding the challenges of supplying primary education are likely more transferable outside Maiduguri, in part because they drew more heavily on interviews with respondents responsible for delivering education in Borno State as a whole. However, it is likely that schools outside Maiduguri are less likely to have been renovated by the SUBEB due to more limited

³⁶ Note that the sample for the NBS/UNICEF research was too small to derive statistically significant and/or representative results.

access. The lack of trained teachers will also likely persist as a problem for longer than in Maiduguri given the ongoing sense of insecurity and concerns about the sustainability of recent improvements in security, and the difficulty this presents in both attracting trained teachers, sustaining their attendance, and holding them to account effectively.

4.1.3 Implications

218. Amid the devastation wrought by the Boko Haram insurgency in north-east Nigeria, there is a major opportunity to increase primary school attendance. However, doing so will require achieving three intermediate objectives:

1. Sustaining high demand for formal education;
2. Reducing financial barriers to accessing primary education; and
3. Mitigating the negative side-effects of increased primary school attendance on learning outcomes (and school attendance);

219. It is important to recognise that this is a window of opportunity that may begin to close over time.

220. First, it is not clear whether emerging social norms around the acceptability and expectation of formal education will persist (i.e. how 'sticky' they are). This is particularly the case when considering IDPs' attitudes toward formal education if and when they return to their communities of origin in more rural areas. The encounter between IDPs who have returned from 'the city' and communities that have stayed behind to live in territory controlled by Boko Haram will present a critical juncture where values and behaviours clash in ways that may lead to a re-evaluation of beliefs and practices (for better or worse).

221. Second, there are important feedback loops linking the quality of education with demand and ultimately school attendance. In particular, there is evidence that parents choose between public and religious schooling for their children based on the perceived quality of education in the public education system. One study presents quantitative evidence from north-east and north-west Nigeria that the poor quality of secular education acts as a disincentive to secular school attendance (Antoninis 2012). Likewise, the NEDS 2015 found that 'poor school quality' was the primary reason why children dropped out of primary school in Borno (NPC and RTI International 2016). These findings are echoed in concerns about the quality of public primary education from community members interviewed during the current research, and these concerns may provide the basis for later disillusionment and a 're-evaluation' of the benefits of formal education.

222. With this in mind, there must be clear prioritisation between the short- and long-term responses to ensure that momentum in strengthening the education system is not lost in the face of an overwhelming 'laundry list' of interventions.

4.2 Recommendations

223. Most large-scale efforts to increase school attendance have focused on improving access through enrolment drives and the provision of school materials to children. Broader support to the education system has focused on school renovation and construction. This section provides recommendations aimed at dealing with those gaps that address specifically the intermediate objectives outlined in the previous section.

224. Several principles have been considered when designing these recommendations. First, the recommendations provided below are aimed at specifically targeting the most significant barriers to

improving primary school attendance. Possible recommendations addressing more minor concerns, barriers or challenges less directly related to school attendance are not covered in depth here.³⁷ Second, Borno is a patchwork of different contexts at different stages of emergency response (including new instances of displacement), early recovery, and broader development that are likely to change at different speeds. Furthermore, the large number of IDPs that are still due to return to their host communities makes both the size and location of target groups difficult to predict. These two factors mean that a flexible response is crucial in ensuring that support to improving school attendance remains relevant, well targeted and effective. Third, the report recognises the huge burdens already placed on the state in Borno and includes recommendations that are designed to align with existing state implementation capacity to avoid 'premature load bearing'. At the same time, wherever possible, government and communities should be engaged in the design and implementation of support to maximise ownership and increase sustainability. Finally, recommendations should be conflict-sensitive, both in the sense that they 'do no harm' but also that they align with and build on opportunities to contribute toward peacebuilding in the long term.

4.2.1 Sustain the high demand for formal education through information campaigns

225. **In the short term, sustaining the current high demand for formal education will require a continued effort to enrol OOSC.** Various respondents noted that the enrolment campaigns run jointly by UNICEF and SUBEB had been effective in increasing school enrolment and played a large part in accounting for the increased attendance in schools in Maiduguri. Continued support is likely to be necessary in two respects. First, IDPs returning to host communities will be required to re-register with schools and enrolment campaigns may help 'nudge' them to do this by acting as a reminder and making the process more transparent. Second, as primary schools continue to be renovated and newly liberated areas become accessible to outside support, enrolment campaigns will need to target community members that may not have been able to enrol their children previously because of the prior lack of access to school. With school closure for two years or more for others, flexible entry points and support are needed for those that have not been to or have never been enrolled in government-supported schools.
226. **Assuming SUBEB and UNICEF continue to provide support in these respects, there are no major gaps in providing this support.** However, some supplementary information that communicates evidence of the benefits of primary education could be provided in order to overcome some of the scepticism in reports that formal education was worthless because it did not lead to any jobs following graduation. There is limited empirical evidence of the effectiveness of such information campaigns, but this reflects the lack of studies researching this topic rather than evidence of negative results *per se* (Snilstveit *et al.* 2016). Instead, future levels of demand for formal education will likely be determined by whether the perceived performance of primary schools meets parents' expectations. This is discussed further in section 4.2.3 below.

4.2.2 Reduce financial barriers to access through cash transfers or school feeding

227. **There are a number of possible interventions that can help alleviate the financial barriers to accessing primary education.** These include interventions aimed at reducing the direct costs of schooling (such as the free provision of uniforms/school materials or removal of tuition/SBMC fees), those aimed at reducing indirect costs (such as free breakfast or policies discouraging child labour) and those aiming to increase household incomes.

³⁷ These include the need for: a conflict-sensitive curriculum, strengthened monitoring systems,

Cash transfers

228. **The success of cash transfers, either unconditional or conditional, in increasing school attendance has been well documented** (UNICEF 2014, Saavedra and García 2012). A recent systematic review notes that ‘cash transfers have by far the most consistent and robust positive effect on school participation across all intervention areas’ (Snilstveit *et al.* 2016).
229. **The range of design features make the cash transfer a flexible tool that can be tailored to the context of Borno and easily adapted over time.** Cash transfers vary significantly in their targeting, size, timing, delivery mechanisms and conditionalities. The conditionality attached to cash transfers that is most relevant to this study is the requirement that the children of target households attend school. However, conditional cash transfers also carry increased costs arising from the need to monitor and enforce compliance whereas unconditional cash transfers generally have lower overhead costs. In contrast with in-kind support such as food assistance or provision of uniforms/school materials, cash transfers allow households to allocate resources in the way they deem most effective for achieving their individual aims in their circumstances. One other advantage of cash transfers is the ability to scale and adapt relatively rapidly, especially where digital delivery mechanisms are used (e.g. smart cards).
230. **There are several unconditional cash transfers currently being implemented by INGOs in Borno as discussed in Section 3.5.2.** However, coverage seems limited and existing programmes seem to be designed as emergency assistance rather than as social protection or with a view to increasing school attendance in particular. Furthermore, the federal government has plans to introduce a conditional cash transfer of NGN 5,000 as part of President Buhari’s Social Safety Net Initiative. Borno was selected as a pilot state and had reportedly begun delivery of cash by the start of 2017 with support from the World Bank, although we found no evidence of this and there is conflicting information as to whether the community-based targeting has been completed (Premium Times 2017b). Key considerations include:
- Does the additional cost of monitoring and enforcing compliance with conditionalities justify the possibility of increased impact on school attendance?³⁸
 - How can those most in need be targeted most effectively, given the lack of accurate data on populations in many communities?³⁹
 - Should cash transfers be delivered to heads of households, mothers or children themselves?
 - How could a cash transfer programme be implemented in a way that complements existing government plans (for example by targeting OVCs directly or providing top-up funds that are contingent on school attendance)?

School feeding

231. **School feeding programmes may also help address the financial barriers to access in a number of ways.** First, parents of children receiving school meals have greater income to spend on other expenses (including school-related expenses). Second, children are no longer delayed from attending school because they or their parents must hawk for money to pay for breakfast each morning.

³⁸ One fundamental factor in determining this is whether a conditional cash transfer intervention can build on the existing or support the creation of new management information systems (e.g. that capture school attendance data). Note that there is no consistent evidence that conditional cash transfers have a stronger or more significant impact on school attendance or learning outcomes relative to their unconditional counterparts.

³⁹ A community-based targeting process, perhaps organised through SBMCs, might be most effective in reaching and providing up-to-date information on targeting given the mobile populations. There is some evidence that local ownership of the feeding programme increased its effect on education outcomes (Snilstveit *et al.* 2016).

232. A school feeding intervention is particularly attractive in the context of Borno for a number of reasons. First, the prevailing food security problem in Borno means families often have to choose between food and education. A systematic review of the academic literature found that ‘the effect of school feeding was stronger in areas where there was high food insecurity and low participation in schools’ (Snilstveit *et al.* 2016). Borno shares both of these characteristics and so the school feeding is particularly relevant to this context and might be expected to be more effective than elsewhere. Second, there are inter-sectoral benefits from school feeding (for example on nutrition and health), which both enhances the benefits beyond the education outcomes and may make mobilising funds easier given the appeal to a wider range of stakeholders. There is also evidence that this nutritional dividend in turn improves participation in schools and ultimately learning outcomes (Snilstveit *et al.* 2016), meaning it may also help to mitigate some of the negative side-effects that increased attendance may have on learning outcomes. This is particularly the case if the food provided is fortified with micronutrients. Third, the challenge posed by hunger in schools is a widely recognised problem identified by both teachers and community members, which likely increases the prospects of ensuring local ownership (and possibly success) of this type of intervention.

233. Our research did not identify any large-scale school feeding programme currently being implemented in Borno State outside the IDP camps.⁴⁰ However, the federal government has plans to implement such a programme with support from the SUBEB as part of the PINE, Buhari’s Social Safety Net Initiative, or National Homegrown School Feeding programme.⁴¹ One senior government official noted that the World Food Programme was willing to support a school feeding programme if launched. Support to such a programme should either seek to buttress existing government plans or at least coordinate with them to ensure a complementary response (for example by providing support to enhance management information systems, community management mechanisms, determining nutritional content, supply chain management or simply extension of coverage). Key considerations include:

- How can the school feeding programme be harnessed to also deliver positive impacts on nutritional and learning outcomes (e.g. through micronutrient supplementation)?
- As with the cash transfer discussed above, how can those most in need be targeted most effectively, given the lack of accurate data on populations in many communities?
- How could a school feeding programme be implemented in a way that complements existing government plans and builds on existing economies of scale provided by supply chains established by government and INGOs to provide food to IDP camps?

Community engagement

234. Community members in both research communities expressed their desire to be actively involved in the education of their children. This enthusiasm could be harnessed through an increased role for PTAs or SBMCs. There is evidence suggesting that SBMCs have little to no impact on school participation or learning outcomes and researchers have some concerns about whether communities are in a position to fulfil the broad range⁴² of responsibilities often associated with SBMCs given low pre-existing levels of social and human capital. However, SBMCs or PTAs could play a more targeted role in supporting the implementation of the interventions mentioned above.

235. Community-based targeting through SBMCs may be a useful way to ensure an intervention remains relevant in rapidly changing contexts and with mobile populations. If SBMCs’ capacity is strengthened

⁴⁰ A representative from SEMA noted that it currently provides food for a school feeding programme in IDP camps.

⁴¹ These are understood to be the same programme. By January 2017, implementation had only begun in three states (Osun, Kaduna and Anambra) (Premium Times 2017b).

⁴² These include in school governance, transparency, accountability, child protection, revenue mobilisation etc.

sufficiently, additional roles and responsibilities could be taken on relating to school governance or even administration of other elements of project support (such as writing grant applications to a challenge fund). Key considerations include:

- How would SBMC membership be comprised to ensure a wide reach across the community in administering a targeting mechanism and ensuring it is perceived as a neutral institution by the community receiving this support (including IDPs and marginalised groups)?
- Would SBMC members be compensated for their time and how would their performance be monitored?

Other considerations

236. **Where cash transfers and school feeding are not feasible or preferred options, decision-makers may consider locating education interventions designed to increase access or improve the quality of education alongside livelihoods interventions.** Such livelihood interventions often constitute ‘income-generating activities’ (IGAs) that aim to increase household incomes through some combination of skills training, asset transfers (e.g. start-up capital or machinery) and community savings groups to facilitate access to finance. The rationale from an education perspective is that these IGAs will increase parents’ overall disposable income and therefore enable them to spend more money on tuition fees and school materials.

237. **Despite being relatively popular among INGOs in Borno State, there are a number of factors that likely limit the potential of IGAs to have impact in this context.**⁴³ With the possible exception of some more urban communities in Maiduguri, there is therefore a fundamental question regarding whether it is realistic for livelihoods programmes to achieve the common objective of ‘graduating’ beneficiaries out of a position of dependency on external assistance in Borno to one in which they can provide for themselves and exit the programme. Our recommendation is therefore that cash transfers provide a more suitable mechanism for alleviating financial constraints to accessing primary education in this context. However, where IGA-based initiatives are already underway, decision-makers may want to consider locating education interventions alongside them.

4.2.3 Use non-formal education to build the absorptive capacity of the primary education system

238. **One of the main challenges highlighted by this research is the potential for increased primary school attendance to undermine learning outcomes by contributing to classroom overcrowding and further reducing the already low teacher-to-pupil ratio in schools in Maiduguri.** Combined with evidence that parents make schooling choices based on their perceptions of the quality of education, this has the potential to lead to a reversal in school attendance as parents become disillusioned with the quality of

⁴³ First, attention must be paid toward creating and supporting value chains that can sustain IGAs beyond the intervention. In practice, this means understanding where the markets are that will buy produced goods or services (the demand side) and where the markets are that will source inputs at reasonable cost (the supply side). Given the devastating impact of the insurgency on Borno, we have significant doubts about whether both of these enabling conditions exist, particularly in more rural areas outside Maiduguri where individuals’ purchasing power is much lower (or effectively zero if they have no cash) and markets are less likely to have (re)established themselves. Sustained support would need to be made simultaneously at multiple levels: to government to create an enabling environment and institutions; to developing regional markets and linkages; to communities to facilitate their access to markets; and to households to provide them with the financial and human capital to integrate with these markets. Second, proper functioning of community savings groups relies heavily on trust between participants that may be lacking in the context of Maiduguri and Borno, where ‘strangers’ are brought together in the same communities through displacement and there remains ongoing fear even between neighbours. In this context, interventions should consider either targeted ways to build trust or adapting packages of IGA support to provide alternative ways of accessing finance that do not rely on intra-communal trust. Finally, even if parents are able to increase their incomes, there is no guarantee that they will spend additional income on education despite the high demand for primary education identified in this study. This is also a concern for unconditional cash transfers.

education provided. It is therefore important to have both short-term and long-term strategies to increase the absorptive capacity of the education system.

Strengthen non-formal primary schools in the short term

239. Expansion of the number and coverage of NFS may help to reduce the overcrowding seen in public primary schools. Presently, NFS are providing education to children that are unable to access or enrol in government-sponsored schools due to financial or capacity constraints. The research found that NFS in Borno have generally been designed with two objectives in mind: to provide students with basic literacy and numeracy skills, and to provide child-friendly spaces where the trauma experienced by children in conflict can be addressed and they can gradually re-acustom to life in a group institutional setting.

240. However, in reality both teachers and community members expressed scepticism about whether NFS played this role and there was a sense that the latter aim (i.e. to provide PSS) overrides the focus on learning. The quality of the education NFS provide therefore needs to be strengthened in a number of ways:

- Increased time and attention devoted to classes in literacy, numeracy and science to ensure parents' expectations are met and NFS maintain an image as a 'school' rather than 'playground'.⁴⁴
- Though it is recognised that 'facilitators' from NFS are community volunteers, it is recommended that a minimum subject knowledge competency is set across the board for 'facilitators' and a more intensive 'crash course' in teacher training is given. Stipends may help attract more qualified members of the community to teach.
- Training of 'facilitators' in and delivery of accelerated learning courses that would enable children who have missed out on years of education due to conflict or displacement to catch up with their peers in the formal system.

241. Given limited government capacity, INGOs may be in a better position to mobilise resources and expertise to establish and manage NFS in the short term. Delegating management to INGOs should avoid overburdening government with additional short-term implementation demands. Consideration in particular should be given to the future of the NFS managed under the ECR programme after funding is due to come to an end in 2017.

Explore possibilities to provide basic education through existing religious schools

242. One alternative to building absorptive capacity through NFS run by INGOs is to equip religious schools – particularly *Islamiyya* and *tsangaya* – with the knowledge and resources to teach numeracy and literacy alongside their religious education. Islamic education continues to be highly valued by all Muslim parents interviewed in the communities as part of this study, and most primary school-aged children are sent to *Islamiyya* or *tsangaya* school regardless of whether they attend a government school. The 'integration' of these schools has been a popular initiative aimed primarily at increasing access to education elsewhere in Nigeria. For example, the Girls Education Project is piloting a series of interventions in integrated Quranic schools between 2014 and 2017, and the federal government plans

⁴⁴ The research team was asked to consider the value of adding a recommendation relating to teaching 'critical thinking' skills in addition to existing curriculum subjects. However, there is very little evidence relating to the effectiveness of interventions in promoting 'critical thinking' in primary schools in low-income contexts and much of the literature relates to simply defining and measuring critical thinking skills. Moreover, current discussions suggest that teaching critical thinking skills requires both highly skilled teachers and students who are able to read and interpret relatively large volumes of text. It is very unlikely that these pre-conditions exist in either government schools or, especially, NFS. We are therefore reluctant to increase the burden on schools further by recommending that they explicitly consider critical thinking skills in their curricula, lesson plans or pedagogical approaches.

to integrate *Islamiyya* and *tsangaya* schools through the RCRP under PINE. As noted above, some integration has already taken place in Borno.

243. The rationale for such an approach is that harnessing the existing capacity of religious schools will extend access to basic education without increasing the burden on government primary schools, which are already struggling to cope with the influx of children in the wake of violent conflict. In theory, this will limit any unintended negative side-effects of increased burden on the quality of education provided in government schools, while at the same time increasing access to primary education. Integrated schooling may increase access to education particularly for those children whose parents cannot afford the costs incurred by attending two schools (which may be less efficient given the need to travel to two separate schools each day and the payment of multiple sets of school fees and costs) or whose parents continue to resist government schools. However, religious schools are incredibly diverse, with significant variation in school structures, pupil–teacher ratios, facilitators’ qualifications, curricula, school leadership and management, lesson timings and openness to collaboration with government. This makes integration a complex task to undertake since one set of policies will not be appropriate for all *Islamiyya* or *tsangaya*. In particular, studies from elsewhere in northern Nigeria have found that facilitators’ knowledge and skills in key domains associated with effective teaching are very low (Pellens *et al.* 2016; De *et al.* 2016). Furthermore, there is no centralised governance authority that oversees *Islamiyya* and *tsangaya* that could support the implementation of an integration initiative.

244. The recommendation is therefore to experiment with integration of some religious schools in the short term but at a slow enough pace that allows opportunities for learning and applying these lessons before forming a more widespread, resource-intensive policy or approach in the longer term. The government’s existing pilots of integration in Borno could be supported. Key considerations arising from existing research into integration include:

- What criteria should be used to select religious schools for integration? At a minimum, attention should be paid toward existing classroom structures, teaching practices and openness of school leadership and teachers to integration.
- How can the primary curriculum be integrated into religious schools in a way that avoids undermining those elements of religious schooling that appeal to some parents? This tension is a particular risk if ‘outsiders’ are seen to be sponsoring religious education.
- In what ways could flexibility and monitoring be built into the process of integration so that packages of support respond appropriately to the varying existing capacities and needs of religious schools to deliver basic education?

Create and communicate clear transition pathways between NFE and formal education

245. The role of NFS should reduce over time as the capacity of the formal education system to deliver quality education increases. Clear transition pathways will need to be created from the non-formal (including both INGO-run and religious schools) to formal system in a number of respects. First, students graduating from NFS at the primary level should be able to enter the formal secondary school system. Some respondents in the research noted that this has been discussed between a current major provider of NFS in Borno and the SUBEB, although the process for these transitions has not been finalised or publicly communicated. Completion of this process will require harmonisation of the curriculum (or at least government recognition of the NFE curriculum) and the issuing of leaving certificates that are recognised by all head teachers in Borno. These should also give IDPs who have yet to relocate to their communities of origin the confidence to invest in getting NFE for their children with the guarantee that this will be recognised in their home communities.

246. **Second, NFEs run by INGOs are currently recruiting a cadre of ‘facilitators’ that will have developed significant experience of teaching and have received some basic teacher training.** Given the shortage of teachers in both the formal and non-formal education systems, there should be a mechanism for effective teachers who wish to transfer to formal schools to do so. This will require setting a minimum competency criteria that would eventually qualify them to work in the regular education system with additional (perhaps in-service) training and experience.

247. **To counteract the perception that NFS are significantly inferior to formal schools, these transition pathways for both students and children will need to be publicly communicated.**

4.2.4 Additional considerations

248. **There are a number of additional recommendations that do not relate as directly to increasing school attendance.** These are as follows:

- **Teacher recruitment and training:** This is an urgent need that is already at the top of the federal and state government agendas given the death and displacement of many teachers as a result of violent conflict.
- **PSS and training:** This was noted as a significant need by many respondents, although is already being provided by some organisations such as UNICEF. Additional support may be necessary to meet currently unmet demand for this support, especially in communities outside Maiduguri that have been more recently affected by intense violent conflict.
- **Conflict-sensitive curriculum:** Given the violence and conflict that children and education providers faced, a conflict-sensitive curriculum could plausibly contribute toward peacebuilding and conflict prevention (Education Above All 2012). Possible topics included under peacebuilding may include critical thinking, human rights, citizenship education, non-violence, conflict prevention and resolution (Sigsgaard 2012). The revised conflict-sensitive curriculum should be reflected in textbooks, schoolbooks and teacher education courses and in the training of education service providers. UNICEF had developed a plan to support conflict-sensitive curriculum revision in February 2017 but lacked the funds to continue this review at the time of writing.
- **Coordination mechanisms:** There was a frustration that existing coordination mechanisms such as the EiEWGN are not used effectively, despite a clear need for greater coordination both within the sector and between sectors as the security environment becomes more conducive to INGOs operating in Borno.

4.3 Future research

249. This in-depth qualitative research has been necessarily limited to communities in or near Maiduguri given the difficult operating environment outside the state capital. There is a need for additional research that verifies the transferability of these conclusions to more remote areas of Borno, particularly rural communities where there has been greater historical resistance to formal education. Second, there are also a number of different thematic areas that merit further investigation:

- **Performance and adaptability of children transitioning from NFE to formal education:** A series of case studies and learning assessments of children transitioning between the two education systems would provide additional information to support the strengthening of the NFE system and the ability of formal secondary schools to absorb children who have previously been in NFS.

- **Lessons from different types of PSS:** This research identified a wide range of delivery modalities, including direct counselling, environmental change, play groups, integration of SEL into school curricula, training teachers to deliver PSS, and referral mechanisms to the government health system for PSS. Future research should undertake a comparative assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of these in the context of Borno and north-east Nigeria more widely.
- **Teacher training, deployment and management:** Previous studies have shown a massive shortfall in the number, competency and management of teachers in other parts of northern Nigeria, including Katsina (Bennell *et al.* 2015) and north-west Nigeria (Steenbergen and Hill 2016). This and other studies have shown that conflict has further weakened teacher supply and management in Borno and this will need to be improved just to bring education back to pre-crisis levels (let alone make further gains). Future research should seek to quantify the shortfall and identify challenges in the rapid training, deployment and management of primary school teachers in Borno and north-east Nigeria, in particular more rural communities where insecurity is a more significant ongoing concern. Future research should also seek to identify ways of harnessing and sustaining the post-crisis teacher training and management surge capacity to address longer-term deficits in teacher training, deployment and management.
- **Comparison of integrated *Islamiyya/tsangaya* schools and government-supported primary schools:** This research identified strong demand for both religious education and formal education, and previous research has suggested that parents avoid sending their children to formal school due to concerns about the quality of education provided (Antoninis 2012). Future research should compare learning outcomes in the two types of school to verify these findings and assess ways to increase the ability of the integrated schools to provide quality formal education and absorb the increased demand for formal education (in the same way as is suggested above for NFS) in Borno and the north east.
- **More empirical evidence of the linkages between extremism, violent extremism and terrorism (EVET) and the education system in Borno:** Many respondents shared a perception that different patterns of school attendance contributed toward the emergence or prevention of EVET. However, as noted above, this view is not supported by evidence drawn from discussions with former Boko Haram members (Mercy Corps 2016). Future research should seek to account for this divergence in findings. There are at least two other areas where additional research can help inform future policies aimed at countering violent extremism. First, it should examine how different forms of pedagogy and curricula in north-east Nigeria can better influence domains of learning that have been linked to EVET, namely the cognitive (critical thinking skills and knowledge of context), socio-emotional (such as values and empathy), and behavioural (strategies for dealing with people with different points of view) domains (UNESCO 2016). Second, it should focus on how patterns of socio-economic marginalisation that are reported to drive EVET in north-east Nigeria are reproduced through and influenced by the education system, and continue this report's efforts to identify ways of increasing access to education to break these cycles of marginalisation.
- **Disability and conflict:** Although clearly visible in some of the communities, disability did not feature strongly in this research. The equity focus of Sustainable Development Goal 4.5 means that research is needed to assess the extent and nature of impact of conflict on disability and the capability of the government school system to provide disability-sensitive education in Borno and north-east Nigeria more widely.

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Annex A Research ethics

This study strictly followed recognised ethical principles for conducting research in conflict-affected situations and with individuals affected by conflict. This annex outlines the principles summarised in Section 2.5 in more depth.

A.1 Informed consent

Written informed consent was sought from all respondents approached to participate in the research. In both PRAs and KIIs the following was carried out to ensure consent was appropriately informed:

- Explaining the purpose of the research, expected duration and procedures;
- Informing potential participants of their right to decline to participate or withdraw at any point, and consequences of doing so (i.e. no side-effects);
- Highlighting factors that may influence their willingness to participate (e.g. risks, discomfort);
- Informing potential participants of the research benefits;
- Explanation of how data will be captured (i.e. audio recorder), stored and shared (i.e. confidentiality and privacy); and
- Provision of a contact point in the research team for any follow-up questions.

All participants provided informed consent to participate and this was recorded on written forms. Participants were also provided with a written document summarising the above information for their future reference.

A.2 Do no harm

At a minimum research should establish measures to avoid doing harm. This research identified four main ways in which harm could be inflicted on individuals and communities.

1. **Discussion of sensitive topics may trigger psychological trauma.** To counter this, researchers emphasised the risk of discomfort talking about conflict when seeking informed consent. Interviewees were also made aware of a referral pathway to access PSS from the ICRC and MSF in Maiduguri (although no such support was available locally in the communities).
2. **Time invested by research participants may prevent them from pursuing livelihoods and income-earning opportunities.** This was identified as a major risk for the PRA in particular, which lasted three hours. As a result, participants were provided with some light refreshments (water and a snack) and given a small financial reward to compensate them for their time. The proliferation of INGOs in Maiduguri had meant that expectations for participation were much higher than expected. A decision was taken to set the financial reward at the lower end of the range provided by INGOs to avoid further entrenching these high expectations.
3. **Discussion of sensitive topics during PRAs may result in conflict between individuals or groups with different perspectives.** This was considered a particular risk when bringing together IDPs and members of host communities in the same PRA. Researchers were trained in the principles of conflict-sensitive facilitation to identify emerging conflicts and manage them effectively to prevent escalation.

4. **Participation in research may increase vulnerability of respondents and communities through association with the research project.** There is still a fear of outsiders and Boko Haram informants in many communities in Maiduguri. Communities were therefore initially approached through the community leader. A safe, private location for carrying out the PRAs was used to limit public association with researchers. Furthermore, international researchers only visited the communities for a short period of time and at a different time to most of the national researchers from Borno and Adamawa to further limit association.

A.3 Inclusive and participatory research

The research recognised that bringing together a diverse range of stakeholders and groups using a participatory approach was an opportunity not only to collect data for the research but also to address unequal power relations within communities by giving a voice to marginalised groups (such as IDPs, single mothers and religious minorities). By bringing together these diverse stakeholders, the research provided communities with a platform through which to build a shared understanding of problems and discuss potential solutions. The relationships formed through and knowledge generated by this interaction may contribute to building the foundations for communities' subsequent collective action and further engagement with external stakeholders.

A.4 Privacy and confidentiality

Data were collected, stored and managed in accordance with the UK Data Protection Act 1998, which sets a high bar for data management. Confidentiality was also discussed with research participants. An appropriate balance has been sought in writing this report between disclosure of enough information about informants' roles/locations/sex to inform readers' understanding and withholding other personal information to ensure research participants' anonymity.

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